# Cuban Oil AFF – GMP Lab

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### Plan

#### The United States federal government should authorize the licensing of American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s energy resources.

### Solvency

#### The plan is key to US-Cuban energy cooperation---solves overall relations and regional stability. Failure to act allows other international actors to get involved.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) 2010 “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)

Oil exploration is an inherently risky enterprise; there are always trade-offs between negatives and positives relating to energy security, environmental integrity, and geostrategic considerations. The consensus arising from the studies and the analyses in this book is that the creation of mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities between the United States and Cuba is long overdue. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Cuban infrastructure and economic development were direct beneficiaries of commercial relations with the United States. This relationship was instrumental in providing Cuba with access to advanced technologies and the signs of modernity that were unparalleled in Latin America and far beyond.¶ Once again, the United States is presented with an opportunity that might serve as the basis of a new relationship between the United States and Cuba. It holds out the possibility of enhancing the stability and development of a region that is wrestling with questions of how and when it too might benefit from engagement with a global economic development model. The question is whether the United States chooses to be at the center, or to leave Cuba to seek some alternate path toward its goals.¶ Ironically, Cuban officials have invited American oil companies to participate in developing their offshore oil and natural gas reserves. American oil, oil equipment, and service companies possess the capital, technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine these resources in a safe and responsible manner. Yet they remain on the sidelines because of our almost five-decades-old unilateral political and economic embargo. The United States can end this impasse by licensing American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s energy resources. By seizing the initiative on Cuba policy, the United States will be strategically positioned to play an important role in the future of the island, thereby giving Cubans a better chance for a stable, prosperous, and democratic future. The creation of stable and transparent commercial relations in the energy sector will bolster state capacity in Cuba while enhancing U.S. geostrategic interests, and can help Cuba’s future leaders avoid illicit business practices, minimize the influence of narcotrafficking enterprises, and stanch the outflow of illegal immigrants to the United States.¶ If U.S. companies are allowed to contribute to the development of Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves, as well as the development of alternative and renewable energy (solar, wind, and biofuels), it will give the United States the opportunity to engage Cuba’s future leaders to carry out long-overdue economic reforms and development that will perhaps pave the way to a more open and representative society while helping to promote Cuba as a stable partner and leader in the region and beyond.¶ Under no circumstances is this meant to suggest that the United States should come to dominate energy development policy in Cuba. The United States certainly has a role to play, but unlike its past relationship with Cuba, its interaction and cooperation will be predicated on its ability to accept, at a minimum, that Cuba will be the dominant partner in potential commercial ventures, and an equal partner in future diplomatic and interstate relations. Without a doubt Cuban government actors are wary of the possibility of being dominated by the “colossus of the North,” but as Cuba’s energy policymakers face the daunting reality of their nation’s energy future, it is abundantly clear that they possess the willingness and the capacity to assiduously pursue sound policy objectives and initiatives that begin to address the island’s immediate and long-term challenges. In the end, this course of action will have direct and tangible benefits for the people of Cuba, it neighbors, and beyond.

#### Cuba will say yes to US ventures – they prefer US assistance due to technological lead. Plan is a catalyst to the normalization of US-Cuban relations and overall regional stability

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) 2006 “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a ¶ continuing opposition by the United States to anything resembling what can be construed ¶ as “good news” for the Castro regime? Obviously, because up until this point it hasn’t ¶ cost the United States much if anything. The current policy continues to clearly place at ¶ the forefront the sanctity and utility of a comprehensive economic and political embargo ¶ in the hopes that it helps to foment a change in regime and a peaceful transition to a ¶ democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy. As energy ¶ security concerns continue to percolate up to an increasingly important status in the realm ¶ of national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position ¶ against the Cuban regime regardless of its leadership. ¶ The overview of the Cuban energy developments clearly and unambiguously ¶ reveals that the Castro regime has every intention of continuing to promote, design and ¶ implement energy development policies that will benefit Cuba for generations to come. ¶ Cuba is sparing no effort by instituting bottom-up and top-down policy initiatives to meet ¶ this challenge. It has significantly increased its international cooperation in the energy ¶ sector and continues to enhance its efforts to ensure energy security in these most ¶ uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how successful these efforts are, ¶ they will come up short. Two factors may alter this present situation. First, Cuba may ¶ indeed realize a bonanza from the offshore tracts that will allow it to possibly address its ¶ many energy challenges, from increasing oil production and refining capacity, to ¶ improving the nation’s energy infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and ¶ no less significant, is the possibility of normalization of trade relations with the United ¶ States. This is important not only because it will allow direct foreign investment, ¶ technology transfer and information sharing between these neighboring states but it ¶ possibly enhances the energy security of both states, and hence, the region, realized ¶ through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge against ¶ natural disaster and market disruptions. Moreover, all states could derive benefit from the ¶ public information campaigns to promote energy efficiency and conservation presently ¶ being promoted in Cuba in the face of diminishing energy stocks and uncertain global ¶ markets. Ultimately, and only after normalization, the task still falls to the Cuban ¶ government, but the cost will necessarily be spread through a number of sources that are ¶ predominately American because of strategic interests, proximity and affinity. It suffices ¶ to say that the requisite investment and assistance will have a distinct American tinge to ¶ it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S. government agencies, and international 7¶ financial institutions, of which the U.S. is a major contributor, will play important roles in ¶ the funding of the effort to revitalize the Cuban energy sector. Cuban officials are not ¶ averse and perhaps would prefer that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to ¶ the fact that most if not all of the cutting-edge technology in energy, oil and gas comes ¶ from the United States. It is remarkable that the Cuban energy sector is as vibrant as it ¶ presently is, absent the type of infrastructural investment that is available to most ¶ developing states, in large part because of the American economic embargo. ¶ Finally, the cost is significant and it stands to reason that the longer one waits to ¶ address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of modernizing the energy sector. For ¶ this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will be significant and ¶ every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the effort. This should ¶ serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the Cuban government and ¶ perhaps can serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence, trust and cooperation in this ¶ critical issue area across the region.

### China ADV

#### Now is the time to engage Cuba – recent Cuban economic reforms are on the brink, provide unique opportunity for engagement

Ted Piccone (Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy) 3/18/2013 “Time to bet on Cuba”, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/03/18-cuba-piccone

Cuba’s efforts to “update” its socialist system through a series of economic reforms just got more complicated. The death of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, its principal benefactor, could seriously disrupt what is already a precarious process of maintaining top-down political control while liberalizing elements of the economy. Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will step down in five years and the emergence of younger leaders born after the 1959 revolution add further uncertainty to the island’s future.¶ These new circumstances offer President Obama a rare opportunity to turn the page of history from an outdated Cold War approach to Cuba to a new era of constructive engagement. In his second term in office, he should place a big bet by investing political capital in defrosting relations, an approach that will advance U.S. interests in a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba.¶ Under Castro, the Cuban government has undertaken important reforms to modernize and liberalize the economy. Cubans are now permitted to buy and sell property, open their own businesses, hire employees and enter into co-ops, with state-owned enterprises on a more equal footing. The updating of the Soviet-style economic system is a gradual and highly controlled process. But the recent legal emergence of formal, small-scale private businesses (cuentapropistas) that can now compete on a more equal footing with state-owned enterprises opens a window into a profound shift in thinking already under way on the island. The reforms also offer new opportunities for U.S. engagement.¶ Castro’s loosening of the apron strings extends beyond the economy. In January, the Cuban government lifted exit controls for most citizens, which is likely to accelerate the process of reconciliation within the Cuban diaspora. It could also result in a swift uptick of Cubans departing for the United States, demanding a reconsideration of U.S. migration policy to manage the increase. The gradual handoff of power to a next generation of more pragmatic party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process is yet further evidence that the Castro generation is looking forward to securing a viable legacy.¶ The U.S. approach to Cuba has likewise undergone important changes since Obama took office. Since the expansion of travel and remittances in 2009, hundreds of thousands of the 1.8 million Cuban Americans living in the United States have sent more than $2 billion to relatives there, providing important fuel to the burgeoning private sector and empowering citizens to be less dependent on the Cuban state.¶ Much more, however, could be done. In his second term, Obama has a wealth of policy options available to him through executive authority that would reframe U.S. support for the Cuban people and advance U.S. national interests.¶ In his second term, the president can (and should):¶ Appoint a special envoy to open a discrete dialogue with Havana without preconditions to discuss such issues as migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, energy and the environment, and trade and investment. Such talks could result in provisions that strengthen border security, protect Florida from oil spills, break down the walls of communication that prevent our diplomats from traveling outside Havana and help U.S. businesses export more goods, and thereby create jobs.¶ Authorize financial and technical assistance to support burgeoning small businesses and permit trade in goods and services with certified independent entrepreneurs.¶ Expand the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including school and art supplies, water and food preparation systems and telecommunications equipment.¶ Grant general licenses for journalists, researchers, humanitarian organizations and others to facilitate people-to-people exchanges.¶ Remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it does not belong, allowing a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce.¶ This list is not exhaustive; the president can take any number of unilateral steps to improve relations and increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. He can also expect significant pushback from a well-organized and vocal minority of elected officials who are increasingly out of step with their constituencies on this issue. (In the 2012 election, Obama’s share of the Cuban-American vote increased by 10 points in Miami-Dade county.) He can win the argument, however, by demonstrating that these measures are in the spirit of the congressional mandate to encourage a free and prosperous Cuba.¶ The trend toward reform in Cuba is evident and suggests that an inflection point is approaching. Now is the time to employ a new paradigm by opening a long overdue direct dialogue with our next-door neighbor and thereby test the willingness of the Cuban government to engage constructively, including on the case of U.S. citizen Alan Gross. By invoking his executive authority to expand trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people, Obama can continue to help them make the transition from subjects to citizens. The moment has come to rise above historical grievances and extend that outstretched hand he so eloquently promised just four years ago.

#### As Cuba open up market for offshore drilling China will enter the market IF the US does not – plan key to open the US-Cuban oil market

Boston Globe 2/9 (“Cuba’s reforms pave way for new US policy, too”, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/02/09/cuba-reform-create-opportunity-drag-policy-into-century/xER2NTTXGsxdLej0miHwFM/story.html)

Relations between the United States and Cuba have been stuck since the United States imposed a full economic embargo in 1962, and during the election season neither President Obama nor Mitt Romney signaled much desire to change the status quo. Yet while Americans have been looking elsewhere, significant change has come to Cuba. The communist government of the ruling Castro brothers, Fidel and Raul, is in the midst of a slow experiment to promote economic entrepreneurship. Late last year, Cuba instituted reforms to its immigration policies that allow Cubans to travel abroad freely and allow those who have emigrated or fled to return home. These changes, and the beginning of Obama’s second term, create an unusual opportunity to acknowledge Cuba’s gestures and respond in a substantive way. Rather than simply extend policies that, in five decades, have failed to dislodge the Castros, the Obama administration has a chance to drag US policy into the 21st century. The Cuban-American population, which has historically opposed any loosening of US policy, is no longer monolithic. Supporting greater contact with friends, family, and the Cuban economy now animates a younger generation of Florida voters. Because of this trend, Obama — who performed nearly as well with Cuban-American voters as Romney — has more maneuvering room politically. The first step would be to end the silly claim, reinstated by the Obama administration last summer, that Cuba remains a “state sponsor of terrorism.” The administration argued that Cuba harbored members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. It has, but the FARC and Colombia are now in negotiations; those peace talks are supported by the Obama White House in order to end a bloody civil war. By depoliticizing the Cuba portfolio, the United States could then begin to lessen trade restrictions, starting with promoting cultural exchanges; ending the travel ban; and eventually allowing for trade in oil, gas, and other commodities. Over time, billions of dollars in new trade between the two nations will benefit both. This would include boosts to US farm companies while helping Cubans. Direct relations would also further US national security and environmental interests; as Cuba opens up, other countries will sweep in to seek influence, as China has already done. Especially as Cuba increasingly promotes offshore drilling and other maritime exploration, the United States must improve communication with Havana. Currently, even though the United States and Cuba are separated by a narrow channel, the two countries have no bilateral communications to ensure safety standards for their mutual protection from oil spills. Secretary of State John Kerry should make Cuba a focus of his first months in office. Unfortunately, his successor as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is Robert Menendez of New Jersey, a son of Cuban immigrants who has opposed the administration’s efforts to ease relations. Menendez will need to be convinced that he can help Cubans more by resetting American policy. Absent military intervention, there are very few opportunities for a president to dramatically alter relations with a historic foe; Obama has taken such advantage of a disorientingly rapid liberalization by Burma’s military rulers. Raul Castro’s recent decision to lift travel restrictions on Cuban citizens is similarly momentous — and signals that the timing is ripe for a new diplomatic agenda with Cuba.

#### The plan critical for US influence in Latin America and prevents Chinese expansion

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) 2006 “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

In the period since the announcement that it had discovered offshore oil reserves off of ¶ the northwest coast of Cuba, the Castro regime, its energy development plans and its ¶ growing list of international partners have garnered increased interest from American ¶ policy analysts, corporate oil interests and a widening number of U.S. government ¶ officials regarding the scope and direction of the Cuban oil boom, and how this might ¶ alter the standing embargo against the Castro regime.2¶ Specifically, the questions have ¶ centered on the size and potential of the oil reserves and the possibility of American ¶ involvement in both the private and public domain. This special report is an attempt to ¶ clarify the current conditions of Cuban oil and gas development schemes and their impact ¶ on longer term U.S. interests as they pertain to energy security, the diversification of ¶ strategic energy resources especially those related to oil refining, and the role that ¶ cooperation in this arena may be beneficial after the eventual normalization of relations ¶ between these two countries. ¶ At first glance, listed below are the important factors to consider in assessing ¶ these prospects: ¶ 1. Since 1990, Cuba has increased its domestic oil production to a level where it ¶ now accounts for 95 percent of the fuel used to produce electricity for the island. ¶ 2. Cuba is enjoying its Venezuelan bonanza – a “virtually” guaranteed supply of oil ¶ imports amounting to 85,000 barrels of oil daily, mostly in the form of refined ¶ petroleum products; gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. ¶ 3. The discovery of a sizable oil field off the northwest coast of Cuba estimated to ¶ be approximately half of the oilfields of the Alaska National Wildlife Reserve ¶ (ANWR). ¶ 4. The growing interest and investment of oil exploration companies from Canada, ¶ China, Spain, Brazil, India and Norway potentially resulting in hundreds of ¶ millions of dollars in investment and significant transfers of cutting-edge ¶ technology to Cuba. ¶ 5. The attempt by the Cuban government to increase efficiency in the consumption ¶ of electricity and to promote an island-wide comprehensive program of energy ¶ conservation. ¶ 6. To improve the integrity of Cuba’s national electrical grid (la sistema de ¶ electricidad nacional – SEN) by shutting down inefficient plants, improving the ¶ national grid for transmission and delivery, and installing remote micro-electrical ¶ generation facilities to offset the impact of disruptions of service due to hurricanes ¶ and other catastrophes. ¶ Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the ¶ governments of the United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly ¶ in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy 2¶ security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the ¶ energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil – although it really would not ¶ minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis – is seen as possible if only partial ¶ remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing ¶ number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like ¶ Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it may prove to provide ¶ Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and ¶ diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the ¶ Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United ¶ States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it ¶ stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially ¶ lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs. Finally, ¶ and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- ¶ Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint ¶ venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cuba’s oil ¶ industry. ¶ To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy ¶ considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term “Post-Oil” Cuba – a Cuba ¶ that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive ¶ relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward ¶ addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro ¶ regime since the Cuban Revolution.3¶ The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and ¶ what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision ¶ makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4¶ This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its ¶ oil bonanza involves the United States. Previous research in this area has clearly laid out ¶ the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the ¶ demise of Cuba’s favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, ¶ and as a result of the oil discovery and Cuba’s energy arrangement with the government ¶ of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havana’s energy policies. Most ¶ of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation ¶ in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at ¶ areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-term ¶ energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have ¶ addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and ¶ dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into ¶ consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity resides on or near the ¶ Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on America’s refining capacity ¶ following Hurricane Rita¶ made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the ¶ necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The potential of ¶ viewing Cuba as a “staging area” for American oil storage and refining is plausible ¶ because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the ¶ growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region ¶ as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that ¶ Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos 3¶ refinery online, there are still many other possibilities open and available to American ¶ companies, as well as a growing number of foreign firms.6¶ Additionally, Venezuela ¶ remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that ¶ the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the ¶ evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in ¶ the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States ¶ policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: ¶ domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic ¶ positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, ¶ possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education ¶ in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt ¶ to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of ¶ Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios ¶ of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the ¶ foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased ¶ investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a well educated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an ¶ important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st¶ century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of ¶ its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related ¶ national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government ¶ has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the ¶ results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of ¶ improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers ¶ and the like. Ultimately, a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and ¶ Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly ¶ lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs.¶ To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture ¶ projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of ¶ such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to ¶ note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and ¶ consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years ¶ under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the ¶ commercial interests of all parties involved.

#### US influence in the region key to crowd out China

Alan Dowd (Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation) 2012 “Crisis in the America's,” http://www.ascfusa.org/content\_pages/view/crisisinamericas)

Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S. policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.¶ Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America.¶ In Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the country’s oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy.¶ In Colombia, China is planning a massive “dry canal” to link the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China.¶ In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin drilling in Cuba’s swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba.¶ New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. China’s state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazil’s main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazil’s vast offshore oil fields.¶ The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentina’s petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant.¶ There is good and bad to Beijing’s increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But China’s riches come with strings.¶ For instance, in exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one million barrels per day. It’s worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.—or about 11 percent of net oil imports—the results would be devastating for the U.S.¶ That brings us to the security dimension of China’s checkbook diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing had “approached every country in our area of responsibility” and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela.¶ The JFQ study adds that China has “an important and growing presence in the region’s military institutions.” Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, “send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC.” In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell “sophisticated hardware…such as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.” The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms “are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products.”¶ Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges.¶ To be sure, much of this is a function of China’s desire to secure oil markets. But there’s more at work here than China’s thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in China’s neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood.¶ This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the region—a challenge that must be answered.¶ First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth—that China’s rulers do not share America’s values—and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context.¶ Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them “guilty” of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason “to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade,” according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.¶ In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, “There is no true international security without respect for human rights.”¶ Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily.¶ That means no more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.¶ Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Chinese stronghold in Latin America will trigger a nationalistic land grad for Taiwan

Robbie Fergusson (Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch) 2012 “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)

Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy?¶ China’s goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources. Although the People’s Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of China’s main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei internationally. The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside.¶ The historical background¶ Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy.¶ When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the ’China seat’ to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.¶ The economics of international recognition¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that “from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan’s direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean,” [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition.¶ However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008.¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay¶ On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the ‘Taiwan issue’ unilaterally. Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to ‘outbidding’ Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that “the region’s leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other.” [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan‘s economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54]¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶ Political strategies of the PRC¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China “provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan,” [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC “has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan),” [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, China’s experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 “the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,” [58] further isolating the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

#### Taiwan crisis is likely this year---draws in the U.S.

Michael Mazza 1-3, research fellow in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, 1/3/13, “Four Surprises That Could Rock Asia in 2013,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/03/four\_surprises\_that\_could\_rock\_asia\_in\_2012?page=full

Since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, Taipei and Beijing have improved ties and deepened their economic integration: cross-strait trade reached $127.6 billion in 2011, an increase of more than 13 percent from 2010. Some national security experts misinterpret this trend, thinking that growing economic interdependence will overwhelm factors pushing the two sides apart, and that interdependence will provide Beijing with leverage it can use to compel unification. But while Taiwan's businesspeople enjoy closer ties with China, the average Taiwanese voter continues to move toward independence. Over the last 20 years, the portion of citizens of Taiwan identifying as "Taiwanese" has increased from 17.6 percent of those polled in 1992 to a whopping 53.7 percent today; those identifying as "Chinese" has declined over the same period from 25.5 percent to just 3.1 percent today. Support for independence has nearly doubled over the last two decades, from 11.1 percent to 19.6 percent. Support for immediate or eventual unification, meanwhile, has more than halved, from 20 percent in 1992 to 9.8 percent in 2012.¶ Economic integration is apparently failing to halt what Beijing sees as a troubling trend. With a cross-strait trade agreement and a slew of other, easier deals already on the books, Beijing now expects Ma to discuss political issues. But Ma doesn't have the domestic political support to pursue political talks -- in March 2012, two months after his reelection, 45 percent of those polled said the pace of cross-strait exchanges was "just right," but the share of respondents answering "too fast" had increased to 32.6 percent, from 25.7 percent before the election. Any Chinese shift toward a more strident Taiwan policy could portend a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait sooner than many expect, as a lack of progress on these issues may buttress hawks in the new Xi Jinping administration. And America would surely be dragged in: Even low-level coercive measures against Taiwan -- a top 10 U.S. trading partner and security ally -- could throw U.S.-China relations into a tailspin.

#### Taiwan escalates and goes nuclear – defense does not assume miscalculation

William Lowther 3-16, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211>

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.¶ “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

### Economy ADV

#### Cuban oil dependence on Venezuela is unsustainable---Venezuela will cut off supplies

Stephen Keppel 3/16 “What Chávez's Death Means for Cuba, Venezuela and the U.S.” http://abcnews.go.com/ABC\_Univision/chavezs-death-means-cuba-venezuela-us/story?id=18669003)

Upon hearing news of the death of Hugo Chávez, scores of Venezuelans gathered in cautious celebration in Doral, a South Florida community with the highest concentration of Venezuelans outside Venezuela. They are hoping that Chávez's passing will bring about change in their homeland.¶ Others in the region were not as happy.¶ Sure Chávez was politically influential in Latin America, but in many ways his economic influence was even greater — especially with friendly countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia and a score of Caribbean nations that benefited from Venezuela's oil-discount program, PetroCaribe.¶ In the name of "economic solidarity," Chávez was extremely generous with these friends, offering oil at discounted rates and with flexible lending conditions. Nicaragua, for example, was known to pay for Venezuelan oil with shipments of beef, sugar, coffee, milk and even 19,000 pairs of pants.¶ According to figures from the state-owned oil company PDVSA, in 2011 Venezuela sent 243,500 barrels of oil a day (or around 8 percent of its production) to 16 countries across Latin America.¶ Yet the absence of Chávez and the potential drawdown of economic support would have the biggest impact on Cuba. That country receives more than 100,000 barrels of discounted oil per day and billions of dollars each year in exchange for Cuban medical personnel, technology experts, political consultants and other "professionals."¶ That's because Chávez had a special relationship with Cuba and the Castros. His relationships with other presidents were also often very personal. That approach may be difficult to sustain in his absence. Even if Nicolas Maduro, Chávez's chosen replacement, wins the upcoming election, he will be more susceptible to domestic pressure to reduce Venezuela's foreign aid, given all the economic challenges at home.¶ The Cubans have bad memories of the ending of Soviet patronage in the 1990s and are right to be worried about what the death of Chávez may bring.¶ Where will Cuba turn this time if Venezuelan aid dries up? Maybe the United States. That doesn't mean the U.S. government, however. Rather, Cuba would likely turn to the nearly two million Cubans living in this country. They are already sending around $2 billion a year back to the island in remittances. Already, Raul Castro seems to have been preparing to make the Cuban economy a little bit more flexible and open to investment, and the Obama administration has made it easier for Cubans in the U.S. to send money back home.¶ Which brings us to Venezuela's financial situation. The truth is the economic state there has been uncertain and chaotic ever since Chavez got sick, and that is unlikely to change in the short term. There is supposed to be a new election, and it appears that Maduro will win. But he will face a tough economic situation. Plus, he lacks the charisma of Chávez and may not be able to maintain popularity if things get tougher.

#### The plan solves Cuban dependence on Venezuela – key to economic and political reforms that will endure Cuban stability

Pinon 11 – Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute at FIU. Spring 2011, "Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What Could Happen If They Don't)"casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964\_Hemisphere\_Vol.\_20.pdf

If Cuba’s suspected but yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are proven real, it will take between three and five years to develop them fully. Production volumes would have to reach more than 200,000 barrels per day to have the same positive economic impact currently derived from foreign oil subsidies. If this occurs, **significant revenues from oil, natural gas and sugarcane ethanol would integrate Cuba into global and regional markets within the next five years.**¶ International oil companies such as Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil Norsk Hydro and Brazil’s Petrobras are actively exploring Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters. Cuban authorities have invited United States oil companies to participate in developing the island’s offshore oil and natural gas resources, but US law does not allow this.¶ Although US oil, oil equipment and service companies have the capital, technology and operational knowhow to explore, produce and refine Cuba’s potential reserves in a safe and responsible manner, the almost five-decade old unilateral political and economic embargo keeps them on the sidelines.¶ Cuba currently **relies on heavily subsidized oil from Venezuela** for two-thirds of its petroleum needs. This supply **contributes to the Cuban government’s ability to maintain a** politically antagonistic and belligerent position **towards the US**.¶ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made Cuba aware of the political and economic risks and consequences of depending on a single source of imported oil. Only when Cuba **diversifies suppliers and** develops its offshore **hydrocarbon** resources, estimated by the United States Geological Survey at 5.5 million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, will it have the economic independence to consider political and economic reforms. It is in the US interest to develop a new policy toward the island based on constructive engagement to support the emergence of a Cuban state in which Cubans themselves can determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. Cuba is about to embark on an 18-month oil exploration drilling program to validate the presence of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves.¶ US support of such endeavors would be beneficial in the framework of a constructive engagement policy. The Deepwater Horizon drilling semi-submersible incident and the resulting catastrophic oil spill demonstrate the urgency of developing a policy of energy and environmental cooperation between the United States and Cuba. As Cuba develops its deepwater oil and natural gas potential, the possible consequences of a spill call for proactive planning by both countries to minimize or avoid an environmental disaster.¶ To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, any company operating in Cuba would require immediate access to US oil services companies for the nearinstant technology and know-how needed to halt and limit damage to the marine environment. Obviously, the establishment of working relations between the US and Cuba in the area of marine environmental protection would assist enormously in the contingency planning and cooperation necessary for an early and effective response to an oil spill.¶ The United States and Cuba are already parties to a number of multilateral oil pollution agreements, such as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the 1983 Convention for the protection and Development of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention). Both agreements address prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation also offers a precedent for cooperation. The convention is designed to encourage and facilitate international cooperation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to major oil pollution incidents. Signatory nations are tasked with developing and maintaining adequate capabilities to deal with such an emergency. In the case of Cuba and the United States, the capabilities must be transnational, as there is no barrier to the movement of oil from one country’s waters to another’s. The United States, therefore, must develop appropriate regulatory and procedural frameworks for the free movement of equipment, personnel and expertise between the two countries as part of any oil spill response.¶ The 1980 Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Mexico Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides the foundation for a similar protocol with Cuba. This would include the establishment of joint response teams, coordinating roles, rapid incident notification mechanisms, joint operations centers and communication procedures, along with regular exercises and meetings. The United States government, irrespective of the current embargo, has the power to license the sale, lease or loan of emergency relief and reconstruction equipment and the travel of expert personnel to Cuba following an oil spill.¶ Cuba’s long-term energy challenges will be a consequence of its future economic growth and rising standard of living within a market environment. This anticipated growth will depend largely on the development of a competitively priced, readily available and environmentally sound long-term energy plan. Cuban energy policy should embrace energy conservation, modernization of the energy infrastructure, and balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies and renewable energy sources that protect the island’s environment. **The country would benefit from the guidance of a variety of partners, including the United States.**

#### Cuban instability collapse causes Latin American instability, creates terrorist hubs throughout the Caribbean, and causing a refugee crisis

Tim Gorrell (Lieutenant Colonel) 2005 “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

#### Caribbean terrorism leads to attack on the US---they’ll use bioweapons

Anthony T. Bryan (director of the North-South Center’s Caribbean Program) 10-21-2001. CFR, Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation, p.  
http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism\_porous\_borders\_and%20\_homeland\_%20security.html)

Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.

#### Risk of bioterror is high---extinction

Jason Matheny (Jason is a research associate at Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute. He previously worked at the Center for Biosecurity and holds an MBA from Duke University) 2007 “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis Vol. 27, No. 5, http://users.physics.harvard.edu/~wilson/pmpmta/Mahoney\_extinction.pdf

Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism.The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).

#### Bioterror leads to extinction

Anders Sandberg (is a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University; Jason G. Matheny, PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Milan M. Ćirković, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade and assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro) 9/8/2008, “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction>

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We mayface even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

#### Refugee crises divert Coast Guard resources---they gut mission effectiveness

Margaret D. Stock (Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York and Lieutenant Colonel, Military Police Corps, United States Army Reserve) 2001, “National Security and Immigration Policy: Reclaiming Terms, Measuring Success, and Setting Priorities” http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM002826.pdf

7 Fed. Reg. 68924 (Nov. 13, 2002) (“A surge in illegal migration by sea threatens national security by diverting valuable United States Coast Guard and other resources from counter-terrorism ...”); In re D-J-, 23 I & N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003) (“[T]here is a substantial prospect that the release of such aliens .... [would] encourage future surges in illegal migration by sea ... diverting valuable Coast Guard and DOJ resources **from counterterrorism and** homeland security responsibilities.”)

#### Coast Guard capabilities are key to naval power projection

Scott Decker (LT CMNDER USCG) Feb 2001 The coast guard is capable of conducting and leading expeditionary harbor defense/port security and Harbor approach defense operations, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA389731

.. .From the Sea touches on this, identifying sealift as a key enabler for joint operations and identifying the potential for Coast Guard involvement. Protection of our sealift assets is vital to our success as "sea lines of communication carry more than 95 percent of the logistic support for forward-deployed forces.. .Although vessels are vulnerable throughout their voyage, that vulnerability is greatest in the transition area between "blue water" (deep oceans and seas) and "brown water" (coastal regions) and at [the] points of origin and destination."6 This transition area is the Coast Guard's backyard: its units play there everyday**.** As America elected to spend the Cold War peace-dividend at home, the Navy sought to increase efficiencies and maximize the use of declining defense funds by improving the multi-mission capabilities of its high-end combatants. As less capable ships are being decommissioned to save money, the Navy is losing the flexibility it professes is necessary for future success. In essence it is finding itself between the "rocks" of limited defense dollars and the uncharted "shoals" of asymmetric warfare. Fewer combatants, although highly capable, equate to less forward presence and a net loss when conflict ensues. "If you lose a multi-mission platform, the impact on your overall warfighting capability [is more significant] with the remainder of the force."7 Then CNO ADM Jay Johnson correctly identified the situation in late summer 1999 and recommended a way out: "the Navy must consider increasing the size of its fleet to further diminish the threat of an attack along a coast.. .Simply put, numbers do matter."8 While defense spending is likely to rise with the pro-defense Bush administration, it will likely not be enough to support both a significant increase in the number of combatants and the development of a theater missile defense system. The "rocks and shoals" will still exist. Admiral James Loy, the Coast Guard's current Commandant recently observed, "In the [Cold War] era of a 600-ship Navy, 40 or so Coast Guard cutters were a virtual afterthought. But today with regional instability and strife around the world and 116 surface combatants in the Navy, [our 41major] cutters along with several hundred coastal patrol boats take on a new significance."9 This statement demonstrates that Coast Guard resources can help fulfill the low-end role. The CINCs have identified these deficiencies as well and are seeking ways to fill the gaps. A 1992 research study on 21s1 century Coast Guard roles and missions asked them the following: "What specialized service could the CG perform for DOD in the next century, and is there a gap in DOD capabilities that the Coast Guard could fill?" The responses ranged from consolidating the Navy's naval control of the shipping mission into the MDZ [maritime defense zone] command structure to assuming responsibilities for "the low end of the high-low mix of ships." Additional responses addressed providing capabilities for which the Navy does not have sufficient resources, and presence in low threat areas.10 Seven years later, the Joint Interagency Task Force on Roles and Missions of the United States Coast Guard [hereafter referred to as' Interagency Task Force'], established by then-President Clinton to "provide advice and recommendations regarding the appropriate roles and missions for the United States Coast Guard through the year 2020,"11 validated this continuing need for Coast Guard involvement, and concluded, "The National Security Strategy and the conclusions of the Quadrennial Defense Review require forces capable of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars. To effect that strategy, the war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief have incorporated and depend upon Coast Guard assets for their war plans."12 In summation, the CINCs are depending on Coast Guard forces—as key partners in the larger joint USN/USCG harbor defense/port security organization currently in place-to fulfill the vision in Forward...From the Sea that"... U.S. naval forces will assume critical roles in the protection of vital sealift along the strategic lines of approach to the theater of conflict, including the air- and sea-ports of debarkation."13 The Coast Guard is ready to respond: permitting the U.S. to project a "seamless" joint force, filling a critical role in protecting U.S power projection capabilities, and freeing up additional combatants for offensive use.

#### Naval power independently solves great power war

James T. Conway (General, U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard) 2007 “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf

No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.

#### Studies prove the effectiveness of US hegemony

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It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalizationand played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy**,** the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. ¶ As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

#### Perception of decline causes US lashout – triggers hegemonic wars

Goldstein (Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania) 2007 “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 30, Issue 4 & 5 August 2007, pages 639 – 682

Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics of a shift in power between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that peace prevails when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’ an international order that it has shaped. Over time, however, as economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development, other states are empowered. Moreover, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon, and challengers eventually emerge who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs, it may become desperate enough to resort to the ultima ratio of international politics, force, to forestall the increasingly urgent demands of a rising challenger. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press its case with threats to use force. It is the rise and fall of the great powers that creates the circumstances under which major wars, what Gilpin labels ‘hegemonic wars’, break out.13 Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of a rising China. It leads to the expectation that international trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of American economic power, benefiting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scurries to put out the many brushfires that threaten its far-flung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote sufficient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China. While the erosion of the once clear American advantage plays itself out, the US will find it ever more difficult to preserve the order in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance. The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of force – either by a Chinese challenger able to field a stronger military in support of its demands for greater influence over international arrangements in Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would look at Asia through the lens of Gilpin’s theory are China’s expanding share of world trade and wealth (much of it resulting from the gains made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its acquisition of technology in key sectors that have both civilian and military applications (e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with to forestall, and the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order whose contours it will define. the ‘revolution in military affairs’); and an expanding military burden for the US (as it copes with the challenges of its global war on terrorism and especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia.14 Although similar to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising challenger, the power-transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerous phenomenon of ‘crossover’– the point at which a dissatisfied challenger is about to overtake the established leading state.15 In such cases, when the power gap narrows, the dominant state becomes increasingly desperate. Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory is less clear about the dangers while a potential challenger still lags far behind and faces a difficult struggle to catch up. This clarification is important in thinking about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because a broad consensus prevails among analysts that Chinese military capabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US in Asia.16 Their theory, then, points with alarm to trends in China’s growing wealth and power relative to the United States, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger – that time when a dissatisfied China could be in a position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid-1990s that offered extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per capita) sometime in the first few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous challenge to American leadership in Asia.17 The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities (especially in terms of technological sophistication) has so far discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this dimension, but inklings of similar concerns may be reflected in occasionally alarmist reports about purchases of advanced Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may have undermined the American advantage in nuclear and missile technology, and speculation about the potential military purposes of China’s manned space program.18 Moreover, because a dominant state may react to the prospect of a crossover and believe that it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a transition while the task is more manageable, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory also provides grounds for concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.19 pg. 647-650

# Case Extension

## Plan

### Optional Plans

#### The United States federal government should authorize the licensing of American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s offshore oil resources.

#### The United States federal government should authorize companies to provide services for the development of Cuban offshore oil resources.

## Solvency

### Solved regional influence

#### Licensing American companies to develop Cuban offshore resources leads to effective drilling and increased influence in the region

Vicki Huddleston (deputy assistant secretary of defense for Africa at the Department of Defense, visiting fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition from 2007 to 2009) and Carlos Pascual (U.S. ambassador to Mexico, He was vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings from 2006 to 2009) 2009 “Use "Smart Power" to Help Cubans,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/02/24-cuba-huddleston)

Licensing U.S. companies to provide services for the development of Cuban offshore oil and gas would provide benefits to the United States and Cuba. (At this point it should be noted that the Secretary of Treasury has always had and contin - ues to have the authority—as embodied in OFAC regulations—to license any transaction found to be in the U.S. national interest. This power has been used over the past fifteen years by various r epublican and Democratic administrations to license a variety of commercial transactions be - tween the United States and Cuba). The following are some of the reasons we might wish to become engaged in developing Cuba’s offshore oil and gas. First, if U.S. and other reputable companies are involved in Cuba’s offshore oil development it would reduce Cuba’s dependence on Venezuela for two-thirds of its oil imports. Second, it is preferable that U.S. oil companies with high standards of transparency develop these resources rather than, for example, russia’s notoriously corrupt oligarchy. Third, U.S. influence in Cuba is likely to increase if U.S. companies have an economic relationship on the ground. Fourth, U.S. companies have the technology and expertise to develop Cuba’s offshore oil and gas.

### Exempt Oil

#### The Secretary of the Treasury can modify the embargo to allow drilling

Vicki Huddleston (deputy assistant secretary of defense for Africa at the Department of Defense, visiting fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition from 2007 to 2009) and Carlos Pascual (U.S. ambassador to Mexico, He was vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings from 2006 to 2009) 2009 “Use "Smart Power" to Help Cubans,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/02/24-cuba-huddleston)

Executive authority¶ Again and again we hear that the embargo can't be changed because the Helms-Burton law codified it. Nothing could be further from the truth. Whether you agree or disagree with the current commercial embargo, the president can effectively dismantle it by using his executive authority. Helms-Burton codified the embargo regulation, but those regulations provide that ``all transactions are prohibited except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, and licenses.''¶ This means that the president's power remains unfettered. He can instruct the secretary to extend, revise or modify embargo regulations. The proof of this statement is that President Bill Clinton issued new regulations for expanded travel and remittances in order to help individuals and grow civil society.¶ Obama will have to modify Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations to fulfill his campaign promise to increase Cuban-American travel and remittances. If he wants to reproduce the more open conditions in Cuba that led to the ''Cuban Spring'' of 2002 and Oswaldo Payá's Varela Project, he could reinstate people-to-people and educational travel. By a simple rule change, he could also speed the entry of life-saving medicines from Cuba, rather than subjecting them to delays from cumbersome OFAC licensing procedures.¶ Since 1992, U.S. law -- the Cuban Democracy Act -- has sought to expand access to ideas, knowledge and information by licensing telecommunications goods and services. Yet, in practice, regulations are so strictly interpreted that the United States in effect is imposing a communications embargo on Cuba. To lift it, the president can authorize a general license for the donation and sale of radios, televisions and computers. In addition, rather than helping Cuban state security keep Yoani Sánchez and others off the Internet, the Obama administration could make Internet technology readily available so that any barriers to communications would be clearly the fault of the Cuban government, and not ours.¶ Environmental concerns rate high with the Obama administration. So it might open bilateral discussions, exchange information and license the provision of scientific equipment to improve the health of the ocean and success of commercial fisheries.¶ The United States Geological Survey estimates that the North Cuba Basin holds 5.5 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. If the president wishes, he can instruct the secretary of the treasury to license U.S. companies to explore, exploit and transport these resources that we and the region so badly need.¶ Failed policy¶ After a half-century of failed policy, there is enormous support in the Cuban-American community for initiatives that will improve the well being and independence of the Cuban people. What they didn't know -- but know now -- is that there is no reason they can't reach out to the Cuban people and still retain the embargo as symbol of their concern about the Cuban government's failure to live up to international norms of human rights, democracy and transparency.

### Say yes

#### Cuba says yes – empirically true

CDA 11 (Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest”, 2011, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba\_Drilling\_and\_US\_Policy.pdf)

6. Cuba would welcome U.S. investment. At MINCEX, the staff discussed the impact of the embargo on Cuba’s access to capital. Ministry staff said the embargo is harmful to Cuba’s ability to attract foreign investments, capital, and technology. Cuban officials repeatedly emphasized that the country is open to any foreign investor, and that Havana would welcome U.S. investment, subject to the same conditions it places on all foreign investors. According to a senior official in Cuba’s diplomatic corps, when Cuba decided to drill off-shore in the Gulf of Mexico in the mid-1990s, the first letters sent by Cuba’s government to invite foreign concerns to participate went exclusively to U.S. energy companies. They declined interest, due to the embargo, and Cuba looked for partners elsewhere.

#### Cuba wants US oil ventures and exempting oil from the embargo builds overall US-Cuban cooperation – solves relations

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) 2010 “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)

Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States and Cuba. This is plain from the almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008,when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as Cuba’s president. Now, the opportunity to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe. Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities, and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions, Cuban energy authorities have made it clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working closely with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the- art U.S. oil technologies. The **assessment from U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy officials has been overwhelmingly positive**.9 Should the U.S. government and the Obama administration see fit to shift its policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to **establishing much-needed familiarity and confidence across these communities**.¶ The United States and Cuba will have a unique opportunity to employ a highly educated and competent cadre of Cuban engineers and technicians to work in critical areas of the energy sector. This will deploy an underused segment of the Cuban workforce, and allow U.S. oil, construction, and engineering firms to subcontract work to an emerging class of Cuban firms specializing in these areas. **The Cubans have accumulated experience and training from past energy cooperation projects and exchanges in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries in the region**. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these contacts and exchanges have been wildly successful because of the Cubans’ high level of competence and strong work ethic. The Cubans have gained invaluable knowledge and experience through the operation and construction of energy facilities in collaboration with their joint-venture partners on the island.¶ The United States possesses few options when it comes to balancing the various risks to U.S. energy security and satisfying energy demand, because U.S. energy independence is not attainable, the policy tools available to deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate, and the United States needs to articulate a new vision of how best to manage international energy interdependence. In particular, even if the United States were to choose to exploit all of its domestic energy resources, it would remain dependent on oil imports to meet its existing and future demand. The critical need to improve the integrity of the U.S. energy supply requires a much broader, more flexible view on the quest for resources—a view that does not shun a source from a potential strategic partner for purely political reasons. U.S. decisionmakers must look dispassionately at potential energy partners in terms of the role they might play in meeting political, economic, and geostrategic objectives of U.S. energy security. The Obama administration has signaled that it wants to reinvigorate inter-American cooperation and integration; a movement toward energy cooperation and development with Cuba is consistent with, and may be central to, that objective. ¶ The energy-security environment for the United States is at a critical juncture. The productive capacity of two of the United States’ largest oil suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, has declined, and the supporting energy infrastructure in both countries is in need of significant revitalization. The vagaries of the politics in the region, the variability of weather patterns, and the overall dismal state of the global economy create a setting of instability and uncertainty that requires close attention to the national security interests of the United States vis-à-vis energy. Cuba’s energy infrastructure, too, is in need of significant repair and modernization (its many energy projects notwithstanding); the price tag is estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Delaying work on many of these projects increases costs, because deterioration of the infrastructure continues and eventually pushes up the cost of renovation and replacement. It also stands to reason that the lion’s share of the financial burden of upgrading Cuba’s energy infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly. **Changes in U.S. policy to allow investment and assistance in Cuba’s energy sector are a** precondition for international entities to make significant investments, yet this change implies a large American footprint. Trade and investment in the energy sector in Cuba have been severely constrained by the conditions of the embargo placed on the Cuban regime. These constraints also affect foreign firms seeking to do business in Cuba because of the threat of penalties if any of these firms use technology containing more than 10 percent of proscribed U.S. technologies needed for oil and gas exploration and production. American private investment and U.S. government assistance will constitute a large portion of the needed investment capital to undertake this colossal effort. **The longer that work is delayed, the higher the cost to all the investors, which will then potentially cut into the returns from such undertakings**.¶ U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United States to improve its relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium. The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital in the development of upstream, downstream, and logistical resources in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives, diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing regional cooperation and integration modalities. **This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fifty-year-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions** that create commercial and trade openings for energy development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba.¶ This discussion is intended to help distill understanding of U.S. strategic energy policy under a set of shifting political and economic environmental conditions in Cuba and its implications for U.S. foreign policy for the near and long term. Because the policies can be considered works-in-progress, an understanding of possible outcomes is **important to those crafting future policy** and making changes in the policymaking milieu.

## ADV China

### Engage Now

#### Now is the key time for the United States to open up engagement opportunities with Cuba – this is critical for broader Latin America relations

Simon Tisdall (writer for the Guardian) 3/5 2013, "Death of Hugo Chávez brings chance of fresh start for US and Latin America" www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print

Hugo Chávez's departure furnishes Barack Obama with an opportunity to repair US ties with Venezuela, but also with other Latin American states whose relations with Washington were adversely affected by Chávez's politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's viscerally unintelligent reaction.¶ In particular, the change of leadership in Caracas could unlock the deadlock over Cuba, if the White House can summon the requisite political will.¶ Possibly anticipating a transition, Washington quietly engineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy standoff during which ambassadors were withdrawn.¶ Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, telephoned Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chávez's preferred successor, and discussed, among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations.¶ "According to US officials, the Venezuelan vice-president offered to exchange ambassadors on the occasion of the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson, in turn, is said to have proposed a step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations, starting with greater co-operation in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and energy issues," Andres Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald.¶ There is much ground to make up. "Relations between the United States and Venezuela have ranged from difficult to hostile since Chávez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century socialism," wrote a former US ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro.¶ "Chávez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him on the United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States and blamed 'the empire' – his term for the United States – for every ill … In foreign affairs, the government actively supports the Assad regime in Syria, rejects sanctions on Iran and generally opposes the US at every turn."¶ Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete rupture. The US remained Venezuela's most important trading partner throughout Chávez's presidency, buying nearly half its oil exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US.¶ In fact, the US imports more crude oil annually from Mexico and Venezuela than from the entire Persian Gulf. This shared commerce now provides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a fresh start.¶ Whether the opportunity is grasped depends partly on Maduro, a Chávez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties to Raúl Castro in Cuba.¶ Yet it depends even more on Obama, whose first term, after a promising start, ended up perpetuating Washington's historical neglect of Latin America. He now has a chance to do better.¶ The political climate seems propitious. Economic and cultural ties are also strengthening dramatically. Trade between the US and Latin America grew by 82% between 1998 and 2009. In 2011 alone, exports and imports rose by a massive 20% in both directions.¶ "We do three times more business with Latin America than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an Obama official told Julia Sweig of the US Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population; the US is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country (after Mexico).¶ Despite this convergence, high-level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag, Sweig argued.¶ "For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too often driven Washington's Latin America agenda – whether on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the supposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said.¶ Obama could change this dynamic if he tried and one way to do it would be to unpick the Cuban problem, which continues to colour the way Latin Americans view Washington.¶ "Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15 percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, he would find a cautious but willing partner in Raúl Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington to advance his own reform agenda," Sweig said.

### Cuba key Latin America

#### Modifying embargo regulations can promote successful engagement and increase credibility throughout Latin America – Cuba is a model

Pascual and Huddleston 9 (Carlos – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy – the Brookings Institution, and Vicki – Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, April, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413\_cuba.pdf)

U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere. Our nearly 50-year old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island and has left the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a bellwether, indicating the extent to which the United States will act in partnership with the region or unilaterally—and ineffectually. i nevitably, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This paper proposes a new goal for U.S. policy to - ward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the polit - ical and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within; the type of government at the helm of the island’s future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that pro - mote the well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban gov - ernment and Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other govern - ments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). i n so doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own desire to encourage the Cuban govern - ment to adopt international standards of democ - racy, human rights, and transparency. Engagement does not mean approval of the Cu - ban government’s policies, nor should it indicate a wish to control internal developments in Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans. i f the United States is to play a positive role in Cuba’s future, it must not indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue on issues that would advance democracy, justice, and human rights as well as our broader national interests. p erversely, the policy of seeking to iso - late Cuba, rather than achieving its objective, has contributed to undermining the well-being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and l atin America. i t has reinforced the Cuban government’s power over its citizens by in - creasing their dependence on it for every aspect of their livelihood. By slowing the flow of ideas and information, we have unwittingly helped Cuban state security delay Cuba’s political and economic evolution toward a more open and representa - tive government. And, by too tightly embracing Cuba’s brave dissidents, we have provided the Cu - ban authorities with an excuse to denounce their legitimate efforts to build a more open society. The Cuban r evolution of 1959 is a fact of histo - ry that cannot be removed or unlived, but, over time, Cuba will change. As the Cuban people become inexorably linked to the region and the world, they will themselves come to play a larger role in the way they are governed. Mortality and time—not U.S. sanctions—have already begun the process of change. A new generation of Cu - ban leaders will replace the Castro brothers and those who fought in the Sierra Maestra. Although Cuba is already undergoing a process of change, the Bush administration’s decision to cling to out - moded tactics of harsh rhetoric and confrontation alienated leaders across the region. Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the Obama administration because it offers a unique opportunity for the president to transform our rela - tions with the hemisphere. Even a slight shift away from hostility to engagement will permit the United States to work more closely with the region to ef - fectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba. By announcing a policy of critical and constructive engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that he has been listening to the region. He can under - line this commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging in dialogue with the regime, as prom - ised during his campaign. By reciprocally improv - ing our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will en - hance our understanding of the island, its people, and its leaders. However, while these measures will promote understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relation - ship between our countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal dip - lomatic relations over time. i f the president is to advance U.S. interests and principles, he will need a new policy and a long- term strategic vision for U.S. relations with Cuba. i f he is prepared to discard the failed policy of regime change and adopt one of critical and con - structive engagement, he and his administration will lay the foundations for a new approach to - ward Cuba and the l atin America. l ike his pre - decessors, p resident Obama has the authority to substantially modify embargo regulations in order to advance a policy of engagement that would broaden and deepen contacts with the Cuban people and their government. He has the popular support—domestic and international—to engage Cuba, and, by so doing, to staunch our diminishing influence on the island and recapture the high road in our relations with the hemisphere.

### Oil Key

#### Offshore drilling is critical for relations – it’s strategically important for both countries

Grogg 12 (Patricia – IPS, Citing Luiz Rene Fernandez – Senior Research and Professor at University of Havana specializing in international economics, “CUBA: Oil Drilling Opens Up New Possibilities”, 2/16, http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/02/cuba-oil-drilling-opens-up-new-possibilities/)

The search for oil in Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters, launched by the Spanish firm Repsol, has triggered speculation about future prospects for Cuba and the possibility of this country one day making the transition from importer to exporter of crude. Moreover, given its strategic importance for both the United States and Cuba, some analysts believe that energy offers a potential area for cooperation that could eventually help pave the way to the normalisation of relations between the two countries. For the moment, the Cuban authorities and oil industry personnel are remaining discreetly silent on the subject. CUPET, the state-owned oil company, has limited itself to officially confirming the arrival in the country on Jan. 19 of the Scarabeo 9 oil rig for “the resumption in the coming days of deepwater drilling for oil exploration.” Drilling operations presumably began in late January. According to CUPET, the goal is to continue testing to determine the potential for oil and gas production in Cuba’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Gulf of Mexico. The results of the drilling will contribute to defining that potential. After opening up its economy to foreign investment in 1991, Cuba divided the EEZ, which covers an area of 112,000 sq km, into 59 oil and gas exploration blocks. On Jan. 18, Rafael Tenreiro, director of exploration and production at CUPET, reiterated a previous estimate of a potential 20,000 million barrels in the area. At the launching of the book “Perforación de pozos petroleros marinos” (“Offshore Oil Well Drilling”) by Rolando Fernández, supervisor of the Gulf of Mexico operations group, Tenreiro stated that it was “possible” that Cuba could become an oil exporter. “We have to prepare the country for this good news,” he added, stressing the need for the production of technology and participation in the entire process. In 2011, more than 20 offshore exploration blocks had already been leased to large foreign energy companies, including, in addition to Repsol, StatoilHydro of Norway, ONGC Videsh of India, PETRONAS of Malaysia, PetroVietnam, Gazprom of Russia, Sonangol of Angola the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. Reflecting on the potential ramifications should Repsol’s exploratory drilling prove successful, university professor Fernando Martirena told IPS that large-scale development of the Cuban oil industry would obviously provide a boost to the government programmes currently underway, since it would represent “a needed injection of fresh foreign currency into a tense national economy.” This scenario, “combined with the package of measures being implemented as a result of the ‘updating’ of the Cuban economic model, will heat up the issue of the blockade,” said Martirena. Under the U.S. economic embargo against this Caribbean island nation, in place for 50 years this month, U.S. companies are shut out from profiting from a potential oil boom in Cuba. In Martirena’s view, if the U.S. Congress wants to be pragmatic, “it will have to choose between continuing to support the hysterical Cuban-American bloc that does so much lobbying around the issue of the blockade, or simply accepting reality – that there is no reason to maintain this policy.” Cuban-American members of Congress headed up by the chairwoman of the influential House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, have attempted to block Repsol’s drilling operations in Cuban waters. While they claim that their opposition is based on concerns for the environment and the security of the United States, analysts believe that their motivation is primarily political. Before arriving in Cuban waters, the Scarabeo 9 drilling rig – built in China and assembled in Singapore, and therefore exempt from the prohibitions of the U.S. embargo – successfully passed inspection by personnel from the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and the U.S. Coast Guard. CUPET has also vouched that the cutting-edge equipment leased by Repsol for its drilling operations has been duly verified to include the necessary features to guarantee the utmost efficiency and safety. The exploratory drilling is expected to last roughly two and a half months. “Technically speaking, the chances of a mishap occurring in Cuba’s economic area are extremely small, not only because of the precautions taken, but also for purely statistical reasons. This is one drilling rig out of the countless rigs operating outside of Cuban waters” in the Gulf of Mexico, economist Luis René Fernández commented to IPS. An expert on Cuba-U.S. relations, Fernández noted that while there are political risks associated with the issues of security and environmental impacts, there are also experiences that indicate that these “could and should be reduced.” “(Socialist) Venezuela has not stopped supplying oil to the United States, although it has tried to diversity its markets,” he mentioned as an example. He also pointed to the migration accords signed by Havana and Washington and Cuba’s purchases of food from U.S. companies despite “all of the restrictions and limitations.” “In these cases, among the reasons for a certain type of communication and collaboration, it always boils down to the importance of geography. There are common issues in which it is more beneficial for both sides to address them directly and even to cooperate. Not doing so could have high costs, not only economic, but also for the environment and security,” he said. Fernández stressed that the U.S. government is not a “unified actor” and that there are different agencies that deal with matters such as energy and the environment. “There are experts and professionals who fulfil their missions and could have real impacts on the concrete political situation,” he said, due to geographical proximity but also because “it is advisable to cooperate in spite of political and ideological differences.” In his opinion, both countries are moving in the mid term and especially in the long term towards the normalisation of relations, regardless of the particular political circumstances in the United States. “On the Cuban side, there is a well-known willingness to cooperate and even to debate, on respectful and equal terms, all of the aspects of the bilateral conflict,” he stressed. “This could be another important area for cooperation, precisely because of the strategic significance of energy sources for both the United States and Cuba. Are there risks? Without a doubt. But the benefits of cooperation definitely outweigh them,” Fernández concluded.

### China lash out

#### Effective isolation prompts a military invasion that goes nuclear

Ikegami 8 (Masako Ikegami – Professor and Director of the Center for Pacific Asia Studies (CPAS) at Stockholm University. She holds Doctor of Sociology from University of Tokyo, and a Ph.D. in peace & conflict research from Uppsala University, Sweden. Her research interests include Asian security & confidence building, arms control & disarmament and non-proliferation issues. 3-28-2008, The Jamestown Foundation, Time for Conflict Prevention Across the Taiwan Strait, <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4822&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=168&no_cache=1>)

Indeed, a cross-Strait conflict is potentially one of the most dangerousconflicts involving two major nuclear powers, in which the risk of escalation, in the worst case, cannot exclude strategic nuclear exchange. Thus, it is understandable that many countries make such a statement of “neutrality” or remain bystanders. The location of Taiwan, however, in the midst of the vital sea lines of communications (SLOCs), any level of armed conflict will inevitably envelop an international affair with global consequences, economically, politically and militarily. By nature, a cross-Strait conflict cannot be a limited theatre of war. Therefore, it would greatly improve conflict prevention if NATO could at a minimum maintain its own version of “strategic ambiguity” to make Beijing’s calculation of using force more difficult, less optimistic, and thereby more prudent [9]. The recent large-scale naval exercise conducted by the United States, Japanese, Australian, Indian and Singaporean navies in September 2007 might have aimed at such a signalling effect toward China. It will also be constructive if Europe, together with other Western countries, were to make Beijing understand that any armed attack on Taiwan would lead to worldwide criticism and boycotts of Chinese products. To leave the issue to Beijing-Taipei bilateral talks is not a solution either. In the 1990s, former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui secretly sent an envoy to Hong Kong to negotiate with Beijing on cross-Strait political issues but apparently failed to bring any constructive outcomes and, consequently, Lee resorted to declaring the controversial meeting special “state-to-state relations” (BBC, July 20, 2000). Likely, China’s One-China principle and Ma Ying-jeou’s claim of “sovereignty country” would hardly coalesce. Given the power disparity between Beijing and Taipei, any bilateral talks on equal terms are impossible and unrealistic. Given Beijing’s persistence on its old-fashioned sovereignty concept and territorial integrity, any bilateral talks would inevitably end up as a cruel power game, in which the absorption of Taiwan would be imminent due to its relatively weaker position. If Beijing judges that Taiwan is already weak and isolated enough to allow for Chinese military operations, Beijing would opt for the use of force to realize its unification aim. The current co-existence framework in the cross-Strait relationship is unsustainable, because the framework lacks a solid ground in terms of international law, and is instead subject to the change of various variables such as military power parity, international political dynamics, economic mergers, and domestic social-political developments in China and Taiwan. In such unstable circumstances, third-party intervention would be constructive and helpful to create a win-win situation. In this respect, Europe, which has a rich historical experience of transcending national borders through post-modern regional cooperation, could provide much inspiration and creative ideas for China and Taiwan, helping them to find a creative third way-out that both parties can comfortably accept. For instance, Europe could suggest to Beijing that a loose confederation or commonwealth to consolidate the current ambiguous co-existence—neither unification nor independence—would be a feasible peaceful solution acceptable to both sides, as well as the international community. When the U.S.-China co-management only muddles through the cross-Strait problem without leading to any fundamental solution, Europe’s rich experiences of conflict prevention and management could be a new subject worth studying for the related parties in the Asia-Pacific.

### US-China escalation

#### Goes nuclear

Glaser (Professor of Political Science and International Affairs – George Washington University) March/April 2011 “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs Vol. 9 Iss. 2,

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### Global nuclear war

Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, American Military University, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, [http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/ Hunkovic.pdf](http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf))

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential toescalate into a nuclear conflictand athirdworld war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

### Taiwan war – impact calc

#### Taiwan war outweighs –

#### A – Faster and more likely – recent Chinese strategy shift

AFP, ‘10 – Feb 21, <http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/archive.cgi?noframes;read=1721>)

BERLIN -- China is ready to engage in war and even nuclear conflict with the United States should fighting break out over Taiwan, Der Spiegel magazine reports on the basis of a supposedly-secret Chinese file. "Document No. 65", allegedly produced by the military sub-committee of the Chinese Community Party's central committee, discussed the possible course of a war over the disputed island claimed by China. "We would have to make a military intervention as early as possible, before the American troops are fully operational," according to the document cited by the German magazine. Faced with US bombardment of key sites and military installations, the document stressed that China has roughly the same level of conventional forces and would benefit from a fight close to its own territory. While arguing that the US would have little interest in starting a nuclear war over the island, the file said that Beijing would be ready to turn to its nuclear arsenal should circumstances demand. "We are ready to defend every square centimetre of our country," said the document. Dated August last year, the analysis would appear to have been drafted during a low point in relations between Beijing and Taipei caused by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's insistence that his country should enjoy "state-to-state" ties with China. China considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has repeatedly warned that it would use force if necessary to ensure its return to the mainland. -- AFP

#### B – Scope and size – effects would be global and produce WWIII

Hunkovic, ‘8 (Lee, American Military University, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

#### US-China war over Taiwan is the most likely scenario for great power nuclear war

Monte R. Bullard, ‘4. Senior Fellow @ Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. “Strait Talk : Avoiding a Nuclear War between the United States and China over Taiwan,” Online Book, December, <http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/index.htm>.

War between the United States and China is unthinkable, but not totally impossible. The above scenario, described in more detail in Chapter Four, is conceivable. It is one of the most likely situations in the world that could bring two mature nuclear powers into direct conflict and cause both sides to contemplate the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The principal effort that has to be undertaken to prevent war between the United States and China is to prevent armed conflict between China and Taiwan. The best policies for preventing armed conflict between China and Taiwan are to reduce the rhetoric and to not increase the arms to establish a deterrence environment. The best policies by all three actors (the US, China and Taiwan) are broad and patient policies that go beyond the military realm and include a more comprehensive and coordinated military, political and economic approach. The title of this book is a bit misleading because it does not focus on the traditional topics of nonproliferation. Instead of focusing on arms control and disarmament subjects like export controls, agreements, treaties and regimes it examines factors that trigger the decisions to enter a conflict that could escalate into nuclear confrontation. The central point is that the fundamental causes of conflict, not just the various means of controlling nuclear arms, must be considered. It is a slightly different approach to the issue of nonproliferation. It goes to the causes of proliferation rather than the processes of arms control.

### Taiwan war – escalation

#### Escalation is guaranteed – no diplomatic solutions

Daniel Blumenthal March 2 2011 “Rethinking U.S. foreign policy towards Taiwan,” FP, Shadow Government, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/02/rethinking\_us\_foreign\_policy\_towards\_taiwan

To Glaser, Taiwan is different. China's belief that Taiwan is part of it is non-negotiable, and Beijing and Washington have very different views of what constitutes the status quo across the Strait. The Taiwan dispute has no diplomatic solution and the risks of nuclear war are getting too high, particularly with China's advancing second strike capability**.** His answer is for the United States to make the necessary "adjustments" and abandon Taiwan.

#### Chinese modernization locks in nuclear war

Charles Glaser (Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University) March/April 2011 "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," Foreign Affairs, 90: 2 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67479/charles-glaser/will-chinas-rise-lead-to-war

A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actorsinvolved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis**.** In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones**.** A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

### A2 economics trump

#### Economics will not check – military views china as a competitior

Jing-Dong Yuan (Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and teaches Chinese politics and East Asia security and arms control at the Monterey Institute of International Studies) Spring 2003, Parameters

For US policymakers, the fundamental questions relate to the rise of China as a major power on the international scene and how Washington is to assess and manage the evolving US-China relationship in strategic terms.39 Arising China, according to some analysts, will likely pose serious threats to US security interests in the Asia-Pacific region because of the greater resources that can be devoted to China’s military buildup, a track record of the propensity of the PRC for the use of force, and the fact that deterrence and the use of economic sanctions may prove inadequate in stopping China from asserting itself and imposing its preferences on its neighbors. The liberal argument that prosperity leads to peace will not work in China’s case.40 US-China military relations are constrained by the larger strategic context in which the United States continues to view China as a potential competitor. General Henry Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that US diplomacy should focus on “ensuring that China does not become the 21st-century version of the Soviet bear.”

#### China will respond to the plan militarily – national security will trump economics when china believes the US is attempting to contain them – security will trump economics

Banning Garrett (Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council) 2003 “Strategic Straightjacket: The United States and China in the 21st Century”

Neither China nor any other state whose power rests on its success in a globalizing world will conclude that its strategic interests are best served by trying to militarily confront the United States, although sometimes even U.S. allies would like to see the “arrogant” United States brought down a notch or two. Unlike the Soviet Union and its client states, all the major powers today depend on the health of the U.S.-led international economic system for their prosperity and often their security. Other nations, including China, need the United States. America also needs these ties (especially with a large and economically important country like China) to help maintain U.S. prosperity and security. As Richard Haass has noted, “war between the great powers” is “almost unthinkable.”xiv National security may frequently override economics, but the key question is a state’s national interests, and what motivates it to pursue policies of war and peace. China's overriding national interest – trumped only by direct military threats to its national security and, possibly, Taiwan independence – is economic development, which Chinese leaders perceive as requiring lasting integration into the global economy. Without continued movement in this direction, the Chinese bicycle will fall over and the Communist Party itself will likely fall from power. While Chinese leaders will continue to worry about Taiwan, that does not mean they need to implement a Monroe Doctrine to protect their interests or to ensure their overall national security. Thus, China's primary concern is to pursue a successful engagement strategy toward the United States and the international community while avoiding provocative behavior toward Taiwan. Should Beijing conclude that the United States is pursuing arealist strategyaimed at keeping China weak and divided, this would become justification for a Chinese strategy that fulfilled the expectations of the American realists. This could lead China to accumulate military power with the aim of dominating East Asia and compelling the United States to withdraw its military forces from the Western Pacific and to terminate its alliances with Japan, South Korea and other Asia Pacific states. For the United States, the strategic objective of preventing the emergence of China as a world power is both impractical and highly counterproductive to U.S. strategic, economic and political interests. It would damage the health of the global economy and international institutions and regimes, weaken support for other U.S. objectives among U.S. allies and friends, and decrease the chances of avoiding potentially dangerous hostility with China.

### A2 trade checks

#### Empirically countries will go to war even when it hurts them economically

John Mearsheimer (professor of political science at the University of Chicago) Jan/Feb 2005 CLASH OF THE TITANS, Foreign Policy, Issue 146, p46

You also argue that China's desire for continued economic growth makes conflict with the United States unlikely. One of the principal reasons that China has been so successful economically over the past 20 years is that it has not picked a fight with the United States. But that logic should have applied to Germany before World War I and to Germany and Japan before World War II. By 1939, the German economy was growing strongly, yet Hitler started World War II. Japan started conflict in Asia despite its impressive economic growth. Clearly there are factors that sometimes override economic considerations and cause great powers to start wars--even when it: hurts them economically

### A2 china no first use

#### China has adopted new policy of preemptive nuclear strikes against other nuclear nations

Jack H. Barnes (is a former trader and hedge fund manage) January 5 2011 “China threatens preemptive Nuclear war”, http://www.businessinsider.com/china-threatens-preemptive-nuclear-war-2011-1

[Kyodo News is reportin](http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/01/64900.html)g that China has changed its nuclear stance. This is going to leave Japan no choice but to produce weapons as well. The new rules allow China to attack another country using nuclear weapons, even if the opponent has not used them. This is a new form of “we will nuke you if you beat us up”. There are only two nations that could realistically try to destroy the Chinese military in place, using only conventional weapons, the United States and Japan. One of them is very far away and has its own nuclear response. The other is geographically closer and does not have any official weapons. You can expect to see the Japanese government ramp up a domestic stimulus program with serious military upgrades built into it. The Chinese military will consider launching a preemptive nuclear strike if the country finds itself faced with a critical situation in a war with another nuclear state, internal documents showed Wednesday. The newly revealed policy, called ”Lowering the Threshold of Nuclear Threats,” may contradict China’s strategy of no first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance, and is likely to fan concern in the United States, Japan and other regional powers about Beijing’s nuclear capability. The People’s Liberation Army’s strategic missile forces, the Second Artillery Corps, ”will adjust the nuclear threat policy if a nuclear missile-possessing country carries out a series of air strikes against key strategic targets in our country with absolutely superior conventional weapons,” according to the documents, copies of which were obtained by Kyodo News.

### A2 No china war – capability/motive

#### China has incentives to fight the US – our evidence is predictive

The Economist 2011 [8/26, “Modernisation in sheep's clothing”, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/08/chinas-military-power]

THE good news, as suggested by the Pentagon's latest annual report on China's military power, is that Chinese leaders are still eager to avoid confrontation with other powers and focus on beefing up the economy. The bad news, it hints, is that this might not last. With its rapidly improving military capability (described by the Pentagon in great detail), China has the wherewithal to challenge thesecurity status quoin the Pacificas well aspotential motives to do so.The report is diplomatically couched—though from China's perspective, not nearly enough. It hints at considerable unease about long-term trends in China's military buildup. The last few months have seen some headline-grabbing aspects of this: an assertion by the Pentagon in December that China was making faster progress than expected on an aircraft-carrier-killing ballistic missile, the DF-21D; a new stealth fighter, the J-20, making its first test flight just as Robert Gates, then defence secretary, was visiting Beijing in January; and then this month the maiden launch of China's first aircraft carrier, a refitted Kuznetsov-class ship (as yet unnamed) from the former Soviet Union.About these particular weapons, the Pentagon avoids sounding alarmed. Of the DF-21D missile, it says that it is still being developed. It does not repeat the claim made by Admiral Robert Willard of America’s Pacific Command in December that the missile has reached “initial operational capability”. The J-20, it says, is not expected to reach “effective operational capability” before 2018 (China, it says, has yet to master high-performance jet-engine production). China is likely to build “multiple” aircraft-carriers with support craft over the next decade. But it will take “several additional years” for China to achieve a “minimal level of combat capability” with them, says the report.The Pentagon does say, however, that China is steadily closing its technological gap with modern armed forces. The country’s lack of transparency about this, it says, is fuelling concern in the region about China’s intentions, with someof its neighboursfearing that China’s growingmilitary and economicweight is “beginning to produce a more assertive posture, particularly in the maritime domain”. A senior Pentagon official, Michael Schiffer, told reporters that China’s capabilities could “contribute to regional tensions and anxieties”.Like previous such reports, this one lists forces which could cause China’s self-proclaimed “peaceful development” to become less so. One of these, which was not listed last year, is a growing expectation at home and abroad that China will become more involved in addressing global problems and pursuing its own international interests. This is causing some of the Chinese leaders in responsible positions to worry about taking on more than they can handle, says the Pentagon. Nationalists at home, however, are pushing for a “more muscular” posture.

## ADV Economy

### Venezuela cut off

#### Venezuelan cutoff will come inevitably – only offshore drilling can meet demand

CDA 11 (Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest”, 2011, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba\_Drilling\_and\_US\_Policy.pdf)

3. Cuba’s arrangement with Venezuela is unsustainable over the long-term. Cuba’s energy dependence on a single country is a significant political and economic risk, as it learned when it lost its access to Soviet oil. A change in Venezuela’s government or policy could devastate Cuba’s economy overnight. Jorge Piñon of Florida International University expresses concerns about the durability of Cuba’s oil arrangement with Venezuela and the impact on Cuba and the United States if the relationship were to summarily change. As he told the CDA delegation, “The political risk and strategic risk to Cuba and the United States is huge. What if Chavez loses an election, or loses power, or if Venezuela disconnects Cuba from oil for some other reason? That risk is not in the best interests of the United States or Cuba.” 7 Additionally, the arrangement is controversial in both countries. Some Venezuelans, who oppose the Chavez government’s close relationship with Cuba, claim that this is a waste of their country’s oil revenues. The “oil for doctors” program has also been controversial in Cuba. Cuban citizens complain it has depleted the supply of physicians in their country. According to MEDICC (Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba), about 20,000 Cuban family doctors provide health services and health education in medically underserved communities in Venezuela. 8 Cuba recognizes the risk of its dependence, and has engaged in diplomatic outreach to other allies (including Angola, Russia, Algeria, South Africa, and Brazil) that produce oil. But the better solution may lie offshore, if supplies are recoverable and in amounts that meet Cuba’s own domestic requirements

### Oil key Cuban economy

#### Oil’s key to Cuba’s economy – loss of oil subsidies will collapse its power generation, resulting instability

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) 2010 “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)Since the beginning of the Cuban Revolution,the electric power sector of Cuba has been managed with little regard for financial and economic issues. This approach to the power sector has a long history in the Communist bloc,as the sector was considered to have a preeminent political dimension.Lenin famously noted in 1920,“Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification ofthe whole country.” 1 It was not considered necessary nor even desirable for this sector to pay for itself or turn a profit. Cuba’s per capita annual power consumption is about 1,300 kilowatthours (kWh).Table 3-1 shows Cuba’s per capita GDP and per capita electricity consumption in comparison with three other countries. 2 (This chapter presents electric power data comparing Chile,Costa Rica,Cuba,and the Dominican Republic.) The power sector in Cuba is controlled almost entirely by the state;the only private participation is in the form of independent power producer arrangements. The situation is somewhat different in the hydrocarbon sector,a s there has been significant private participation in exploration and crude oil production since the 1990s.This is the result of the very attractive production-sharing agreements (PSAs) offered in Cuba. But international trade in oil and derivatives—refining, distribution, and pricing—do not seem to follow financial and economic considerations there. This lack of concern for financial and economic pressures may result from the fact that both the Soviet Union and Venezuela have provided large subsidies to Cuba by supplying oil and derivatives on concessionary terms, and Cuba’s economic policymakers do not seem to take account of opportunity costs in the energy sector (see also chapter 2 ofthis volume). The power and hydrocarbon sectors are inextricably linked, as Cuba produces about 85 percent of its power using liquid fuels, a very high percentage compared with other countries.3 The total value of the energy consumed in Cuba has been estimated at 14 percent of GDP, compared with a world average of about 10 percent. In 2007, domestic production of crude oil accounted for about 40 percent of total consumption and the rest was imported from Venezuela. About 50 percent of the total supply of fuel oil is applied to power generation and 50 percent for transportation and other uses; this is consistent with the usage breakdown seen in other countries.

### Solve Venezuela dependence

#### Drilling is key to eliminate Venezuelan oil dependence

Reuters 12 (“Cuba Offshore Drilling: Another Well Declared A Failure”, 8/6, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/06/cuba-offshore-drilling-failure\_n\_1746576.html)

Cuba's hopes for energy independence suffered another blow on Monday when its state oil company said the island's latest offshore oil well was not successful. Cubapetroleo said the well drilled by Malaysia's state-owned Petronas in partnership with Russia's Gazprom Neft found oil but in a geological formation so tightly compacted that oil and gas could not flow through it in "significant quantities." "It cannot be qualified as a commercial discovery," the company said in an announcement in the Communist Party newspaper Granma. It was the third failed well in three attempts in Cuba's part of the Gulf of Mexico, where the communist country has said it may have 20 billion barrels of oil. The government led by President Raul Castro needs the oil to free it from dependence on socialist ally Venezuela, which under an oil-for-services deal sends Cuba about 115,000 barrels of oil daily. With Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez battling cancer and facing re-election in October, the future of his oil largess for Cuba is uncertain.

#### Plan solves Venezuelan imports – allows energy independence

CDA 11 (Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest”, 2011, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba\_Drilling\_and\_US\_Policy.pdf)

Oil in commercially viable amounts would change Cuba’s geo- political equation. As Jorge Piñon testified before Congress, “If Cuba’s undiscovered reserves are proven, it would take between three and five years for their development, and production volumes would have to reach a level of over 200,000 barrels per day to have the same economic benefit as that derived today from Venezuela’s oil subsidies.” 33 Were this threshold met, Cuba would no longer be dependent on Venezuela to provide it with subsidized shipments of oil. It would be energy independent. Lisa Margonelli takes note of the fears about Venezuela and China operating in the region and establishing spheres of influence near the U.S. In light of these fears, she says “We won’t be acting on our own interests if we tighten the screws and pursue a policy that drives out everyone except Venezuela and China.” 34

### Plan key Cuban oil development

#### US-Cuban oil cooperation is key to revitalize their domestic oil sector

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) 2006 “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a continuing opposition by the United States to anything resembling what can be construed as “good news” for the Castro regime? Obviously, because up until this point it hasn’t cost the United States much if anything. The current policy continues to clearly place at the forefront the sanctity and utility of a comprehensive economic and political embargo in the hopes that it helps to foment a change in regime and a peaceful transition to a democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy. As energy security concerns continue to percolate up to an increasingly important status in the realm of national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position against the Cuban regime regardless of its leadership.¶ The overview of the Cuban energy developments clearly and unambiguously reveals that the Castro regime has every intention of continuing to promote, design and implement energy development policies that will benefit Cuba for generations to come. Cuba is sparing no effort by instituting bottom-up and top-down policy initiatives to meet this challenge. It has significantly increased its international cooperation in the energy sector and continues to enhance its efforts to ensure energy security in these most uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how successful these efforts are, they will come up short. Two factors may alter this present situation. First, Cuba may indeed realize a bonanza from the offshore tracts that will allow it to possibly address its many energy challenges, from increasing oil production and refining capacity, to improving the nation’s energy infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and no less significant, is the possibility of normalization of trade relations with the United States. This is important not only because it will allow direct foreign investment, technology transfer and information sharing between these neighboring states but it possibly enhances the energy security of both states, and hence, the region, realized through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge against natural disaster and market disruptions. Moreover, all states could derive benefit from the public information campaigns to promote energy efficiency and conservation presently being promoted in Cuba in the face of diminishing energy stocks and uncertain global markets. Ultimately, and only after normalization, the task still falls to the Cuban government, but the cost will necessarily be spread through a number of sources that are predominately American because of strategic interests, proximity and affinity. It suffices to say that the requisite investment and assistance will have a distinct American tinge to it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S. government agencies, and international financial institutions, of which the U.S. is a major contributor, will play important roles in the funding of the effort to revitalize the Cuban energy sector. Cuban officials are not averse and perhaps would prefer that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to the fact that most if not all of the cutting-edge technology in energy, oil and gas comes from the United States. It is remarkable that the Cuban energy sector is as vibrant as it presently is, absent the type of infrastructural investment that is available to most developing states, in large part because of the American economic embargo. ¶ Finally, the cost is significant and it stands to reason that the longer one waits to address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of modernizing the energy sector. For this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will be significant and every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the effort. This should serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the Cuban government and perhaps can serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence, trust and cooperation in this critical issue area across the region.

### Terrorism – Caribbean CBW

#### Groups in the Caribbean are building CBWs to use against the US

Clark 5 (Richard Clark, 2005 (an internationally recognized expert on security, including homeland security, national security, cyber security, and counterterrorism, served in the United States government from 1973 to 2003, with a specialization in the issues of intelligence and terrorism, A Security Risk Management Analysis for  ATTORNEY GENERAL PATRICK LYNCH  RHODE ISLAND, <http://www.projo.com/extra/2005/lng/clarkereport.pdf>)

Natural gas shipments from Trinidad and Tobago account for more than 80% of all U.S. LNG imports, with that number expected to rise over the course of the next decade as the U.S. weans itself off of natural gas from Algeria and Qatar because of terrorism concerns. But there is a terrorism concern associated with Trinidadian natural gas as well. Jamaat al-Muslimeen is a radical Islamic Trinidadian opposition group that staged a failed coup against the national government in 1990 and has since built a lucrative  criminal empire that includes arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and a disturbing kidnapping operation. Other radical Islamic groups in Trinidad include Waajihatul Islaamiyyah, an organization that openly supports Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and Jemaah Islamiya. Waajihatul Islaamiyyah has said it intends to establish an Islamic state in Trinidad and has claimed to be manufacturing chemical and biological weapons for use against U.S. and British oil and gas interests on the island. Concerns within the U.S. government are deep enough that FBI and CIA counterterrorism experts have been sent to Trinidad to assist the government in cracking down on the fundamentalist organizations.

### Terrorism – LNG scenario

#### Caribbean instability causes LNG terrorism

Bryan 1 (Anthony T., Director of the Caribbean Program – North/South Center, and Stephen E. Flynn, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation”, 10-21, http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism\_porous\_borders\_and \_homeland\_ security.html)

Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.

#### LNG tanker explosions cause catastrophic damage – outweighs nuclear war

Lovin 1 (Amory B., Chief Scientist of the [Rocky Mountain Institute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rocky_Mountain_Institute), and L. Hunter Lovin, President – National Capitalism and Co-Founder – Rocky Mountain Institute, “Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security”, http://verdilivorno.it/doc\_gnl/198204\_Brittle\_Power\_intro\_GNL\_note.pdf)

About nine percent of such a tankerload of LNG will probably, if spilled onto water, boil to gas in about five minutes. 3 (It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twenty-eight Fahrenheit degrees hot- ter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) The result- ing gas, however, will be so cold that it will still be denser than air. It will therefore flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an ignition source. Such a plume might extend at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty minutes. 4 It might ultimately reach much farther—perhaps six to twelve miles. 5 If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating. If ignited, it will burn to completion with a turbulent diffusion flame reminiscent of the 1937 Hindenberg disaster but about a hundred times as big. Such a fireball would burn everything within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away. 6 An LNG fireball can blow through a city, creating “a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. No present or foreseeable equipment can put out a very large [LNG]... fire.” 7 The energy content of a single standard LNG tanker (one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters) is equivalent to seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about fifty-five Hiroshima bombs.

### Terrorism – LNG o/w nukes

#### LNG terrorism will cause an explosion larger than Hiroshima – studies prove

Husick and Gale 5 (Lawrence A. Husick and Stephen Gale, 2005 (Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Center on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Homeland Security. Stephen Gale, Ph.D., is co-chair of FPRI’s Center on Terrorism, Planning a Sea-borne Terrorist Attack, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050321.americawar.husickgale.seaborneterroristattack.html>)

Consequences of an Attack  Despite van der Linde’s and other warnings, and the examples of several cases of earlier accidental releases that have resulted in the detonation of LNG, the consequences of a rupture of an LNG tanker and subsequent ignition of the gas were not thoroughly studied by United States government security agencies until 2004. In the 2004 study by Sandia National Laboratories, the resulting report (quietly released on 21-Dec-2004), estimated that an intentional attack on an LNG tanker would result in a vapor cloud of explosive gas spread over a radius of almost 2 miles from the ship. Any source of ignition within that vapor cloud would instantly cause an explosion of devastating proportion and horrific effect.  The US military’s largest non-nuclear weapon is the so-called “daisy cutter” bomb, (designated BLU-96), disperses 2,000 lbs. of a flammable hydrocarbon, has a blast zone of over 500 feet in radius, and consumes all available oxygen within that zone, and for some distance beyond. Compare this with the 130,000 cubic meters of LNG contained in a typical tanker: 3,237,472.7 MMKJ (million kilo joules) of energy, or the equivalent of 775 kilotons of TNT. (N.B. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima yielded 15 kilotons of TNT equivalent.[6]) Keep in mind that the conflagration zone envisioned by Sandia for an LNG tanker attack extends outward for as much as three miles from the ship. In this zone, everything is exposed to searing temperatures, and all of the oxygen is consumed by the explosion, thus suffocating all living things. Beyond this zone, massive damage results from the shock wave. For cities that have large buildings with glass facades, for example, nearly universal destruction of the glass in the zone beyond three miles creates a killing field both inside and outside the structures, as glass, propelled by the shock wave propagating outward at over 775 mph from the explosion zone, is rained on citizens from above.

### Terrorism – A2 No Caribbean LNG terrorism

#### Caribbean terrorists target LNG tankers – Probability is high due to American reliance on LNG

Kelshall 4 (Candyce Kelshall, 11/15/04 (Director of Bluewater Defence and Security Ltd, Radical Islam and LNG in Trinidad and Tobago, <http://www.iags.org/n1115045.htm>)

Over the past several years, maritime attacks have become more violent, more frequent and clearly more organized. It is believed that militant groups, particularly in South East Asia, are practicing hijacking ships for their possible use as weapons. Of all types of vessels oil and chemical tankers are perhaps the most attractive targets for terrorists. These vessels are manned by smaller crews and loaded with volatile substances that could potentially cause significant damage. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) attacks against tankers are growing at an alarming rate.   While all eyes are placed on the area surrounding the Malacca Straits, the world oil bottleneck, and on the Indonesian coast off Aceh, very little attention is placed on the U.S. underbelly of the Caribbean and the softer targets in the region closest to America's back yard: Trinidad, Venezuela and the Bahamas. These Caribbean countries are among the short list of natural gas producing countries and liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exporters. Trinidad and Tobago alone account for 80% (1st quarter 2004) of all U.S. LNG imports, up from 68% in 2002. Therefore, any incident involving an LNG tanker along the Caribbean routes could harm not only U.S. energy security but also the economies of the Caribbean islands, affecting tourism and other industries decades. Existing well heads in the U.S. are being depleted while demand for natural gas is expected to rise 2% a year. Imports from.   LNG and Tanker Terrorism   U.S. Department of Energy figures paint a bleak picture for U.S. dependence on imported energy in the coming Canada, whose own energy demand is increasing, are projected to pick up some of the burden. But Canada's gas demand is growing faster than expected, also due to the gas intensive process of converting tar sands to crude oil, and thus its ability to export gas to the U.S. is being diminished. The U.S. will therefore be required to import more of its gas in LNG form from Nigeria, Sao Tome, Trinidad, Venezuela and the Persian Gulf. Today 2% of total gas usage in the U.S. is derived from LNG. By 2010 this figure is likely to grow to 10%.   LNG terminals and tankers present potential targets for terrorists. In the pre-9/11 world LNG tankers were considered among the safest ships at sea. These tankers are still as safe as is possible for a vessel of this nature today. But this statement is only valid if one pre-supposes that terrorists do not want an easily attainable weapon of mass destruction. The potential for mass casualty maritime suicide terrorism has changed our perceptions of safety at sea especially when it comes to lean crewed LNG tankers and other PCG (Petro/chemical/gas) and ships. With maritime terrorists currently combing the world for ways to make their message reach as wide an audience as possible, LNG tankers could be their perfect mass casualty weapon

### Terrorism – A2 No LNG terrorism

#### Terrorists have the intent and capability to attack and explode an LNG tanker

Clark 5 (Richard Clark, 2005 - an internationally recognized expert on security, including homeland security, national security, cyber security, and counterterrorism, served in the United States government from 1973 to 2003, with a specialization in the issues of intelligence and terrorism, A Security Risk Management Analysis for  ATTORNEY GENERAL PATRICK LYNCH  RHODE ISLAND, <http://www.projo.com/extra/2005/lng/clarkereport.pdf>)

NET ASSESSMENT: While there is no adequate way in which to determine the probability of a terrorist attack on the proposed urban LNG facility and inland waterway transit routing, there is adequate grounds to judge that such an attack would be consistent with terrorists demonstrated intent and capability**.** There is also a basis to judge that likely enhanced security measures would not significantly reduce the risk. While there are some differences among experts about the conditions needed to generate a catastrophic explosion and about the precise extent of the resulting damage, there is significant grounds to conclude that a high risk exists of catastrophic damage from the types of attacks terrorists are capable of mounting. Those damage levels would overwhelm regional trauma, burn, and emergency medical capabilities. The LNG facility’s insurance is likely to be inadequate to fully compensate victims and to rebuild facilities.

### Terrorism – A2 LNG protected

#### LNG infrastructure is uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attack

Parfomak 3 (Paul, Specialist in Science and Technology, Resources, Science, and Industry Division @ CRS, "Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Background and Issues for Congress," www.energy.ca.gov/lng/documents/CRS\_RPT\_LNG\_INFRA\_SECURITY.PDF)

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel frequently shipped in massive tankers from overseas to U.S. ports. LNG is also manufactured domestically and is often stored near population centers. Because LNG infrastructure is highly visible and easily identified, it can be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. LNG industry and federal agencies have put new measures in place to protect LNG infrastructure and respond to the possibility of terrorism. Nonetheless, public concerns about LNG risks continue to raise questions about LNG security. While LNG has historically made up a small part of U.S. natural gas supplies, rising gas prices and the possibility of domestic shortages are sharply increasing LNG demand. Faced with this growth in demand and public concerns, Congress is examining the adequacy of federal LNG security initiatives.

### Terrorism – LNG Impacts – Global Spillover

#### Caribbean terrorists can attack LNG tankers anywhere in the world – the ships go to the US, Japan and Spain

Kelshall 4 (Candyce Kelshall, 11/15/04 (Director of Bluewater Defence and Security Ltd, Radical Islam and LNG in Trinidad and Tobago, <http://www.iags.org/n1115045.htm>)

The idea that terrorists could attack an LNG tanker en route to the U.S. or Japan or Spain, the three main destinations for LNG leaving the Caribbean, either via sea or with small aircraft on a suicide mission must be recognized as possible and acted upon. The island chain that LNG tankers sail through en route to their destinations provide any number of soft targets with limited response resources.

### Terrorism – LNG Impacts – Economy

#### LNG tanker attack would crush the global economy

GAO Report 7 (FEDERAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES IN PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ENERGY COMMODITY TANKERS, 12/10, lexis)

Nonetheless, these successful attacks abroad, the expressed desire by terrorists to target U.S. economic interests, and the potential outcome of a terrorist attack on a tanker have led Congress and the Administration to conclude that protective efforts are warranted.A successful attack on an energy commodity tanker could have substantial public safety, environmental, and economic consequences**.** Public safety and environmental consequences of an attack vary by commodity. For instance, highly combustible commodities like LNG and LPG have the potential to catch fire, or in a more unlikely scenario- -if they are trapped in a confined space such as under a dock-- explode, posing a threat to public safety. Crude oil and heavy petroleum products remain in the environment after they are spilled and must be removed, potentially causing significant environmental damage. Finally, the economic consequences of a major attack could include a temporary price spike reflecting fears of further attacks, and supply disruptions associated with delays of shipments if major transit routes, key facilities, or key ports are closed. The loss of one cargo of an energy commodity might not have a significant, sustained price impact. However, if an attack results in port closures for multiple days or weeks, price responses and higher costs could mean losses in economic welfare to consumers, businesses, and government amounting to billions of dollars.

### Economy – LNG Impacts – Free Trade

#### LNG attack would wreck global trade

Mihailescu 4 (ANDREA R. MIHAILESCU, 7/13/04 (Analysis: LNG a security risk to the U.S.?, UPI, lexis)

The bulk of the world's LNG trade moves by sea. Singapore's Defense Minister, Rear Adm. Teo Chee Hean, says the threat from maritime terrorism is real and an attack against a major shipping checkpoint such as the Suez Canal or Strait of Malacca could have serious repercussions for global trade. Dow Jones quoted Hean as saying, "For terrorists, the payoff from a successful maritime attack could be considerable. The damage could be horrific if terrorists turned supertankers, LPG -- liquid petroleum gas -- LNG or chemical carriers into floating bombs." His comments were echoed by former Bush security official Richard Clarke.

#### Extinction

Pazner 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### Internal – Korea and Caucus

#### Cuban instability collapse causes Latin American instability, creates terrorist hubs throughout the Caribbean, and causing a refugee crisis

Tim Gorrell (Lieutenant Colonel) 2005 “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

### Korea impact

#### Korean instability causes nuclear war

Kim Myong Chol (author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences) August 20 2011 "Dangerous games" www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dg01.html

The divided and heavily armed Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global flashpoint, with any conflict sparked there likely to become a full-blown thermonuclear war involving the world's fourth-most powerful nuclear weapons state and its most powerful. ¶ Any incident in Korea by design, accident, or miscalculation could erupt into a devastating DPRK-US war, with the Metropolitan US serving as a main war theater. ¶ Rodong Sinmun warned on August 16: "The Korean Peninsula is faced with the worst crisis ever. An all-out war can be triggered by any accident." ¶ Recent incidents illustrate the real danger of miscalculation leading to a total shooting war, given the volatile situation on the Land of Morning Calm. ¶ 1. The most recent case in point is the August 10 shelling of North Korea by the South. Frightened South Korea marines on Yeonpyeong Island mistook three noises from a North Korean construction site across the narrow channel for artillery rounds, taking an hour to respond with three to five artillery rounds. ¶ The episode serves as a potent reminder to the world that the slightest incident can lead to war. A reportedly malfunctioning firefinder counter-artillery radar system seems to partly account for the panicky South Korean reaction. ¶ South Korean conservative newspaper the Joong Ang Daily reported August 17: ¶ "A military source said that radar installed to detect hostile fire did not work last week when North Korea fired five shots toward the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the disputed maritime border, on Aug 10. ¶ "'We must confirm the location of the source of the firing through the ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) and HALO (hostile artillery location) systems, but ARTHUR failed to operate, resulting in a failure to determine the source of the fire,' said the source." ¶ BBC reported on November 25 last year the aggressive nature of troops on the South Korea-held five islands in North Korean waters. ¶ "Seen in this sense, they (five islands including Yeonpyeong Island) could provide staging bases for flanking amphibious attacks into North Korea if South Korea ever takes the offensive." ¶ 2. An almost catastrophic incident took place at dawn on June 17 near Inchon. South Korean marines stationed on Gyodong Island near Inchon Airport fired rifles at a civilian South Korean jetliner Airbus A320 with 119 people aboard as it was descending to land, after mistaking it for a North Korean military aircraft. ¶ The Asiana Airlines flight was carrying 119 people from the Chinese city of Chengdu. ¶ About 600 civilian aircraft fly near the island every day, including those flying across the NLL, but they face a perennial risk of being misidentified as a hostile warplane. ¶ It is nothing short of a miracle that the Airbus A320 was not hit and nobody harmed. ¶ 3. On March 26, 2010, the high-tech South Korean corvette Sokcho fired 130 rounds at flocks of birds, mistaking them for a hostile flying object. The innocent birds looked like a North Korean warplane just at a time when an alleged North Korean midget submarine had managed to escape with impunity after torpedoing the hapless Cheonan deep inside security-tight South Korean waters. ¶ The South Korean military's habit of firing at the wrong target increases the risk of an incident running out of control. ¶ CNN aired a story December 16, headlined: "General: South Korea Drill Could Cause Chain Reaction." ¶ F/A-18 pilot-turned Marine Corp General James Cartwright told the press in the Pentagon, "What we worry about, obviously, is if that it [the drill] is misunderstood or if it's taken advantage of as an opportunity. ¶ "If North Korea were to react to that in a negative way and fire back at those firing positions on the islands, that would start potentially a chain reaction of firing and counter-firing. ¶ "What you don't want to have happen out of that is ... for us to lose control of the escalation. That's the concern." ¶ Agence France-Presse on December 11 quoted former chief of US intelligence retired admiral Dennis Blair as saying that South Korea "will be taking military action against North Korea". ¶ New Korean war differs from other wars¶ Obama and the Americans seem to be incapable of realizing that North Korea is the wrong enemy, much less that a new Korean War would be fundamentally different from all other wars including the two world wars. ¶ Two things will distinguish a likely American Conflict or DPRK-US War from previous wars. ¶ The first essential difference is that the US mainland will become the main theater of war for the first time since the US Civil War (1861-1865), giving the Americans an opportunity to know what it is like to have war fought on their own land, not on faraway soil. ¶ The US previously prospered by waging aggressive wars on other countries. Thus far, the Americans could afford to feel safe and comfortable while watching TV footage of war scenes from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Libya as if they were fires raging across the river. ¶ The utmost collateral damage has been that some American veterans were killed or returned home as amputees, with post traumatic stress disorder, only to be left unemployed and homeless. ¶ However, this will no longer be the case. ¶ At long last, it is Americans' turn to have see their homeland ravaged.¶ An young North Korea in 1950-53 was unable to carry the war all the way across the Pacific Ocean to strike back, but the present-day North Korea stands out as a fortress nuclear weapons state that can withstand massive American ICBM (Intercontinental ballistic missile) attacks and launch direct retaliatory transpacific strikes on the Metropolitan USA. ¶ The second essential difference is that the next war in Korea, that is, the American Conflict or the DPRK-USA War would be the first actual full-fledged nuclear, thermonuclear war that mankind has ever seen, in no way similar to the type of nuclear warfare described in science fiction novels or films. ¶ North Korea is unique among the nuclear powers in two respects: One is that the Far Eastern country, founded by legendary peerless hero Kim Il-sung, is the first country to engage and badly maul the world's only superpower in three years of modern warfare when it was most powerful, after vanquishing Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. ¶ The other is that North Korea is fully ready to go the length of fighting [hu]mankind's first and last nuclear exchange with the US. ¶ The DPRK led by two Kim Il-sungs - the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander Kim Jong-il and his heir designate Kim Jong-eun - is different from Russia under Nikita Khrushchev which backed down in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. ¶ Khrushchev and his company never fought the Americans in war. As a rule, most countries are afraid to engage the Americans. As the case is with them, North Korea is the last to favor war with the Americans. ¶ However, it is no exaggeration to say that the two North Korean leaders are just one click away from ordering a retaliatory nuclear strike on the US military forces in Guam, Hawaii and metropolitan centers on the US mainland. ¶ On behalf of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-eun will fire highly destructive weapons of like Americans have never heard of or imagined to evaporate the US. ¶ The North Koreans are too proud of being descendents of the ancient civilizations of Koguryo 2,000 years ago and Dankun Korea 5,000 years ago, to leave the Land of morning Calm divided forever with the southern half under the control of the trigger-happy, predatory US. The North Koreans prefer to fight and die in honor rather than kowtow to the arrogant Americans. ¶ At the expense of comforts of a better life, North Koreans have devoted more than half a century to preparing for nuclear war with the Americans. All available resources have been used to convert the whole country into a fortress, including arming the entire population and indigenously turning out all types of nuclear thermonuclear weapons, and developing long-range delivery capabilities and digital warfare assets. ¶ An apocalyptic Day After Tommorow-like scenario will unfold throughout the US, with the skyscrapers of major cities consumed in a sea of thermonuclear conflagration. The nuclear exchange will begin with retaliatory North Korean ICBMs detonating hydrogen bombs in outer space far above the US mainland, leaving most of the country powerless. ¶ New York, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and major cities should be torched by ICBMs streaking from North Korea with scores of nuclear power stations exploding, each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs.

### Caucus impact

#### Caucus instability causes nuclear war

Stephen Blank (MacArthur Professor of Research at The Strategic Studies Institute at US Army War College) 2000 “U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA,” June, <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/Blank2000.pdf>)

In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus Many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side's stakes, since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client's defeat are not well established or clear as in Europe. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia - or if it could, would trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies) - the danger of major war is higher here than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74

### Latin America impact – democracy

#### Latin American democracy solves environmental destruction

Danny Callejas (Professor of Economics at the Universidad de Antioquia, Colombia) November 2010 “Democracy and Environmental Quality in Latin America: A Panel System of Equations Approach, 1995-2008,”

Democracy has a positive effect on environmental quality. The theory suggests that democracy sustains and encourages freedom of speech, freedom of press, political participation and social awareness. These elements provide a conduit for social demands. As urban population and income grow, citizens increase their demand for higher environmental standards and quality. The enactment of new policies and regulations that incentive individuals and firms may lead to a reduction in pollution, environmental degradation and deforestation; therefore, leading to a higher level of environmental quality.¶ This study analyzed 19 Latin America countries for the period 1995-2008. A panel data system of equations estimates suggest that a 10% increase in democracy may reduce CO2 emissions per capita in 0.48% or 0.60% in Latin America. Similarly, a 10% increase in education may reduce emissions in 0.71% or 0.73%. These results suggest that democracy and education have a positive effect on environmental quality.

#### Extinction

David Takacs 1996 Philosophies of Paradise, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr., Baltimore)

"Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon **basin** could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on **stable climate**, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to athermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.""

### Caribbean Impacts – GPW

#### Caribbean instability causes global war

Griffith, 2k (Ivelaw L. Griffith 2k, professor of political science and dean of the honors college at Florida International University, “U.S. Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security”, JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2000, Issue 26)

The strategic importance of the Caribbean is found in its resources, sea lanes, and security networks. The Caribbean Basin is the source of fuel and nonfuel minerals used in both the defense and civilian sectors. Of particular significance are petroleum and natural gas produced in Barbados, Colombia, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Moreover, though several countries and U.S. territories in the area do not have energy resources, they offer invaluable refining and transshipment functions (Aruba, Bahamas, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, and U.S. Virgin Islands). Other mineral resources from the Caribbean include bauxite, gold, nickel, copper, cobalt, emeralds, and diamonds. The Caribbean Basin has two of the world's major choke points, the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea. The former links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and saves 8,000 miles and up to 30 days of steaming time. The canal has military and civilian value. And while it is less important to the United States than it was two decades ago, other countries remain very dependent on it, and many, like Chile, Ecuador, and Japan, are militarily or politically important to Washington. Once ships enter the Atlantic from the canal they must transit Caribbean passages en route to ports of call in the United States, Europe, and Africa. The Florida Strait, Mona Passage, Windward Passage, and Yucatan Channel are the principal lanes. The Caribbean is also our southern flank. Until a decade ago the United States maintained a considerable military presence throughout the Caribbean, mainly in Puerto Rico at the Atlantic threshold, in Panama at the southern rim, and in Cuba at Guantanamo on the northern perimeter. In 1990, for instance, there were 4,743 military and civilian personnel in Puerto Rico, 20,709 in Panama, and 3,401 in Cuba. Much has changed since 1990, requiting strategic redesign and force redeployment. Today Puerto Rico is home to fewer forces, and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) relocated from Panama to Miami in September 1997, leaving behind only small components. Guantanamo, long considered to have little strategic value, serves essentially as a political outpost in the last remaining communist bastion in the hemisphere, with about 1,200 military and civilian personnel. During the 1980s the Soviet presence in Cuba included modern docks and repair facilities, reconnaissance aircraft, and satellite and surveillance capabilities. The 28-square mile base located at Lourdres monitored missile tests, intercepted satellite communications, and relayed microwave communications to diplomatic posts in the Western Hemisphere. The facility was reputedly the largest maintained by the Soviet Union abroad. It is still in operation, but not at Cold War levels. Yet fear of foreign encroachment persists. The United States is concerned about increasing Chinese interest and investment in Panama. Although such strategic affairs may not be crucial to Washington, they affect allies as well as regional stability and security and thus bear watching. Geoeconomics The mixture of geography, economics, and national power in the area exercises influence over trade and investment. For example, the Department of Commerce found that for the four-year period prior to 1988 a total of 646 U.S. companies invested over $1.5 billion in Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) beneficiary countries. Moreover, from 1986 to 1995 U.S. trade surpluses with the area grew from $297 million to $2.6 billion. In 1995 exports grew by 15 percent, to $8 billion, with the Dominican Republic and Jamaica accounting for 55 percent. That year also saw surpluses with every country except Aruba, Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago. Last year the U.S. Trade Representative told an InterAmerican Development Bank forum, "Taken as a whole, the Caribbean Basin is a larger market for our goods than ... France, Brazil, or China. Likewise, the United States is the area's natural market, taking 80 percent of its exports and providing nearly $50 billion in foreign direct investment." The United States is the largest trading partner and source of capital flows for Caribbean Community and Common Market countries. CBI nations are a principal market for U.S. exports, totaling $21.1 billion in 1998 (9.1 percent over the previous year). Exports to the Caribbean Basin accounted for 3 percent in 1998 (up 2.8 percent over the previous year). An estimated half of each dollar spent in the area is returned to the United States compared with 10 cents from Asia. Further, this trade supports some 400,000 jobs in this country and many more in the Caribbean. Moreover, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) reported in 2000 that from 1995 to 1999 it assisted in 38 projects in the area involving $3.2 billion in investments, which are expected to generate $1.5 billion in U.S. exports and, in turn, support 4,500 jobs in this country. Moreover, in February 1999, OPIC and Citibank established a $200 million investment facility for Central America and the Caribbean to help meet needs for medium- and long-term capital. Geonarcotics There are four dimensions in the drug phenomenon: production, consumption, trafficking, and money laundering. These activities threaten the security of states around the world. Narcotics operations and capital ventures which they spawn precipitate both conflict and cooperation among state and nonstate actors in the international system. Because of the global dispersion of drug traffic and physical, social, and political features of facilitating countries, power involves securing compliant action. In the drug world, this power is both state and nonstate in origin, and some nonstate sources exercise relatively more power than state entities. Politics revolves around resource allocation through the ability of power brokers to determine who gets what, when, where, and how. Because power in this milieu is not only state in origin, resource allocation is not exclusively a state function. Drug operations generate complex relationships. Some involve nonmilitary pressures such as political and economic sanctions by the United States against countries it considers not proactive enough in combating drug traffic. Yet the problem entails more than the movement of drugs from and through the area; it involves money laundering, organized crime, corruption, arms dealing, and matters of sovereignty. Such activities are reported in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report issued annually by the Department of State and are reflected in the following vignettes: Operation Dinero, an international money laundering sting conducted out of tiny Anguilla from January 1992 to December 1994, led to the seizure of nine tons of cocaine and $90 million in assets, including expensive paintings, Head of a Beggar by Pablo Picasso among them. Cocaine seizures in only five nations--Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica--totaled 3,300 kilos in 1993. Seizures for those same countries amounted to 6,230 kilos--almost double--during 1999. Between 1993 and 1998, over 9,000 deportees were returned to Jamaica, most for drug-related offenses in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In November 1998, American owned Cupid Foundations closed its business in Jamaica after 22 years with a loss of 550 jobs. Cupid could no longer afford the fines incurred with the seizure of its merchandise by U.S. Customs because of attempts to smuggle drugs in its clothing. Operation Conquistador, conducted March 10-26, 2000, involving the United States and 24 nations in the region, led to the issuance of 7,300 search warrants, arrest of 2,300 people, and seizure of 12,000 pounds of cocaine, 120 pounds of heroin, 150 pounds of hashish oil, 30 pounds of morphine base, 172 vehicles, 13 boats, and 83 guns. Between November 24, 1999, and June 6, 2000, 12 freighters were seized in Miami on arrival from Haiti with over 6,000 pounds of cocaine hidden in their cargo. Since mid-October 2000 Jamaica has produced a drug-related drama involving high-level police corruption, illegal wire-tapping of government officials, and the attempted assassination of the head of the National Firearms and Drug Intelligence Center. Traditional and Emerging Issues Security in the Caribbean has political, military, economic, and environmental implications and includes internal and external threats. Nonstate actors are as important as state actors. Indeed, many nonstate actors can mobilize more economic and military assets than some countries. Thus the security landscape reveals both traditional and nontraditional concerns. Territorial disputes and geopolitical posturing are core traditional issues. Belize, Colombia, Guatemala, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela have serious disagreements, some of which Involve multiple disputes. For example, Guyana faces claims by Venezuela for the western five-eighths of its 214,970 square kilometers of territory and by Suriname for 15,000 to the east. Drugs, political instability, migration, and the environment are major nontraditional issues. There is no uniformity in the importance ascribed to them, but a comparison of the traditional and nontraditional categories reveals a generally higher premium on nontraditional issues. Some states, such as those in the Eastern Caribbean, face no traditional security concerns or overt threats. The foremost nontraditional threat involves drugs. This multifaceted problem has increased in scope and gravity over the last decade and a half and added security effects. Crime, corruption, and arms dealing dramatically impact on national security and governance in political, military, and economic terms. They also infringe on national sovereignty. Two decades ago most Caribbean leaders were reluctant to acknowledge that their countries faced a drug threat Two decades ago most Caribbean leaders were reluctant to acknowledge that their countries faced a drug threat. But the severity of the problem grew until the danger was obvious inside and outside the area. For instance, at a meeting on criminal justice in June 2000, which was attended by officials of Europe, Canada, the Caribbean Basin, and the United States, the attorney general of Trinidad and Tobago spoke of "the direct nexus between illegal drugs and crimes of violence, sex crimes, domestic violence, maltreatment of children by parents, and other evils," and remarked that "aside from the very visible decimation of our societies caused by drug addiction and drug-related violence, there is another insidious evil: money laundering." Engagement Challenges Leaders in the Caribbean and the United States share a common assessment of the principal security concerns in the area: drugs, border disputes, poverty, corruption, natural disasters, illegal migration, insurgencies, and the environment. Consistent with this view, SOUTHCOM is focused on counterdrug operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. One basic challenge in redesigning policy or strategy is determining which instruments and modalities should be changed. Except for Cuba, engagement does not warrant revamping existing practices. Some things work well and should be retained; others do not and should be modified. This discussion addresses both types. Robert Pastor, who served on the National Security Council staff during the Carter administration, noted that Caribbean nations are too small and poor to directly challenge the United States. What really moved Washington was the threat of powerful adversaries from other parts of the world forging relationships in the area that facilitated the harassment of or attack on the United States or its neighbors. "When the threat diminishes," he remarked, "so does U.S. interest. That accounts for the apparent cycle between preoccupation at moments of intense geopolitical rivalry and neglect at times of geopolitical calm." Today's relative geopolitical calm justifies the concern of scholars and statesmen about the likelihood of a new phase of benign neglect or even worse. Hence it is important to highlight the challenge of staying engaged in both symbolic and substantive terms. Some years ago, the prime minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines declared: "We have to behave like Grenada or Fiji to get attention, and when we stop misbehaving we are left to languish in blissful obsecurity." Engagement demands flexibility and adaptability. For some missions, political expediency may require that nonmilitary personnel take the lead, or perhaps coastguardsmen as opposed to soldiers or marines. And flexibility and adaptability may be compromised by pushing the economy of force envelope too far. Also, engagement programs must not mistake silence for satisfaction. In addition, engagement requires the first team. U.S. leaders must not relegate decisionmaking to uninformed interns, junior staffers, or freshman bureaucrats. Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela are clearly hot spots that should be watched closely; but so must other countries. Guyana bears scrutiny because of resurgent territorial claims, the impact of that dispute on investment and development (especially because U.S. and Canadian investors are involved), the likelihood of political instability, and the influence of drug trafficking. Another concern is violent crime in Jamaica, some of which affects foreign tourists and investors. In addition, Jamaican organized crime poses transnational dangers to law enforcement and economic interests. Drug trafficking and economic deprivation could also lead to renewed political instability. The Dominican Republic faces issues of drug traffic, transnational crime, illegal migration, and political instability as that nation strives to translate rapid economic growth into less deprivation. The economy grew by 6.5 percent in 2000, 8.3 percent in 1999, and 7.3 percent in 1998, yet many Dominicans do not benefit from this wealth as some 20 percent of the country's 8.5 million people live in poverty. Puerto Rico also warrants attention. Although a domestic question for the United States, Vieques detracts from U.S. conflict resolution credibility. While Vieques is allegedly indispensable for Navy training, this issue highlights a troubling aspect of relations between the mainland and the island. Programs must operate on several tracks encompassing broad interagency activities. Multifaceted engagement is especially vital in counternarcotics efforts. Countermeasures must be multi-level--regional and international as well as national--because drug operations are transnational. Moreover, the measures must be implemented on a multiagency level to grapple with jurisdictional, legal, social, and economic issues precipitated by the drug problem. In addition to government agencies, a range of corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and international bodies such as the Organization of American States and the U.N. International Drug Control Program must play critical roles. Multilateral security measures do not preclude bilateralism. Indeed, such measures may be more politically expedient because they can be designed and executed faster. There may be budget incentives to act quickly. Moreover, in light of resource difficulties, a premium should be put on regulatory and operational aspects of interagency work to guard against turf and prestige battles. Whether it is an issue of drugs, territorial disputes, migrant flows, or the environment, engagement should be pursued on the basis of mutual interest. This is not always achievable. Sometimes even leaders of comparatively wealthy states, though partners, are unwilling to agree to collective efforts because of concern about their impact. Domestic factors such as political change and public opinion often make it difficult to honor or renew pledges. But despite such complications, leaders must not let the possibility of conflict undermine cooperation. There are high stakes for the United States in the Caribbean. The stakes are also high for the Caribbean countries. New defense and foreign policy initiatives may encourage effective engagement and investment of the resources to match the national interest in an area that represents a global crossroads and an essential element for regional stability.

### Caribbean impacts – FDI – OTEC impacts

#### A collapse of Caribbean stability deters FDI

Kolstad 8 (Ivar and Espen Villanger, Research Director and Senior Researcher for the Poverty Reduction Group "Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean," Development Policy Review, 2008, 26(1), p. 84-74)

5 Results: is the Caribbean different? Table 3 presents the main result in terms of testing the relative attractiveness of the Caribbean in terms of FDI flows. As it shows, the coefficient of the Caribbean dummy variable is highly significant and positive, indicating that Caribbean countries on average do better in attracting FDI than countries in other regions. By implication, hypothesis 1 can be rejected. The Caribbean is different, and in a good way. The main result was tested further using other specifications, and found to be robust. The other control variables have the expected signs and are significant in the estimation, with the exception of GDP per capita and population size, which become insignificant in other specifications. Given the above result, it is of interest to inquire into how the Caribbean is different. Table 4 presents representative results which include the Caribbean interaction terms. As can be seen from model 2, regulatory quality and stability are both significantly positive for FDI. The Caribbean-stability interaction term is and significant as shown in specifications 3 and 4, which indicates that Caribbean countries have an positive even greater effect of stability on foreign investment than other comparable countries. The results thus confirm hypothesis 2, Caribbean countries lose more to instability than countries in other regions. As for regulation, its interaction term with the Caribbean dummy is significantly negative. It is not large enough to outweigh the generally positive effect of improving the quality of regulation, but this region-specific effect suggests that the Caribbean may have forgone less FDI due to less stringent regulation than other regions. The results therefore confirm hypothesis 3 on the role of regulation. Again, this may be due to investor perceptions of the Caribbean as a haven from certain types of regulations. For the control variables, results do not differ substantially from what was noted above. The coefficient of the law index is negative, but this is most likely a result of multicollinearity, making it hard to draw conclusions for this variable. As noted earlier, the interaction of the Caribbean dummy with other policy variables, such as trade, is not robust. When there are as few observations as we have on the Caribbean interaction terms, it is necessary to investigate whether there are particular patterns in some of the countries that explain these results, or whether these are findings representative of the Caribbean countries. Our initial test of this was to exclude one of the 12 Caribbean countries, and then re-run model 3 on this sample. This test was performed for each of the 12 countries, and two interesting results emerged. First, none of the variables changed significantly in any of these 12 regressions, except for the Caribbeanregulatory- index interaction term, which became insignificant in four of the regressions, namely, when the Bahamas, Haiti, Jamaica or Grenada were excluded. The fact that a few observations drive the regulatory result implies that we cannot generalise from the significant coefficient from the full sample regressions. What we can say, however, is that policy-makers interested in increasing FDI to the four countries in question should look further into this relationship in order to find the reason for this pattern. A second test consisted of excluding pairs of Caribbean countries to investigate whether two countries together may drive the results. Thus, all combinations of two countries were excluded and model 3 was run for each alternative sample. In addition to the obvious result that the four countries discussed above affect the significance of the Caribbean regulatory-index interaction term in a similar pattern in this test, we find that the Caribbean stability interaction is affected by two country pairs. This interaction term becomes insignificant if we exclude Haiti and Guyana, and also if Dominica and Grenada are jointly excluded. Again, these findings imply that there is an extra effect of improving stability in Haiti, Guyana, Dominica and Grenada. Moreover, our estimates suggest that improving stability in these countries will lead to more than a tenfold increase in inflows of FDI compared with an average country. This may indicate that foreign investors will withdraw from countries that become unstable, but also that FDI may increase substantially in countries that move from severe instabilities and into a more stable state. We would probably get a more thorough understanding of this relationship by scrutinising the track record of FDI and stability in these four countries. 6 Concluding remarks This study is the first to examine systematically the peculiarities and particularities of foreign direct investment in the Caribbean. The results show that the Caribbean is not disadvantaged in terms of FDI; on the contrary, countries in the region attract more FDI on average than comparable countries in other regions. Unlike Africa, the Caribbean is a host region relatively favoured by foreign investors. However, the results also underscore some of the more stereotypical perceptions of the Caribbean region as a trouble spot, and as a haven from regulation. Foreign investors thus appear to conform to these stereotypes, as revealed by their investment decisions. The results on stability and regulation also have policy implications for Caribbean governments and donors. Since foreign investment in the Caribbean appears particularly sensitive to stability, efforts to improve the investment climate of countries in the region should focus on this aspect. One might also be tempted to suggest less stringent regulation, but the effect of this in the past could reflect opportunities which may have become more restricted due to new source-country regulation, and may relate to certain specific sectors only. Further research using alternative approaches and sources of data should be conducted to elicit further information on the relation between stability, regulation and investment

#### But, Bahamian FDI’s key to global OTEC --- solves water, food and hydrogen shortages

Smith 7 (Larry, Former Reporter and Editor of the Nassau Tribune, Owner and Operator of Bahamas Media, Member of the Board of Directors of the Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas, Degrees in Political Scince and Journalism from the University of Miami, "In Pursuit of OTEC in the Bahamas," Bahama Pundit, June 13, www.bahamapundit.com/2007/06/in\_pursuit\_of\_o.html)

OTEC is a 19th century idea that uses the sea as a gigantic solar collector, but it has proved difficult to implement - for both technical and economic reasons. Some experts are now saying that its time may have come. They argue that technical advances and economic changes have made OTEC a cost-effective alternative to fossil fuels for many tropical island communities. And in addition to electricity, these systems offer the bonus of producing fresh water and hydrogen, as well as nutrients for mariculture and agriculture. "It has long been known that some of the sun's energy can be re-captured at sites where there is a substantial difference in sea water temperature (say about 40 degrees Fahrenheit)," Bardelmeier told Rotarians. "This re-captured heat energy can be used to generate electricity." Essentially, an OTEC plant pumps warm surface sea water into a tank. The air in the tank is pumped out to create a vacuum, which vapourises the water. The steam spins a turbine to generate electricity, and then passes through a heat exchanger where it is condensed - by cold water pumped up from the ocean - into fresh water. And from the sound of things, the Bahamas is just about the best place on Earth to locate such a facility. As Bardelmeier pointed out, the ideal OTEC site must be within the tropics, have a steep drop-off where the water plunges to over 3,000 feet, and be close to a power grid. "In essence this describes the southwest corner of New Providence," Bardelmeier said. And in fact, that's where E. P. Taylor's New Providence Development Company planned to build an OTEC plant about 40 years ago. Taylor was the Canadian investor who developed Lyford Cay. And in 1966 his NPDC was run by an engineer named John Bainton - a long-time friend of Bardelmeier, who shared his interest in ocean thermal energy conversion. Bainton died in 1989 at the age of 63, but his widow, Aileen, still lives at Lyford Cay. In fact, Bainton went so far as to charter a Deepstar research submersible to dive to the bottom of the Tongue of the Ocean. And in 1967 he commissioned one of Canada's top engineering firms to study the feasibility of an OTEC facility at Clifton - just west of the BEC power plant. The idea was to develop a 10,000 kilowatt sea thermal power plant that would also produce 6 million gallons a day of fresh water. Back then, the construction cost was estimated at about $19 million (assuming duty-free imports). "Jack gave a talk about it to one of the service clubs," Bardelmeier told Tough Call. "But no-one got very excited. They spent a lot of money, and had some innovative design ideas, but it never lit off. Jack was ahead of his time." One of the stated reasons for Bainton's interest was the possibility that NPDC might get into the aragonite mining business, which needed a supply of low-cost power. Aragonite is a sand formed by chemical precipitation in the ocean and huge amounts are deposited onto the Bahama Banks. Mining of this resource was introduced near Bimini in 1969. Lerner Marine Labs of Bimini had the initial concession but turned it over to Union Carbide, which sold it to the Dillingham Corporation, a big US construction and engineering firm. The idea was to supply millions of tons of pure Bahamian sand to cement manufacturers and glassmakers on the US eastern seaboard. Bardelmeier was Dillingham's shipping advisor at the time. "Cement-making was a cheapy big market," Bardelmeier recalled. "You had to deliver a ton of aragonite to General Portland Cement in Tampa for $2. That meant 90 cents per ton for freight, which was pretty skinny. So the netback to Ocean Cay was maybe $1.10 per ton. Profitability lay in producing at least five million tons a year." And coincidentally, in 1979 Dillingham was involved in building a floating OTEC prototype plant off Hawaii. That was soon after the Arab oil embargo of 1973 had spurred intense interest in renewable energy systems. After Dillingham sold its Bahamas aragonite operation, Bardelmeier tried to enlist Willard Rockwell, the chairman of one of America's largest technology companies, who had become famous for his role in building the Space Shuttle. Rockwell owned a vacation home at Cat Cay, an upscale resort close to the aragonite concession at Ocean Cay. "He came to Nassau in his 'copter one day and landed right across from our office at the Pilot House, climbed our fire escape and pounded on the door." Bardelmeier said. "Unlike the other Cat Cayers who didn't welcome the industrial sights at Ocean Cay, Rockwell thought he might buy the aragonite project, but after a lot of research he backed off." Bardelmeier exploited the contact with Rockwell to present his own proposal for an OTEC plant at Clifton. In 1984 he told Rockwell that such a facility would be capital intensive, but once built would have virtually no maintenance, labour or fuel costs. "At the southwest corner of New Providence is an area of shallow heated sand flats which adjoin a 6,000-foot-deep underwater canyon," Bardelmeier wrote in his proposal. "Onshore at this point is the government-owned electricity plant with its existing distribution systems...and the cost of electric power in Nassau is among the highest in the western world." His proposal called for a private corporation to negotiate a 40-year contract with the government to build a 40,000kw OTEC power station at Clifton Cay, both as a demonstration project and to sell power to BEC. He added that the US government might be willing to help fund the project. But Rockwell turned him down. In those days the most expensive parts of an OTEC plant were the large-diameter cold water pipes which would have to extend for a length of 14,000 feet to a depth of 3200 feet to draw cold water. There was no experience then in laying pipe to such depths, but nowadays engineers can lay large-diameter pipe to much greater depths. This became evident a few years ago when investors proposed replacing the barging of fresh water from Andros to New Providence with a 30-mile undersea pipeline through the Tongue of the Ocean. But independent experts said the pipeline was an untried technology compared to the reverse osmosis plants favoured by the Water & Sewerage Corporation. "We know exactly what an RO plant costs, how to build it, and how it works. They operate worldwide and produce drinking water in 10 Caribbean countries successfully." This is essentially the same argument used when comparing ocean thermal energy with conventional fossil fuel power generation. Despite the fact that French Scientist Jacques D’Arsoval described the OTEC concept over a century ago, there has been slow progress in developing the engineering systems to realize its potential. But at least one Bahamas-based investor is interested. Frank Crothers of Island Corporate Holdings is a major shareholder of Caribbean Utilities Company in the Cayman Islands (as well as serving on the board of a zillion other companies). Cayman's proposed plant will produce 10 megawatts of electricity and 3 million gallons of fresh water per day. The utility has a memorandum of understanding with the Baltimore-based Sea Solar International, and officials are saying that OTEC electricity could be produced within three years. Currently, no OTEC plant operates at a commercial scale equivalent to conventional power stations or wind and mini-hydro plants. But there is a lot of interest in Pacific islands like Hawaii, which has a leading-edge OTEC laboratory where working models have been proven and a deep cold water pipe is already in place. In fact, Hawaii exported about $17 million worth of desalinated deepsea water in 2005, marketed as healthy, pure, mineral-rich drinking water. Experts say OTEC facilities can reuse cold outfall water for air-conditioning, refrigeration, agriculture and mariculture. For example, David Melville, a long-time investor on Rum Cay, grows organic wheat grass at his Port Nelson home using only the nutrients contained in deepsea water provided by a Florida company in which he owns shares (www.oceangrown.com). And a few years ago, another American investor proposed an OTEC scheme for Inagua that would have used deepsea water to grow several commercial marine species on land. But Bardelmeier says the Bahamas is not tracking scientific developments in the renewable energy field: "Perhaps it would be a worthy role of government to create a small, non-political entity to monitor the global scientific community and disseminate studies to the public domain, rather than treating them as secrets or leaving them to gather dust on a shelf," he told Rotarians. "It is only a matter of time before some of the venture capitalists who constantly pass through or live here take a hard look at building a modest OTEC plant to sell power to BEC and get in on the ground floor of what may well be a widespread island industry around the globe in the next two decades."

#### Food shortages cause extinction

Klare 6 (Michael, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies – Hampshire College, “The Coming Resource Wars”, 3-11, http://www.waterconserve.org/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkid=53710&keybold=water%20 land%20conflict)

"As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to abrupt climate change," the Pentagon report notes, "many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity" -- that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements for human survival. This "will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression" against countries with a greater stock of vital resources. "Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply." Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those without the means to survival invade or migrate to those with greater abundance -- producing endless struggles between resource "haves" and "have-nots." It is this prospect, more than anything, that worries John Reid. In particular, he expressed concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and the resulting risk of state collapse, civil war and mass migration. "More than 300 million people in Africa currently lack access to safe water," he observed, and "climate change will worsen this dire situation" -- provoking more wars like Darfur. And even if these social disasters will occur primarily in the developing world, the wealthier countries will also be caught up in them, whether by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations, by fending off unwanted migrants or by fighting for access to overseas supplies of food, oil, and minerals. When reading of these nightmarish scenarios, it is easy to conjure up images of desperate, starving people killing one another with knives, staves and clubs -- as was certainly often the case in the past, and could easily prove to be so again. But these scenarios also envision the use of more deadly weapons. "In this world of warring states," the 2003 Pentagon report predicted, "nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable." As oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their energy needs -- and this "will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security." Although speculative, these reports make one thing clear: when thinking about the calamitous effects of global climate change, we must emphasize its social and political consequences as much as its purely environmental effects. Drought, flooding and storms can kill us, and surely will -- but so will wars among the survivors of these catastrophes over what remains of food, water and shelter. As Reid's comments indicate, no society, however affluent, will escape involvement in these forms of conflict.

#### OTEC solves fisheries and plankton growth

Avery, 94 (William Avery, 1994. B.S. in chemistry from Pomona College and his A.M. and Ph.D. degrees in physical chemistry from Harvard. “Renewable energy from the ocean: a guide to OTEC,” p. 425-427.)

Gains of plankton organisms may result some distance away from the OTEC plant as a result of increased nutrient input to euphotic zones that are associated with the shoaling of isopycnal and nutricline. Since plankton is important in the marine food chain, enhanced productivity due to redistribution of nutrients may improve fishing. Fish, which in general are attracted to offshore structures, are expected to increase their ambient concentration near OTEC plants. The world annual yield of marine fisheries is presently 70 million tons, with most fish caught on continental shelves. In fact, the open ocean (90% of the total ocean area) produces only about 0.7% of the fish because most of the nutrients in the surface water are extracted by plants and drift down to the ocean floor in the remains of plant or animal life. The water in the coastal zones is continually supplied with fresh nutrients in the runoff from the adjacent land and, hence, supports a high level of plant life activity and produces 54% of the fish. Only 0.1 % of the ocean area lies in the upwelling regions, where nutrient-laden water is brought up from the ocean depths, yet these regions produce 44% of the fish The reason for this spectacular difference can be seen in Table 9-9, which shows that the nitrate and phosphorus concentrations in deep seawater are about 150 and 5 times more, respectively, than their counterpart concentrations in surface water at a typical site (St. Croix in the Virgin Islands). Proposals to produce artificial upwelling, including one using nuclear power, have concluded that the cost would be excessive. Roels (1980) studied the possibility of using a shore-based OTEC plant to supply nutrient-laden water to a mariculture system, with a series of experiments carried out at St. Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands. At that site the ocean is 1000 m deep only 1.6 km offshore. Three polyethylene pipelines, 6.9 em in diameter and 1830 m long, have brought approximately 250 liters/min of bottom water into 5-m3 pools where diatoms from laboratory cultures are grown. The food-laden effluent flows through metered channels to pools where shellfish are raised. The resulting protein production rate was excellent; 78% of the inorganic nitrogen in the deep seawater was converted to phytoplankton-protein nitrogen, and 22% of that was converted to clam-meat protein nitrogen. This compares with plant-protein/animal-protein conversion ratios of31 % for cows' milk production and 6.5% for feedlot beef production. The production of seafood is therefore more efficient than that of beef. Thus, shifts from beef to seafood, already underway in some societies for health reasons, could help to meet world needs for high-quality food. Net gains of plankton organisms may result some distance away from the OTEC plant as a result of increased nutrient input to the euphotic zone associated with the shoaling of isopycnal and nutricline. Increased harvests of small oceanic fish, which feed on plankton, would result.

#### Plankton solve extinction

UPI, 8 (UPI, 6/6/2008. “Acidic oceans may tangle food chain,” <http://www.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2008/06/06/Acidic_oceans_may_tangle_food_chain/UPI-84651212763771/print/>.)

Increased carbon levels in ocean water could have devastating impacts on marine life, scientists testified Thursday at a congressional hearing. Although most of the concern about carbon emissions has focused on the atmosphere and resulting temperature changes, accumulation of carbon dioxide in the ocean also could have disturbing outcomes, experts said at the hearing, which examined legislation that would create a program to study how the ocean responds to increased carbon levels. Ocean surface waters quickly absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, so as carbon concentrations rise in the skies, they also skyrocket in the watery depths that cover almost 70 percent of the planet. As carbon dioxide increases in oceans, the acidity of the water also rises, and this change could affect a wide variety of organisms, said Scott Doney, senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, a non-profit research institute based in Woods Hole, Mass. "Greater acidity slows the growth or even dissolves ocean plant and animal shells built from calcium carbonate," Doney told representatives in the House Committee on Energy and the Environment. "Acidification thus threatens a wide range of marine organisms, from microscopic plankton and shellfish to massive coral reefs." If small organisms, like phytoplankton, are knocked out by acidity, the ripples would be far-reaching, said David Adamec, head of ocean sciences at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. "If the amount of phytoplankton is reduced, you reduce the amount of photosynthesis going on in the ocean," Adamec told United Press International. "Those little guys are responsible for half of the oxygen you're breathing right now." A hit to microscopic organisms can also bring down a whole food chain. For instance, several years ago, an El Nino event wiped out the phytoplankton near the Galapagos Islands. That year, juvenile bird and seal populations almost disappeared. If ocean acidity stunted phytoplankton populations like the El Nino did that year, a similar result would occur -- but it would last for much longer than one year, potentially leading to extinction for some species, Adamec said. While it's clear increased acidity makes it difficult for phytoplankton to thrive, scientists don't know what level of acidity will result in catastrophic damages, said Wayne Esaias, a NASA oceanographer. "There's no hard and fast number we can use," he told UPI. In fact, although scientists can guess at the impacts of acidity, no one's sure what will happen in reality. Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., pointed to this uncertainty at Thursday's hearing. "The ocean will be very different with increased levels of carbon dioxide, but I don't know if it will be better or worse," Bartlett said. However, even though it's not clear what the changes will be, the risk of doing nothing could be disastrous for ecosystems, said Ken Caldeira, a scientist at the Carnegie Institution for Science, a non-profit research organization. "The systems that are adapted to very precise chemical or climatological conditions will disappear and be replaced by species which, on land, we call weeds," Caldeira said. "What is the level of irreversible environmental risk that you're willing to take?" It's precisely this uncertainty that the Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act attempts to address. The bill creates a federal committee within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to monitor carbon dioxide levels in ocean waters and research the impacts of acidification. like Bishop. "We would lose everything," he told UPI.

#### Fish decline causes global war

Pomeroy 7 (Robert, Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics – University of Connecticut, et al, “Fish Wars: Conflict and Collaboration in Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia”, Marine Policy, 31(6), p. 647)

The result of overfishing and multiple sources of fishing pressure in Southeast Asian coastal waters is the reduction or collapse of important fishery populations, leading to high levels of conflict among different users over remaining stocks [12]. A complex, negative feedback cycle is created in this situation, whereby rapid population growth paralleled by fewer economic opportunities and access to land increases the number of people living in the coastal zone dependent on fishery resources and thus the number of fishers. Increased fishing pressure results in fish population declines and stock collapses and increased resource competition, both between fishers and scales of fishing operation (e.g., small vs. commercial). The result is reduced income and food security, increased poverty, and a lower overall standard of living and national welfare. This in turn drives users to employ more destructive and overefficient fishing technologies in the ‘‘rush’’ to catch what remains, thereby further depleting fishery populations. These factors lead to further increased user competition, and thus higher rates and probabilities of human conflict, over remaining stocks. This destructive cycle leads to a pattern of self-reinforcing ‘‘fish wars’’ with deteriorating social and environmental consequences. Decreasing fish stocks combined with increasing conflict are driving some people out of the fishery. This is leading to increasing unemployment in many rural areas. This added level of instability is thought to fuel national levels of social unrest and political instability, thereby acting as a powerful and destabilizing risk factor to regional and global security concerns.

#### OTEC solves extinction via sea colonies

Savage, 92 (Marshall Savage, Professor of English at USC. “The Millennial Project: Colonizing the Galaxy in Eight Easy Steps,” p. 94-95.)

Every space colony is an ark. Aquarius will serve not only as the jumping off point for the colonization of space, but also as a reserve ark for the potential recolonization of Earth. Life must be preserved; we, the caretakers of Life, must survive to preserve it. Our planet is threatened by a variety of calamities. Some are developing as slowly as an eroding atmosphere; others could come as suddenly as a nuclear blast. In any case, if catastrophe does overtake us, there must be some seed of surviving human culture from which to rebuild civilization. Without man, or some other intelligent tool user, Life will be condemned to remain bound to this single tiny planet-perhaps forever. If Life is to survive then we too must survive. Aquarius can fulfill the role of planetary ark admirably. Sheltered in the warm equatorial waters, our floating marine colony can survive almost any conceivable disaster, including nuclear war. The warm waters of the tropical oceans will give up only a fraction of their heat even if the rest of the planet is plunged into nuclear winter for months. Similarly, the catastrophic climatic effects of nuclear winter that will ravage the mid-latitudes with colossal hurricanes, typhoons, and tornadoes, will leave the stable equatorial belt more or less unaffected. Aquarius is self-sufficient in energy, food, and most other things. While the rest of humanity attempts to cope with a shattered world: unable to raise crops, perhaps for years; ravaged by social and political anarchy; decimated by plagues, pestilence, floods and droughts; and slowly poisoned by radiation in the food chain; the people of Aquarius will be relatively unharmed. The social dissolution following nuclear war is likely to be as destructive to life and civilization as the war itself. No trace of social order is likely to survive in the countries actually blasted by the bombs. Massive upheavals will shred the already tattered social fabric even in countries left unmolested. By the time radiation, starvation, riots, poverty and disease have reaped their grim harvest, there will be only isolated pockets of survivors clinging to life here and there around the world. At that point, it will be up to the scientists, technicians, artists, poets, and philosophers of Aquarius-just as in the legends of Atlantis-to recolonize this planet.

## ADV Environment

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#### Offshore oil drilling in the Cuban Basin is inevitable – Without US technical expertise catastrophic oil spills are inevitable

Melissa Bert (a military fellow (U.S. Coast Guard) at the Council on Foreign Relations) and Blake Clayton (fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations) 2012 “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill”, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515

The imminent drilling of Cuba's first offshore oil well raises the prospect of a large-scale oil spill in Cuban waters washing onto U.S. shores. Washington should anticipate this possibility by implementing policies that would help both countries' governments stem and clean up an oil spill effectively. These policies should ensure that both the U.S. government and the domestic oil industry are operationally and financially ready to deal with any spill that threatens U.S. waters. These policies should be as minimally disruptive as possible to the country's broader Cuba strategy.¶ The Problem¶ A Chinese-built semisubmersible oil rig leased by Repsol, a Spanish oil company, arrived in Cuban waters in January 2012 to drill Cuba's first exploratory offshore oil well. Early estimates suggest that Cuban offshore oil and natural gas reserves are substantial—somewhere between five billion and twenty billion barrels of oil and upward of eight billion cubic feet of natural gas. Although the United States typically welcomes greater volumes of crude oil coming from countries that are not members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a surge in Cuban oil production would complicate the United States' decades-old effort to economically isolate the Castro regime.¶ Deepwater drilling off the Cuban coast also poses a threat to the United States. The exploratory well is seventy miles off the Florida coast and lies at a depth of 5,800 feet. The failed Macondo well that triggered the calamitous Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010 had broadly similar features, situated forty-eight miles from shore and approximately five thousand feet below sea level. A spill off Florida's coast could ravage the state's $57 billion per year tourism industry.¶ Washington cannot count on the technical know-how of Cuba's unseasoned oil industry to address a spill on its own. Oil industry experts doubt that it has a strong understanding of how to prevent an offshore oil spill or stem a deep-water well blowout. Moreover, the site where the first wells will be drilled is a tough one for even seasoned response teams to operate in. Unlike the calm Gulf of Mexico, the surface currents in the area where Repsol will be drilling move at a brisk three to four knots, which would bring oil from Cuba's offshore wells to the Florida coast within six to ten days. Skimming or burning the oil may not be feasible in such fast-moving water. The most, and possibly only, effective method to respond to a spill would be surface and subsurface dispersants. If dispersants are not applied close to the source within four days after a spill, uncontained oil cannot be dispersed, burnt, or skimmed, which would render standard response technologies like containment booms ineffective.¶ Repsol has been forthcoming in disclosing its spill response plans to U.S. authorities and allowing them to inspect the drilling rig, but the Russian and Chinese companies that are already negotiating with Cuba to lease acreage might not be as cooperative. Had Repsol not volunteered to have the Cuba-bound drilling rig examined by the U.S. Coast Guard and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to certify that it met international standards, Washington would have had little legal recourse.¶ The complexity of U.S.-Cuba relations since the 1962 trade embargo complicates even limited efforts to put in place a spill response plan. Under U.S. law and with few exceptions, American companies cannot assist the Cuban government or provide equipment to foreign companies operating in Cuban territory.¶ Shortfalls in U.S. federal regulations governing commercial liability for oil spills pose a further problem. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) does not protect U.S. citizens and property against damages stemming from a blown-out wellhead outside of U.S. territory. In the case of Deepwater Horizon, BP was liable despite being a foreign company because it was operating within the United States. Were any of the wells that Repsol drills to go haywire, the cost of funding a response would fall to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is woefully undercapitalized. OPA 90 limits the OSLTF from paying out more than $50 million in a fiscal year on oil removal costs, subject to a few exceptions, and requires congressional appropriation to pay out more than $150 million.¶ The Way Forward¶ As a first step, the United States should discuss contingency planning for a Cuban oil spill at the regular multiparty talks it holds with Mexico, the Bahamas, Cuba, and others per the Cartagena Convention. The Caribbean Island Oil Pollution Response and Cooperation Plan provides an operational framework under which the United States and Cuba can jointly develop systems for identifying and reporting an oil spill, implement a means of restricting the spread of oil, and identify resources to respond to a spill.¶ Washington should also instruct the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct basic spill response coordination with its counterparts in Cuba. The United States already has operational agreements in place with Mexico, Canada, and several countries in the Caribbean that call for routine exercises, emergency response coordination, and communication protocols. It should strike an agreement with Cuba that is substantively similar but narrower in scope, limited to basic spill-oriented advance coordination and communication. Before that step can be taken, U.S. lawmakers may need to amend the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 to allow for limited, spill-related coordination and communication with the Cuban government.¶ Next, President Barack Obama should issue an export-only industry-wide general license for oil spill response in Cuban waters, effective immediately. Issuing that license does not require congressional authorization. The license should allow offshore oil companies to do vital spill response work in Cuban territory, such as capping a well or drilling a relief well. Oil service companies, such as Halliburton, should be included in the authorization.¶ Finally, Congress should alter existing oil spill compensation policy. Lawmakers should amend OPA 90 to ensure there is a responsible party for oil spills from a foreign offshore unit that pollutes or threatens to pollute U.S. waters, like there is for vessels. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Congressman David Rivera (R-FL) have sponsored such legislation. Lawmakers should eliminate the requirement for the Coast Guard to obtain congressional approval on expenditures above $150 million for spills of national significance (as defined by the National Response Plan). And President Obama should appoint a commission to determine the appropriate limit of liability cap under OPA 90, balancing the need to compensate victims with the desire to retain strict liability for polluters.¶ There are two other, less essential measures U.S. lawmakers may consider that would enable the country to respond more adeptly to a spill. Installing an early-response system based on acoustic, geophysical, or other technologies in the Straits of Florida would immediately alert the U.S. Coast Guard about a well blowout or other unusual activity. The U.S. Department of Energy should find out from Repsol about the characteristics of Cuban crude oil, which would help U.S. authorities predict how the oil would spread in the case of a well blowout.¶ Defending U.S. Interests¶ An oil well blowout in Cuban waters would almost certainly require a U.S. response. Without changes in current U.S. law, however, that response would undoubtedly come far more slowly than is desirable. The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S. offshore gas and oil companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and other vital technologies. Although a handful of U.S. spill responders hold licenses to work with Repsol, their licenses do not extend to well capping or relief drilling. The result of a slow response to a Cuban oil spill would be greater, perhaps catastrophic, economic and environmental damage to Florida and the Southeast.¶ Efforts to rewrite current law and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging cooperation with its government, could antagonize groups opposed to improved relations with the Castro regime. They might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory.¶ However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban waters would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba. For years, Washington has worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely coordinates with Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well as to combat illicit drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides Cuba with information on Caribbean storms.¶ The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to the specific challenges that a Cuban oil spill poses to the United States. They would not help the Cuban economy or military. What they would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger emanating from Cuba.¶ Cuba will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States. Defending against a potential oil spill requires a modicum of advance coordination and preparation with the Cuban government, which need not go beyond spill-related matters. Without taking these precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon, this time from Cuba.

#### Cuban oil spill will crush marine coastal life throughout Cuba, Florida coastlines, and the Gulf of Mexico – Unique coral reefs and mangroves will be destroyed

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

If a spill were to occur in Cuban waters, marine and coastal resources of the United States, Cuba, ¶ and the Bahamas could be placed at significant risk. Fisheries, coastal tourism, recreation, and ¶ other natural resources-based enterprises and activities in the region could experience adverse impacts on the scale of weeks to years, or even decades. Multiple factors—including the type ¶ and amount of oil spilled, the environment in which the oil spilled, and prevailing weather and ¶ ocean current conditions—would play key factors in determining the extent and gravity of a ¶ spill’s impact.45¶ In Cuba, marine and coastal habitats could suffer substantial long-term harm which could ¶ degrade, in turn, entire populations and habitats downstream in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. ¶ According to Dr. John W. Tunnell, Jr., associate director of the Harte Research Institute and an ¶ expert on the Gulf of Mexico marine environment, the primary three habitats at risk on Cuba’s ¶ North Coast near the area where exploration is occurring are coral reefs, seagrass beds, and lush ¶ mangrove forests.46 These habitats are found throughout the region, but in greatest abundance ¶ in the Archipelago Sabana-Camaguey and the Archipelago Los Colorados, where they provide ¶ breeding, nursery, and feeding habitats for commercial fish species, including grouper, snapper, ¶ and grunts.¶ If chemical dispersants were used as part of the clean-up effort, they could reduce impacts ¶ on fauna for which oiling per se is the greatest threat (e.g. birds) but also add additional toxicity, ¶ as well as alter the transport and ecological fate of oil constituents moving through the water ¶ column and then into the air or back towards the bottom. Dispersed oil could have greater ¶ deleterious effect on Cuba’s coral reefs, which are fragile, slow-growing, and have low resilience ¶ to physical and chemical stresses.47 Like salt marshes, coastal mangrove swamps are also ¶ difficult to clean up in the aftermath of an oil spill, and mangroves can die within a week to ¶ several months as a result of oil exposure.48 Reduced from their formerly healthy, vibrant state, ¶ such important habitats could lose their ability to support the fisheries and marine life that ¶ depend on them.

#### Collapse of the coral reef ecosystem collapses the biosphere

Robin Kundis Craig (Associate Prof Law, Indiana U School Law) 2003

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us.

### Cuban Drilling = Oil Spill

#### Drilling causes catastrophic oil spills – US companies can’t prevent or mitigate the spill

Allen 12 (Greg – NPR, “U.S. Watches Closely As Oil Drilling Begins Off Cuba”, 2/13, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/13/146635957/u-s-watches-closely-as-oil-drilling-begins-off-cuba)

There are big plans for oil exploration in the Caribbean, not far off the coast of Florida. A Spanish company recently began drilling in Cuban waters — just 55 miles from Key West. The well is the first of several exploratory wells planned in Cuba and the Bahamas. The drilling has officials and researchers in Florida scrambling to make plans for how they'll respond in case of a spill. The U.S. currently doesn't allow any drilling for oil off its Atlantic coast or in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. One reason is what's at stake. Florida's tourism-based economy depends on its beaches, fishing and clear Caribbean water. Environmental Concerns The U.S. ban on drilling off of Florida, however, doesn't affect America's Caribbean neighbors. The exploratory well being drilled off of Cuba has many here concerned, including people like Richard Dodge. Dodge is the dean of Nova Southeastern University's Oceanographic Center in Dania Beach, near Fort Lauderdale, and what he's really concerned about is coral. At the school, Dodge and his graduate students raise staghorn coral in outdoor saltwater tanks. Live coral grow in the crystal-clear water, some just finger length. "These are relatively new ones that we're starting out," Dodge says. "But over here, these are ones we'll be transplanting to the wild." In another tank, large branches of coral will soon be used to help restore damaged reefs. Florida is home to more than three-quarters of the nation's coral reefs — and they haven't been doing so well. Development and warming oceans have already weakened many. On a map, Dodge points out the location of what he believes is an even bigger potential threat — the spot where Cuba has approved offshore oil drilling. "The site that will be drilled," he says, "is only about 50 miles from Key West." The rig drilling off Cuba's northern coast is operating in water that is more than a mile deep. But it's not the depth that concerns Dodge. In the case of a blowout, it's the operation's proximity to the Gulf Stream. "We're worried that it could get into that stream fast and therefore, within days, impact our coastal ecosystem and coastline," Dodge says. A spill could potentially affect hundreds of miles of beaches, mangroves and estuaries from the Keys to Palm Beach. Dodge and other marine scientists in Florida are asking the federal government to fund research that would help identify the resources most at risk, and develop guidelines to protect them. Embargo Could Complicate Cleanup Complicating matters is the fact that this new well is being drilled in the waters of a country that's under a strict U.S. embargo. Unless they apply for and receive special permission from the government, U.S. companies are banned from doing any work on the well — even if there's a spill.

### A2 no drilling

#### Drilling is inevitable – cuba wants to act and international actors are lining up

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

In May 2012, the Spanish oil company Repsol announced it had drilled a dry hole during its ¶ deepwater exploration in Cuba. After having spent roughly $150 million on two failed wells in ¶ Cuba’s waters (the first being in 2004), the company revealed it would likely exit the island and ¶ explore more profitable fields such as those in Angola and Brazil. In August 2012, Cuba’s state ¶ oil company announced that the latest offshore exploration project—a well drilled by Malaysia’s ¶ state-owned Petronas on Cuba’s northwest coast—was also unsuccessful.¶ To some, the outcome of three failed wells out of three attempts in Cuban waters may ¶ suggest that the threat of a catastrophic offshore spill impacting U.S. waters and the shared ¶ ecosystems of the Gulf of Mexico is now moot. To the contrary, the issue is salient now more ¶ than ever. Cuba has an existing near-coastal oil industry on its north coast near Matanzas, a ¶ near- single-source dependency on imported petroleum from Venezuela, and has exhibited ¶ continued strong interest in developing its own offshore capacity. Several additional foreign oil ¶ companies are slated to conduct exploratory deepwater drilling in Cuba at least through 2013.

### US Expertise Key

#### Drilling inevitable – US involvement and expertise key to prevent oil spill and lays the foundation for cooperative relations

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

Current U.S. foreign policy on Cuba creates a conspicuous blind spot that is detrimental to ¶ the interests of both countries. The United States government enacted stricter regulations ¶ governing deepwater drilling in U.S. waters in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, ¶ and has publicly acknowledged a need to better prepare for a potential major spill in ¶ neighboring Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Yet U.S. policy still does not do enough to ¶ lessen the likelihood of such a spill or to ensure that sufficient resources will be at the ready to ¶ respond to a spill in a timely and effective manner. Beyond their geographical proximity, Cuba and the United States are tightly interconnected by ocean currents and share ecosystems such ¶ that a spill in either country could have profound impacts on fisheries, tourism, and recreation ¶ in the entire region. Yet, due to longstanding U.S. economic sanctions, international operators ¶ working in Cuba are unable to turn northward to the United States to freely access equipment ¶ and expertise in the event of an oil disaster.¶ The purpose of this report is to present EDF’s position that direct dialogue and cooperation ¶ between the United States and Cuba on environmental and safety matters associated with offshore oil and gas development is the only effective pathway to protect valuable environmental ¶ and economic interests in both countries. Cooperation now on safety and environmental ¶ preparedness surrounding offshore oil can also lay a foundation for broader constructive ¶ engagement on environmental protection and natural resources management in the future. ¶ Principally, this report addresses U.S. policy toward Cuba and makes recommendations for ¶ improving environmental and safety preparedness related to offshore oil exploration and ¶ development in Cuba. This report is not intended nor does it purport to serve as a comprehensive analysis of Cuba’s domestic energy strategy, policies, laws, or regulations.¶ Deepwater drilling off the northern coast of Cuba and in many other areas of the Gulf ¶ ofMexico poses a potential threat to sensitive and vulnerable marine and coastal ecosystems ¶ and to coastal communities. Cuba has a sovereign right to determine whether to exploit oil ¶ andgas resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in the same way other nations ¶ do,including Cuba’s neighbors in the Gulf of Mexico, the United States and Mexico. Other ¶ Caribbean countries, such as the Bahamas, are also considering offshore oil and gas operations ¶ in the future. The underlying reality is that the Cuban government will continue with its drilling ¶ activities, with or without the acquiescence of U.S. policymakers.

#### US expertise in Cuban drilling operations is necessary to prevent oil spills

Helman 11 (Christopher – Forbes, “U.S. Should Drop Cuba Embargo For Oil Exploration”, 12/12, http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/12/12/u-s-should-drop-cuba-embargo-for-oil-exploration/)

In a few months Spanish oil company Repsol will start drilling for oil off the coast of Cuba, in a spot just 70 miles south of Key West. Soon Repsol–and its JV partners Norway’s Statoil and India’s ONGC–will be joined by rigs from PetroVietnam, Malaysia’s Petronas and Venezuela’s PDVSA. But you won’t see any U.S. companies there. Inexplicably, the U.S. maintains its economic embargo against the Castro regime.This wrong-headed policy represents a dangerous threat to the environment and a huge missed opportunity to the U.S. oil industry. The U.S. embargo will do nothing to prevent oil drilling from taking place in Cuban waters. But it will prevent that work from being done by the most experienced companies with the highest-quality equipment. Norway’s Statoil is a proven operator with a long history in the North Sea and the Gulf. The rest of those companies are just getting started offshore. A group of U.S. lawmakers in September urged Repsol (ticker: REPYY.PK) to call off its Cuba plans or face the threat of U.S. lawsuits. Repsol wisely called that bluff. At least the Obama administration is doing something to ensure that Repsol’s drilling rig is up to snuff. According to an excellent article from Bloomberg today, Repsol’s Chinese-built Scarabeo 9 rig will soon by boarded by four U.S. inspectors (two from the Coast Guard, two from the Dept. of Interior) who will do what they can to check out the rig and watch some drills. But, according to the article, there will be real limits to what the inspectors can inspect. They won’t get to check the rig’s all-important blowout preventor, or the well casing or drilling fluids that are to be used. Though the U.S. inspectors will discuss any concerns they have with Repsol, they will have no enforcement authority. Although the offshore industry’s best service companies and parts manufacturers are right here on the U.S. Gulf coast, Repsol will have to train its people and scrounge for spare parts from the rest of the world. But here’s something that completely blows my mind. The administration, again, according to the Bloomberg article, has granted some U.S. companies the license to respond to an oil spill were it to occur in Cuban waters. The government won’t say how many companies have that license or who they are, but there’s at least two of them: Wild Well Control and Helix Energy Solutions Group. Helix plans to stage a subsea containment cap on the U.S. coast so it can quickly respond to any Cuban blowout. Of course it’s smart and safe for the U.S. government to put defensive measures in place in the event of a spill, but the message to the industry is clear: we refuse to give superior U.S. operators the license to drill for oil in Cuba, but we want to make sure you’re ready to clean up any problems. And the message to Cuba: we’re not going to let you use our engineers, just our janitors. Knowing that a top-notch American clean-up crew is on standby in case of a blowout is not a big incentive for Cuba to keep its own regulators on top of things. Think about Cuba in relation to U.S. oil adventures in the rest of the world. Even if Cuba really were a tyrannical threat to U.S. interests, there’s myriad countries where U.S. oil companies have done business that are no more democratic than Cuba. They include Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Libya, Equatorial Guinea and Kazakhstan. The Castros’ days as rulers of Cuba are numbered. The embargo stick hasn’t brought regime change, and has only forced Cuba into the arms of autocrats like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Better to use the carrot of capitalism to gradually bring Cuba into the U.S. sphere of influence. The oil industry is a great place to start.

### Cuba coral key

#### Cuba is the crown jewel of marine biodiversity

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

Situated at the convergence point of the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean Sea, ¶ Cuba is a biological crown jewel that boasts the largest marine biodiversity in the Caribbean. ¶ The country’s expanses of mangrove forests, wetlands, seagrass meadows, and coral reefs ¶ provide critical spawning areas, feeding grounds, and shelter for a wide array of marine animals, ¶ plants, and organisms.¶ Its location within the Caribbean makes Cuba a prime migratory corridor and wintering site, ¶ particularly given its positioning along the Mississippi and East Atlantic flyways. Cuba provides ¶ crucial refueling habitat for 284 bird species that breed in the United States, including warblers, ¶ orioles and other song birds, shore birds and wading birds, and raptorial birds.2¶ Cuba’s network ¶ of wetlands provide extremely important habitat for waterbird species—including flamingos, ¶ ibises, cormorants, egrets, and spoonbills—that form in record concentrations not found ¶ elsewhere throughout the Caribbean.3¶ One of these wetlands, the Zapata Swamp on Cuba’s ¶ southern coast, encompasses over a million acres and represents one of the largest protected ¶ areas in the entire Caribbean region.¶ The popular media has often, and mistakenly, characterized Cuba’s prized natural environment as “an accidental Eden,” made possible through coincidences “of geography and history.”4¶ Such a perspective fails to recognize or credit the affirmative and, in many cases, progressive ¶ environmental policies and programs that Cuba has adopted over the last 20 years. In the mid-1990s, Cuba began adopting a suite of environmental laws and regulations that established ¶ environmental protection and sustainability as top policy priorities.¶ Among these are strong new laws on coastal zone conservation and management and the ¶ protection of biodiversity and important natural areas. In 1996, the government set aside the ¶ Jardines de la Reina (Gardens of the Queen) as a largely no-take fishery reserve, now the largest ¶ and one of the most important marine parks in the Caribbean. The famed archipelago off ¶ Cuba’s southern coast—home to thriving populations of giant grouper, sharks, sea turtles, and ¶ American crocodiles—is regarded as one of the world’s most intact coral reef ecosystems.5¶ The ¶ government has now pledged to protect a full 25 percent of its insular shelf as marine parks or ¶ reserves, and appears primed to meet this objective.6¶ Despite the apparent commitment of Cuban officials to build a body of environmental laws, ¶ policies, and regulations, the country’s environment is not immune to natural and manmade ¶ pressures. These threats range from global challenges — such as climate change, which is ¶ causing ocean acidification, rising seas, and intensifying storms — to more local problems, ¶ including management of liquid and solid wastes, soil erosion, deforestation, and pressure to ¶ develop pristine coastal areas for tourism and other economic sectors.

### Coral impacts

#### Marine biodiversity is key to human survival

Davidson 3 (Founder – Turtle House Foundation and Award-Winning Journalist, Fire in the Turtle House, p. 47-51)

But surely the Athenians had it backward; it’s the land that rests in the lap of the sea. Thalassa, not Gaia, is the guardian of life on the blue planet. A simple, albeit apocalyptic, experiment suggests Thalassa’s power. Destroy all life on land; the ocean creatures will survive just fine. Given time, they’ll even repopulate the land. But wipe out the organisms that inhabit the oceans and all life on land is doomed. “Dust to dust,” says the Bible, but “water to water” is more like it, for all life comes from and returns to the sea. Our ocean origins abid within us, our secret marine history. The chemical makeup of our blood is strikingly similar to seawater. Every carbon atom in our body has cycled through the ocean many times. Even the human embryo reveals our watery past. Tiny gill slits form and then fade during our development in the womb. The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate. The astonishing biodiversity is most evident on coral reefs, often called the “rain forests of the sea.” Occupying less than one-quarter of 1 percent of the global ocean, coral reefs are home to nearly a third of all marine fish species and to as many as nine million species in all. But life exists in profusion in every corner of the ocean, right down to the hydrothermal vents on the seafloor (discovered only in 1977), where more than a hundred newly described species thrive around superheated plumes of sulfurous gasses. The abundance of organisms in the ocean isn’t surprising given that the sea was, as already mentioned, the crucible of life on Earth. It is the original ecosystem, the environment in which the “primordial soup” of nucleic acids (which can self-replicate, but are not alive) and other molecules made the inexplicable and miraculous leap into life, probably as simple bacteria, close to 3.9 billion years ago. A spectacular burst of new life forms called the Cambrian explosion took place in the oceans some 500 million years ago, an evolutionary experiment that produced countless body forms, the prototypes of virtually all organisms alive today. It wasn’t until 100 million years later that the first primitive plants took up residence on terra firma. Another 30 million years passed before the first amphibians climbed out of the ocean. After this head start, it’s not surprising that evolution on that newcomer-dry land-has never caught up with the diversity of the sea. Of the thirty-three higher-level groupings of animals (called phyla), thirty-two are found in the oceans and just twelve on land.

### Florida impact – A2 not reach Florida

#### Oil will hurt the straits of florida

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

In preparation for Repsol’s exploration project in 2012, NOAA generated computer tracking ¶ models to assess the threat to U.S. coasts and shorelines from deepwater drilling off the coast ¶ of Cuba. NOAA selected 20 potential deepwater drilling sites from the western region of Cuba to ¶ the Bahamas. The model was run using 200 different spill scenarios based on a variety of ocean ¶ current and weather conditions. According to the agency’s first study of a hypothetical spill from a deepwater well site offshore of Cuba, the area at highest risk of shoreline impact could be the ¶ eastern shore of Florida.40 Areas as far north as Charleston, South Carolina could face potential ¶ shoreline risk, though the modeled scenario predicted a lower likelihood of oiling for shorelines ¶ north of the Florida border.41¶ While areas at risk of immediate impact appear to be those along the Straits of Florida and ¶ U.S. south Atlantic coast, scientists are careful to note that the models are far from precise, ¶ authoritative forecasts. NOAA specialists themselves emphasize that the models vary significantly based on weather data and location of the drilling site. Richard Sears, who served as chief ¶ scientific advisor on the federal commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster, ¶ stressed there was significant uncertainty in projecting the path of the BP oil slick in 2010, even ¶ with the combined technical expertise of federal agencies and private companies.42¶ “There were a wide array of models surrounding the BP spill, ranging from most of the ¶ oilprojected to come ashore to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida—to a significant ¶ portion going out through the Straits of Florida and up the East Coast towards North Carolina,”

### Florida internal – coral reefs

#### Spills risk destruction of key ecosystems

Padgett 12 (Tim, “The Oil Off Cuba: Washington and Havana Dance at Arms Length Over Spill Prevention”, 1/27, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2105598,00.html)

On any other occasion that might have raised the ire of the Cubans, who consider Washington their imperialista enemy. But the U.S. examination of the Scarabeo 9, which Repsol agreed to and Cuba abided, was part of an unusual choreography of cooperation between the two countries. Their otherwise bitter cold-war feud (they haven't had diplomatic relations since 1961) is best known for a 50-year-long trade embargo and history's scariest nuclear standoff. Now, Cuba's commitment to offshore oil exploration — drilling may start this weekend — raises a specter that haunts both nations: an oil spill in the Florida Straits like the BP calamity that tarred the nearby Gulf of Mexico two years ago and left $40 billion in U.S. damages. The Straits, an equally vital body of water that's home to some of the world's most precious coral reefs, separates Havana and Key West, Florida, by a mere 90 miles. As a result, the U.S. has tacitly loosened its embargo against Cuba to give firms like Repsol easier access to the U.S. equipment they need to help avoid or contain possible spills. "Preventing drilling off Cuba better protects our interests than preparing for [a disaster] does," U.S. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida tells TIME, noting the U.S. would prefer to stop the Cuban drilling — but can't. "But the two are not mutually exclusive, and that's why we should aim to do both."

#### A Cuban oil spill destroys multiple marine ecosystems – proximity and modeling prove

ORR 12 (Office of Response and Restoration – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Getting Ready for Offshore Oil Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas”, 4/27, http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/getting-ready-offshore-oil-drilling-cuba-and-bahamas.html)

For the past year, NOAA and the U.S. Coast Guard have been studying the possible threats that new offshore oil drilling activity near the Florida Straits and the Bahamas pose to Florida. For example, the proximity of Cuba's oil fields to U.S. waters has raised a lot of concerns about what would happen if a spill like the 2010 Deepwater Horizon/BP oil well blowout happened. If a large oil spill did occur in the waters northwest of Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry the oil to U.S. waters and coastal areas in Florida. However, a number of factors, like winds or currents, would determine where any oil slicks might go. NOAA's National Ocean Service has more information about how we're preparing for worst-case scenarios there: The study focuses on modeling the movement of oil in water to predict where, when, and how oil might reach U.S. shores given a spill in this region of the ocean. Models help to determine the threat to our coasts from a potential spill by accounting for many different variables, such as the weathering processes of evaporation, dispersion, photo-oxidation, and biodegradation—all of which reduce the amount of oil in the water over time. Currents and winds also play a role in determining where oil will move in water. For example, there are three major currents that would dominate movement of spilled oil near the Florida Straits: Loop Current, Florida Current, and the Gulf Stream. If oil did reach U.S. waters, marine and coastal resources in southern Florida could be at risk, including coral reefs and the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, located north of the Cuban drilling sites. We'll be watching the drilling activity there very carefully. If a spill does happen, NOAA will be ready to share our scientific expertise on oil spill response with the U.S. Coast Guard.

### Florida internal – spills

#### Cuban oil spills collapse Floridian and Gulf of Mexico ecosystems – the plan prevents and mitigates the impact to spills

Sarah Stephens (Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas) and Jake Colvin (Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council) 9/29/2011 “US-Cuba policy, and the race for oil drilling” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/184661-us-cuba-policy-and-the-race-for-oil-drilling)

To protect the national interest — and for the sake of Florida's beaches and the Gulf of Mexico's ecosystem — it is time to stop sticking our heels in the sand when it comes to U.S.-Cuba policy. Before the end of the year, a Chinese-made drilling platform known as Scarabeo 9 is expected to arrive in the Gulf. Once it is there, Cuba and its foreign partners, including Spain’s Repsol, will begin using it to drill for oil in waters deeper than Deepwater Horizon’s infamous Macondo well. The massive rig, manufactured to comply with U.S.-content restrictions at a cost of $750 million, will cost Repsol and other companies $407,000 per day to lease for exploration. They are taking this financial risk because Cuba needs the oil and its partners — Spain, Norway, Russia, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada, Angola, Venezuela, and possibly China — believe that drilling in waters said to contain undiscovered reserves of approximately 5 billion barrels of oil is good business. In virtually every other country in the world, developments like these would prompt high-level discussions about how to exploit these resources safely or to anticipate a crisis were a disaster to strike. Experts who have studied the currents say a spill in Cuban waters would send 90 percent of the oil into the Keys and up the East Coast of Florida. But the embargo leaves Florida’s sensitive coastal resources defenseless. Due to the fact that the drilling involves Cuba, American companies and workers cannot lend their expertise to what could be a risky operation. U.S. economic sanctions prevent our private sector from helping Cuba drill safely and paralyze the U.S. government, which ought to be convening bilateral discussions on best practices and coordinating disaster response. In fact, the U.S. has no emergency response agreement with Cuba for oil spills. While some specific licenses have been granted to permit U.S. firms to conduct limited transactions with Cuba, current sanctions bar the United States from deploying the kind of clean-up equipment, engineers, spare parts for blow-out prevention, chemical dispersants, and rigs to drill relief wells that would be needed to address an oil crisis involving Cuba. One welcomed development came earlier this month, when William Reilly, a former head of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and co-chair of the Commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster, led a group of experts to Cuba to take a look at their plans. While the administration has done well giving permission to Mr. Reilly, as well as to other experts, to discuss the problem with Cuban counterparts, it should move more aggressively to work with the Cuban government to cooperate on plans for safe drilling and responding to a possible crisis. Rather than moving forward, some in the U.S. Congress would make the problem worse. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-R), who criticized Mr. Reilly’s visit to Cuba as “giving credibility to the regime’s dangerous oil-drilling scheme,” has offered legislation to try and stop Repsol from drilling. Rep. Vern Buchanan (FL-R) would deny Repsol the right to drill in U.S. waters if it helped Cuba drill in its waters. Thirty-four members of both parties have written Repsol directly, threatening the company if it drills with Cuba. Yet this tactic can’t work. Even if they could deter Repsol from drilling – which is unlikely – they cannot stop Cuba and partners from countries like China, Russia, and Venezuela, from using the rig and searching for oil. At some point, it is likely that drilling will begin and the United States ought to do what it can to prepare for that eventuality. The U.S. government should facilitate access by Cuba and its drilling partners to the resources they need to drill safely. President Obama should instruct the Treasury Department to issue a blanket general license now that would allow private industry to provide what oil expert Jorge Piñon calls ”any conceivable response” in the event of a crisis.

### Florida impact – hot spots

#### Florida is a unique biodiversity hotspot

Alles 7 (David L. Professor of Biology – Western Washington University, “Biodiversity Hot Spots: The Florida Everglades”, 3-7-2007, <http://www.biol.wwu.edu/trent/alles/Everglades.pdf>)

"Biodiversity hot spots are areas where endemic species with small ranges are concentrated. Not all are in the tropics, but most are. Hot spots can be extraordinarily concentrated; thousands of species may be found within a relatively small area. Species with small ranges are particularly vulnerable to impacts. Nature has put her eggs in a small number of baskets, and we are in danger of dropping them. On land, worldwide 25 areas are recognized as hotspots which contain concentrations of endemic species that are disproportionately vulnerable to extinction from regional habitat destruction. These areas retain less than 10% of their original habitat and have unusually high human population densities." (Pimm, 2001) The Florida Everglades contains one of the highest concentrations of species vulnerable to extinction in the United States. The 5,000-square-kilometre wetland in southern Florida is home to at least 60 endangered species, including the American crocodile (Mason, 2003). And the area retains less than 10% of its original habitat as the human population density of southern Florida threatens to over-run one of the most unique habitats in North America. Nourished by the rain soaked Kissimmee River Basin and stretching south from 700 square mile Lake Okeechobee (left center), the Everglades are a wide slow moving river of marsh and saw grass covering some 4,500 square miles, flowing slowly towards the mangrove estuaries of the Gulf of Mexico (right below center). The Everglades are a unique habitat; there are no other everglades in the world. No other place combines a subtropical climate, a broad, shallow river, and a stunning diversity of plants and animals into such a complex and fragile ecosystem. No other place is so dramatically defined by annual rhythms of drought and flood, fire and sunshine and torrential rain. Everglades National Park is the largest remaining subtropical wilderness in the United States. Its abundant wildlife includes rare and endangered species, such as the American crocodile, Florida panther, and West Indian manatee. Alligators, like the one shown above, are an important part of this ecosystem, and are regarded as a “keystone” species of the Everglades. The Florida Everglades ecosystem is also the only place in the world where alligators and crocodiles exist side by side. The American crocodile, shown above, was listed as an endangered species in Florida in 1975. It’s numbers had dropped dramatically because of hunting and loss of habitat. Today, it’s estimated that between 500 to 1,200 crocodiles live in Florida, up from approximately 200 to 400 two decades ago. They are found in the U.S. in the remaining tidal marshes in the Everglades along Florida Bay and in the Florida Keys. Though the species resemble one another, crocodiles vary greatly from the more than 1 million alligators found in Florida. Crocodile color ranges from olive green to gray compared with the black hue of alligators. Their snouts are narrower, and the bottom and top teeth are visible from the side when the mouth is closed; only the upper teeth are seen on an alligator. Adult crocodiles are 7 to 15 feet long and weigh 150 to 450 pounds. Decidedly less aggressive than the infamous Nile and Australian crocodiles, American crocodiles are rarely seen by people. The West Indian manatee is a large, herbivorous, aquatic mammal. These gentle creatures are endangered throughout their range. High annual mortality, primarily associated with human activity, as well as a low reproductive rate and loss of habitat continue to keep the number of manatees low and threaten the species’ future. The manatee population has long been the focus of battles between conservationists and boaters. Boating kills dozens of manatees a year, crushing or gashing the slow-moving mammals as they rise to the surface to breathe. Red tide algae blooms have been another cause of mortality for manatees along Florida's south-central Gulf Coast. The one-cell organism that causes red tide releases a toxin when it dies, sickening manatees. Once the toxin is in the animal, it affects their coordination and causes paralysis (Flewelling, et al., 2005). "Manatees on Florida’s Gulf coast are frequently exposed to brevetoxin, a potent neurotoxin produced by the dinoflagellate Karenia brevis, during red tide events. In 1996, 151 manatees were documented to have died in southwest Florida from brevetoxicosis. This epizootic was particularly detrimental to the manatee population because more adults were killed than any other age class. Other red tide epizootics in 1982, 2002, 2003, and 2005 resulted in the deaths of 37, 34, 96, and (preliminarily) 81 manatees, respectively. There is no clear evidence that these events have been increasing in frequency along Florida’s coast, but certainly the impact on the manatee population has increased over the past two decades. Viewed globally, harmful algal blooms have been increasing over the past 25 years in frequency and in their impacts on the economy, public health, and marine life." In addition to rare and endangered species, the Everglades are rightly famous for the profusion of bird species found there, with 347 species recorded within the Park boundaries. The mangrove estuaries of Florida Bay, in particular, are a breeding habitat for Roseate Spoonbills, Wood Stork, White Ibis, Glossy Ibis, and eleven species of egrets and herons. Once, water flowed freely from Lake Okeechobee to Florida Bay in a “river of grass”, Florida environmentalist Marjory Stoneman Douglas's poetic phrase. It is a river that is 120 miles long and 50 miles wide, but less than a foot deep. In this flat landscape, even a few inches of elevation meant the difference between wet marsh and dry ground. Today, the Everglades is an ecosystem in danger of extinction. Canals and levees capture and divert its water for human use, including drinking water, irrigation, and flood control. Often, too much water is withheld from the Everglades during the wet season, or too much is diverted into it during the winter drought, disrupting the natural cycles of feeding and nesting which depend on these patterns. Much of the time the water is contaminated by pollutants.

#### Extinction

Nautiyal & Nidamanuri 10 (Sunil and Rama Rao – Centre for Ecological Economics and Natural Resources @ Institute for Social and Economic Change & Department of Earth and Space Sciences @ Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology, “Conserving Biodiversity in Protected Area of Biodiversity Hotspot in India: A Case Study,” International Journal of Ecology and Environmental Sciences 36 (2-3): 195-200, 2010)

The hotspots are the world’s most biologically rich areas hence recognized as important ecosystems not important¶ only for the rich biodiversity but equally important for the human survival as these are the homes for more than¶ 20% of the world’s population. India got recognition of one of the mega-diversity countries of world as the country¶ is home of the two important biodiversity hotspots: the Himalaya in north and the Western Ghats in the southern¶ peninsula. Policy makers and decision takers have recognized the importance of biodiversity (flora and fauna) and¶ this has resulted to segregate (in the form of protected areas) the rich and diverse landscape for biodiversity¶ conservation. An approach which leads towards conservation of biological diversity is good efforts but such¶ approaches should deal with humans equally who are residing in biodiversity hotspots since time immemorial. In¶ this endeavor, a study was conducted in Nagarahole National Park of Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve, in Karnataka. Our¶ empirical studies reveal that banning all the human activities in this ecosystem including agriculture, animal¶ husbandry has produced the results opposite to the approach ‘multiple values’ of national park. To monitor the¶ impact, existing policies have been tested from an economic and ecological view-point. Unfortunately, the local¶ livelihoods (most of them belongs to indigenous tribes) in the area have received setbacks due to the¶ implementation of the policies, though unintentionally. However, the ecological perspective is also not showing¶ support for the approach and framework of the current policies in the hotspots. Satellite data showed that the¶ temporal pattern of ecosystem processes has been changing. An integrated approach for ecosystem conservation and¶ strengthening local institutions for sustainable ecosystem management in such areas is therefore supported by this¶ study.

### Oil spills spread

#### Cuba oil spill will spread to US waters and coastlines

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

As demonstrated by the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico oil disaster of 2010, the Exxon Valdez¶ spill in Alaska in 1989, and Mexico’s 1979 Ixtoc I well blowout, deepwater drilling is inherently ¶ risky. Even companies using the most sophisticated, cutting-edge technology with highly ¶ skilled personnel experience oil spills and accidents that threaten human lives, economies, ¶ and the environment.¶ In fact, the Deepwater Horizon accident resulted in extensive oil pollution of roughly 200 miles ¶ along the edge of the Cuban EEZ, and very nearly led to U.S.-drilled oil befouling important ¶ and valuable Cuban beaches, reefs, seagrass beds, and mangrove swamps.36 The only factor ¶ that prevented an international incident was the chance timing of the central Gulf Loop Current ¶ gyre formation, which interrupted the delivery of oil down current as far as the Florida Keys.¶ As Cuba proceeds with plans to explore its deepwater offshore oil fields, the risk of a potential oil spill in Cuban waters impacting U.S. marine and coastal resources is similarly worrisome. ¶ Significant oil spills from exploratory wells are not without precedent: both the BP Deepwater ¶ Horizon and Ixtoc I spills resulted from exploratory well blowouts. Experience from past disasters ¶ highlights that oil spills do not adhere to political boundaries and that advanced planning and ¶ cross-border cooperation are pivotal for mounting a timely, coordinated response strategy

### A2 cannot predict spills route

#### Spill possibility means cooperation imperative

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

While areas at risk of immediate impact appear to be those along the Straits of Florida and ¶ U.S. south Atlantic coast, scientists are careful to note that the models are far from precise, ¶ authoritative forecasts. NOAA specialists themselves emphasize that the models vary significantly based on weather data and location of the drilling site. Richard Sears, who served as chief ¶ scientific advisor on the federal commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster, ¶ stressed there was significant uncertainty in projecting the path of the BP oil slick in 2010, even ¶ with the combined technical expertise of federal agencies and private companies.42¶ “There were a wide array of models surrounding the BP spill, ranging from most of the ¶ oilprojected to come ashore to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida—to a significant ¶ portion going out through the Straits of Florida and up the East Coast towards North Carolina,” ¶ Sears said in a personal interview. “Neither of those happened.”43¶ Sears described the added complexity of estimating the oil’s vertical movement. “There were ¶ a lot of surprises with Macondo about where the oil went,” Sears explained, “not only in two ¶ dimensions, but also in terms of three dimensional impacts within the water column.”44¶ Preparing for a potential spill in Cuba’s EEZ highlights the underlying uncertainty in ¶ predicting the trajectory of a spill, particularly with regards to possible shoreline impacts ¶ andbiological threats within the water column and on the seafloor. This lack of predictability ¶ reinforces the importance of opening lines of communication and expanding U.S.-Cuban ¶ cooperation to ensure that any containment and response strategy would be implemented ¶ effectively using the most timely incident updates.

### Spill impact – Cuban economy

#### Oil spill will wreck tourist and fishing industries – they are key to the Cuban economy

Emily A. Peterson¶ Daniel J. Whittle, J.D.¶ and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D¶ December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf¶ Finding Common Ground on Environmental and ¶ Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

The intertwined relationship between coastal economies and the local environment illustrates ¶ that the economic implications of a major deepwater spill in Cuba could be substantial, with ¶ far-reaching impacts on tourism as well as commercial and recreational fishing. In Florida, over ¶ 86.5 million tourists visited the state in 2011 and generated over $67 billion in direct economic ¶ impact.50 Tourism represents Florida’s top industry and accounts for 23 percent of the state’s ¶ sales tax revenue.51¶ Florida also boasts one of the most productive commercial fisheries in the country, and its ¶ recreational saltwater fishery has an economic impact of $5.7 billion, while supporting over ¶ 54,000 jobs.52 As demonstrated during the Deepwater Horizon disaster, publicity surrounding ¶ a spill can ignite public fears and decimate tourism and seafood consumption even in areas ¶ spared of oil exposure.¶ An oil spill could threaten fisheries and tourism in Cuba as much as in Florida. Top tourist ¶ areas along Cuba’s North Coast—including Cayo Paraiso and Cayo Levisa—are known for their ¶ pristine beaches and attractive snorkeling opportunities. Following Havana, the resort town of ¶ Varadero is the second most popular destination on the island for foreign travelers. Varadero’s ¶ extensive beaches receive one million international visitors annually and could experience ¶ devastating physical and financial impacts in the event of a spill. Cayo Coco, located on ¶ the Sabana Camaguey Archipelago on the northern shore of Cuba, is another prime tourist ¶ destination also directly vulnerable to a potential spill. With its crystal waters and pristine ¶ white sand beaches, Cayo Coco is home to a host of all-inclusive luxury resorts.¶ In 2011, tourism attracted 2.7 million visitors and 2.5 billion in income to Cuba, which ¶ represents a 12.8 percent increase in revenue from the previous year.53 Given that the tourism ¶ industry is perceived as the engine of Cuba’s economic growth, the island would have much ¶ tolose if a highly-publicized oil spill impacted its shores

### Environment Impact

#### Eco collapse causes extinction

Jayawardena 9 (Asitha, London South Bank University, “We Are a Threat to All Life on Earth”, Indicator, 7-17, http://www.indicator.org.uk/?p=55)

Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) explain in detail why the natural environment is so important for life on Earth. It is from the environment that the living organisms of all species import the energy and raw material required for growth, development and reproduction. In almost all ecosystems plants, the most important primary producers, carry out photosynethesis, capturing sunlight and storing it as chemical energy. They absorb nutrients from their environment. When herbivores (i.e. plant-eating animals or organisms) eat these plants possessing chemical energy, matter and energy are transferred ‘one-level up.’ The same happens when predators (i.e. animals of a higher level) eat these herbivores or when predators of even higher levels eat these predators. Therefore, in ecosystems, food webs transfer energy and matter and various organisms play different roles in sustaining these transfers. Such transfers are possible due to the remarkable similarity in all organisms’ composition and major metabolic pathways. In fact all organisms except plants can potentially use each other as energy and nutrient sources; plants, however, depend on sunlight for energy. Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) further reveal two key principles governing the biosphere with respect to the transfer of energy and matter in ecosystems. Firstly, the energy flow in ecosystems from photosynthetic plants (generally speaking, autotrophs) to non-photosynthetic organisms (generally speaking, heterotrophs) is essentially linear. In each step part of energy is lost to the ecosystem as non-usable heat, limiting the number of transformation steps and thereby the number of levels in a food web. Secondly, unlike the energy flow, the matter flow in ecosystems is cyclic. For photosynthesis plants need carbon dioxide as well as minerals and sunlight. For the regeneration of carbon dioxide plants, the primary producers, depend on heterotrophs, who exhale carbon dioxide when breathing. Like carbon, many other elements such as nitrogen and sulphur flow in cyclic manner in ecosystems. However, it is photosynthesis, and in the final analysis, solar energy that powers the mineral cycles. Ecosystems are under threat and so are we Although it seems that a continued energy supply from the sun together with the cyclical flow of matter can maintain the biosphere machinery running forever, we should not take things for granted, warn Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995). And they explain why. Since the beginning of life on Earth some 3.5 billion years ago, organisms have evolved and continue to do so today in response to environmental changes. However, the overall picture of materials (re)cycling and linear energy transfer has always remained unchanged. We could therefore safely assume that this slowly evolving system will continue to exist for aeons to come if large scale infringements are not forced upon it, conclude Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995). However, according to them, the present day infringements are large enough to upset the world’s ecosystems and, worse still, human activity is mainly responsible for these infringements. The rapidity of the human-induced changes is particularly undesirable. For example, the development of modern technology has taken place in a very short period of time when compared with evolutionary time scales – within decades or centuries rather than thousands or millions of years. Their observations and concerns are shared by a number of other scholars. Roling (2009) warns that human activity is capable of making the collapse of web of life on which both humans and non-human life forms depend for their existence. For Laszlo (1989: 34), in Maiteny and Parker (2002), modern human is ‘a serious threat to the future of humankind’. As Raven (2002) observes, many life-support systems are deteriorating rapidly and visibly. Elaborating on human-induced large scale infringements, Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) warn that they can significantly alter the current patterns of energy transfer and materials recycling, posing grave problems to the entire biosphere. And climate change is just one of them! Turning to a key source of this crisis, Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995: 37) emphasise that, although we humans can mentally afford to step outside the biosphere, we are ‘animals among animals, organisms among organisms.’ Their perception on the place of humans in nature is resonated by several other scholars. For example, Maiteny (1999) stresses that we humans are part and parcel of the ecosphere. Hartmann (2001) observes that the modern stories (myths, beliefs and paradigms) that humans are not an integral part of nature but are separate from it are speeding our own demise. Funtowicz and Ravetz (2002), in Weaver and Jansen (2004: 7), criticise modern science’s model of human-nature relationship based on conquest and control of nature, and highlight a more desirable alternative of ‘respecting ecological limits, …. expecting surprises and adapting to these.’

### Hotspot Impact

#### Extinction

Kunich 1(John C., Assoc. Prof Law – Roger Williams University School of Law, 52 Hastings L.J. 1149, Lexis)

It is rather well known, even beyond the scientific community, that many of the world's species have either gone extinct or are on the road to extinction. It is much less well known, but equally important, that enormous numbers of these species are confined to a few "hotspots" of biodiversity, far beyond the norm for the average region of comparable size. These hotspots are the key to the future of life on this planet. To understand why, we must first examine the degree of risk to which earth's biodiversity is exposed today.

## ADV Russia

### Russia 1ac ADV

#### Drilling is key to Cuban-Russian rapprochement – oil will be the center point to re-establish the alliance

Voice from Russia July 2012 “Russia and Cuba: Old Friendships Never Wither”, http://02varvara.wordpress.com/tag/havana/

Russia and Cuba are strengthening their bilateral relations again after a break that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union supplied Cuba with oil, up to 13 million tons each year, and quantities of arms. In return, it received Cuban tobacco, coffee, fruit, and sugar and enjoyed the right to build and operate military facilities on Cuban territory. However, after the Soviet collapse these exchanges went downhill. The oil was cut off. In the early 90s, Russia shut its military training centre in Cuba. In 2002, it also closed its signals intelligence centre near the Cuban town of Lourdes, withdrawing all 1,000 personnel from the facility.¶ The millennium turn was the low point of the relationship. However, under Vladimir Putin, Russian-Cuban ties started to pick up again. In 2000, Putin visited Havana. In 2006, during a Havana visit by Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, Cuba’s Soviet-era debts to Russia were finally settled, and Cuba received a 335 million dollar (11.925 billion Roubles. 275 million Euros. 215 million UK Pounds) Russian credit line, which allowed it to procure spare parts for some of its Soviet-made machinery and weaponry. In 2009, Cuban President Raúl Modesto Castro Ruz visited Moscow. This Wednesday, he arrived again, amid summertime heat, which he said reminded him of Havana. After discussing matters with Prime Minister Medvedev, he proceeded to the suburban dacha of President Putin.¶ President Putin said, “Some time ago, Russia and Cuba marked 110 years since they established diplomatic ties. These 110 years have seen ups and downs in relations, but at present, the relations are on the rise. Although pragmatic, they don’t negate the positive legacy of the past. We’re glad to welcome you. I do hope we’ll be able to review the entire spectrum of Russian-Cuban relations”. President Putin also used the occasion to extend his best wishes to veteran Cuban leader Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz (President Castro’s elder brother).¶ President Castro said he was looking forward to a very productive Moscow visit, saying, “We live in a very complex and rapidly changing world. During my previous visit, we devoted time to the challenges faced by our countries in 2009. Today, we’re discussing the current situation. I’m always happy to meet with my old friends in the Russian capital. I expect my working visit to be very busy and highly productive”. After meeting with President Putin, Señor Castro shall meet with Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Russian National Security Council.¶ Annual trade between Russia and Cuba already tops 220 million dollars (7.175 billion Roubles. 180 million Euros. 140 million UK Pounds) and continues to grow. Importantly, it isn’t limited to arms sales. Russia’s Gazpromneft is drilling for oil and gas in the Cuban sector of the Gulf of Mexico. Other Russian companies are helping Cuba develop electricity generation. Last year also saw a 30 percent increase in Russian tourist visits to Cuba. Russian holidaymakers on the island are rapidly catching up with European and Canadian ones.

#### Increased Cuba-Russia relations causes war

Paul Richter (Staff Writer for New York Times) 2008 “Moscow-Havana ties worry U.S.” http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/01/world/fg-usrussia1)

But at a time when Russia has intervened forcefully in Georgia and is extending the global reach of its rebuilt military, some senior officials fear it may not be only bluster.¶ Russia "has strategic ties to Cuba again, or at least, that's where they're going," a senior U.S. official said recently, speaking, like others, on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive implications of the assessments.¶ The officials said they doubted the Russians would risk stationing nuclear bombers on Cuba. But some believe that Moscow might seek to restore its once-energetic intelligence cooperation with Havana, and to resume limited military cooperation, possibly including refueling stops for aircraft and warships.¶ In the current environment, such contacts would make U.S. officials uneasy, serving as a reminder of a military relationship between Havana and Moscow that stretched from the Cuban Revolution in 1959 until a weakened, post-Soviet Russia finally closed a massive electronic intelligence complex in Lourdes near Havana in 2001.¶ One senior military officer said a return of Russian ships or planes could force additional U.S. deployments in the region. But the Bush administration and Pentagon declined to comment publicly on the implications.¶ "It is very Cold War retro," said a government official. "The topic could be reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis, and that is a chapter that people don't want to revisit."¶ The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed a report in the newspaper Izvestia in July that quoted an unidentified Russian official as saying the government intended to begin basing Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack and Tupolev Tu-95 Bear nuclear bombers in Cuba.¶ However, the report was taken seriously enough in Washington that Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, the new Air Force chief of staff, said during his Senate confirmation hearing at the time that sending the bombers would cross a "red line in the sand."

#### US engagement with Cuba crowds out Russia

Stephen Blank (Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College) 2009 “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood,”

The only way in which Russian policy truly threatens the US and Latin America is its military and intelligence support for Chavez and similar leaders. This support is passed on to insurgents while strengthening Chavez and his allies. Adequate responses to such threats are inherently economic and political, and only military as a last resort. ¶ Washington can do much more to facilitate security in Latin America: regenerating its own economy; simultaneously opening up trade markets and eliminating barriers to Latin American exports; enhancing multilateralism and interoperability among defense forces as requested by Latin American militaries; and beginning the normalization of Cuba.¶ Havana is no longer the threat it was, Venezuela has claimed that dubious honor. Rehabilitating Cuba, given that Castro’s days are clearly numbered, would take the air out of Chavez’s balloon; it is quite clear that Havana would probably welcome a path towards better relations with the US, especially the economic benefits they would inevitably bring. A policy with a more symbolically important impact upon Latin America is currently difficult to imagine.¶ Nonetheless, there should be no illusion that the security problems that plague this region are easily overcome, quite the opposite. But that is all the more reason why the US cannot ignore the area and let it drift to Moscow, Tehran, and Beijin for want of a better alternative. That outcome would only confirm once again that in world politics, there is no such thing as benign neglect. Instead neglect is malign and engenders negative results for the negligent state along with those neglected. The policies of the Bush administration allowed Russia to gain a foothold in Latin American politics, a result of Washington’s negligence; under President Obama, the US should reverse those outcomes and demonstrate what liberal democracy in action can truly accomplish.

#### Russian expansion spurs a new Cold War and proxy conflicts

Walter Walle (Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs) 2012 “Russia Turns to the South for Military and Economic Alliances,” http://www.coha.org/russia-turns-to-the-south-for-military-and-economic-alliances/)

Quite clearly, Russia’s interest in Latin America is escalating. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, argued in his article, “The New Stage of Development of Russian-Latin American Relations,” that there is great attractiveness in establishing bilateral relations, especially when three of the top twenty emerging economies -Mexico, Brazil and Argentina- are in Latin America.[23] Lavrov has also stated that the Russian Federation has an interest in joining the Inter-American Development Bank, perhaps a move to better accommodate Russian interests in the region, while at the same time neutralizing American influence.¶ Demonstrably, Russia has been developing cooperative relationships with prominent organizational bodies of the region, such as the OAS (Organization of American States), and has ratified visa-free travel agreements with countries like Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In his article, Lavrov argues that Russia’s intention behind quests for partnerships is the establishment of non-ideologized relationships with Latin American countries, relationships that could be of mutual benefit to all parties involved.¶ However, the Russian stance on Latin America ultimately may be cause for apprehension. The establishment of bilateral, cordial relations between Russia and Latin American countries could evolve to a proxy, neo-Cold War scenario. If the situation in the regions worsens, some countries would be funded and supported by the U.S., while others, including several members of Latin America’s “New Left”, would become the major beneficiaries of Moscow. An analogy of such practice is the Georgia – Russia crisis that surfaced in August of 2008. During this brief war, the U.S. sent military aid to Georgia[24] on warships to territory Russia considers its “backyard” (i.e. the Caucasus and the Black Sea), infuriating Moscow. A month after the conflict erupted, ostensibly in retaliation, Russia sent two Tu-160 bombers to conduct military exercises with Washington’s least favorite nation in Latin America: Venezuela[25]. More importantly, in November of 2008 Moscow conducted war games with Caracas, in which a small Russian fleet was sent to the Caribbean to participate in joint naval maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy.[26] This was a powerful symbolic act: as it was the first time that Russian warships had visited the Caribbean since the Cuban Missile Crisis.¶ In the wake of the post-Georgia conflict, such joint military maneuvers between Russia and Venezuela were revitalized, and helped to build up the tensions between Washington and Moscow, sending strong signals of a Cold War revival. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the declarations of independence by the breakaway regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Venezuela[27] and Nicaragua[28] were alone among Latin American countries in recognizing the independence of the new republics.

#### That causes miscalculation

Jose Orozco (Correspondent for Christian Science Monitor) 2008 “Cold war echo: Russian military maneuvers with Venezuela,” http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0912/p01s05-woam.html)

The last time a Russian Navy ship plied the azure waters of the Caribbean for major joint maneuvers with an anti-US country was during the cold war.¶ But in a move out of Cuban leader Fidel Castro's historical playbook, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez announced this week that his nation will host four Russian warships and 1,000 troops in November for joint military exercises.¶ That was followed Wednesday by the arrival in Venezuela of two Russian long-range bombers.¶ Although Latin American leaders so far have shrugged off the moves as another act of bravado in Mr. Chávez's push against what he calls "Yankee hegemony," some diplomats and US officials see the potential for real trouble.¶ The US typically ignores the leftist leader's angry tirades, and is playing down the news.¶ Still, an extensive military relationship between Venezuela and Russia could heighten tensions and signal the start of a new regional cold war.¶ "This is a risky step that could provoke the US," says retired Navy Vice Admiral and former Vice Minister of Defense Rafael Huizi Clavier. "Any incident, any error, could bring problems." This week, Russia announced that it will send a naval squadron, including the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, as well as long-range patrol planes for the upcoming joint exercises with Venezuela.

#### Extinction

Ira Helfand (past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility) and John O Pastore (past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility) March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html]

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

### Russia – cuba oil key

#### Russia ramping up development – cuba key

Industry Press 3/2 “Will Russia Find Cuban oil?”

Many became highly concerned last week, when it was said that Russia was forgiving Cuba nearly $30 billion of debt. Journalists speculated that Russia had thus received access to the Cuban shelf which is quite promising, with a large resource base, but it has not been developed, so the work on the Cuban shelf bears certain risks for both Russian and other companies. Nevertheless it is beneficial for Russia to participate in the development of the Cuban shelf not just to increase oil production and sales, but also to receive additional technologies and experience on the shelf.¶ Assumptions of large reserves of black gold on the north coast of Cuba first appeared in 2008. Several companies started to explore the Cuban shelf: Venezuela’s PdVSA, Petronas of Malaysia, the Spanish Repsol, and the Russian Zarubezhneft. However, the results were bleak. Oil was not found, but Russia believed that it was early to give up.

### Cuba/Russia Rapprochement = war

#### Cuba-Russia relations are increasing and will cause war

Inter-American Dialogue 12 (U.S. based think tank for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, “Are External Tensions Entangling Latin American Countries?” http://www.cepr.net/documents/CEPR\_News/LAA120810.pdf)

A Stephen Johnson, senior fellow and director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: "It may or may not be true that Russia's government is seeking to build resupply bases for its navy in Cuba, Vietnam and the Seychelles islands. While Russian navy officials say 'da,' the foreign ministry says 'nyet.' Similar talk of establishing bases elsewhere, such as Venezuela, has not materialized. In any case, it would not present a direct threat unless such a facility became an entry point for hostile arms similar to the nuclear-tipped missiles that provoked the 1962 crisis. Like any other state, Russia can strike diplomatic agreements to base military units in other countries. On the other hand, it would be a challenge. First, it would rekindle a military relationship that ended when Russia transferred its signals intelligence facility at Lourdes to the Cuban government in 2002. A new base might be a shot in the arm to the Cuban economy, helping the Castro brothers hang on to aspects of their old command economy without going cold turkey for market reforms. A base could also serve as a hub for military weapons sales to other Latin American nations when the region needs help in fighting transnational crime. The Soviet Union fell more than 20 years ago, but Russia still has large military industries and needs to sell arms more than washing machines. Its prime customers would, like Cuba, be in the Bolivarian alliance. Second, a Russian navy station in Cuba might complicate U.S. politics, specifically any plans a U.S. administration might have to hand back Guantanamo Naval Base in the near future, for which Cuba's current government refuses to cash our rent checks. At a time when U.S. Northern and Southern Commands are gearing more toward military support for civilian law enforcement missions, it would reintroduce a strategic deterrence component into joint exercises and training. That might not be a bad thing, but it would argue for more U.S. defense spending on the Western Hemisphere. All of which seems to argue that recent threat trends in the Americas are not very predictive and that certain old alliances won't go easily into the sunset."¶ A Stephen Wilkinson, chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba: "Russia is in military talks with Cuba for three reasons. One is economic, related to Russian investment in Cuban nickel and oil and the need to guarantee protection of these investments. Another factor is geostrategic. Recent events in Syria have confirmed Russian fears of the long-term strategic aims of the United States. The Russians are very aware that the United States and Western Europe have been supporting the rebels in Syria and they see this as an indirect attack upon their interests as Assad provides them with a naval base at Tartus, on the Mediterranean. The third reason is possibly rather more personal, Vladimir Putin has turned his face against Washington since his recent re-election because he perceived a U.S. hand in organizing the protests against him. From Cuba's point of view, having a Russian military base would be a guarantee of security since it would mean that U.S. military action against it would be less likely. If Washington would not wish for Havana to have such an ally, it ought to reconsider its own policy toward the island. At present, the embargo, and especially the Helms Burton Law, makes it sensible for the Cuban government to seek alliances with as many powers as possible in order to protect itself. U.S. military presence in Latin America has grown in recent years. There are now 24 bases including two new ones in Chile and Argentina. Seven bases in Colombia are being expanded. The justification for this expansion is the war on drugs and for humanitarian intervention purposes. However, it should come as no surprise that this is not the way that Cuba or its closest allies such as Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales view them. They see the bases as potential threats to their independence and sovereignty and a sign that Washington's hegemonic designs on the region are very much alive."¶ A Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow and director of the Cuba Project at the Center for International Policy: "Given the history of the 1962 U.S.-Soviet missile crisis, for the Russians now to propose exploring with the Cubans the setting up of naval bases on the island would seem a rather maladroit idea. The United States made it clear in 1962 that the positioning of offensive nuclear missiles on the island was unacceptable and demanded that they be withdrawn. The world has never been so close to an all out nuclear war. Fortunately, both Kennedy and Khrushchev showed themselves to be sensible men. They reached an understanding under which Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles and Kennedy gave assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba. Subsequently, without informing the United States, the Soviets began building a submarine base on the island, but when it was made clear to them that the United States would consider this a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding of 1962, work on the base was quietly halted and never resumed. The United States should of course oppose the positioning of Russian bases in Cuba today, as should the other countries of the hemisphere. They would serve no reasonable purpose and could only unnecessarily add to tensions. The United States has not increased its military presence in Latin America. There is no reason for the Russians to do so."

# Add-ons – A2 intl actor CPs

## US-Cuba Relations

### Add-on – US/Cuba Relations – Caribbean stability

#### Relations are critical to preserve Caribbean stability – cooperation enables effective regional security

John F Tierney (Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs) April 29 2009 “Hearing on "National Security Implications of U.S. Policy toward Cuba"”, http://tierney.house.gov/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=588&Itemid=500141)

Current U.S. policy toward Cuba is anachronistic and unsustainable - and it is a source of contention between the United States and the rest of Latin America, as well as the European Union. In the lead-up to the recent Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the Costa Rican newspaper La Nacion observed that, quote, "all of Latin America is asking for an end to Cuba's isolation." In today's hearing, the Subcommittee aims to identify concrete ways in which increased U.S.-Cuba cooperation is in our own national security interest, ways it could support the safety and security of U.S. citizens, and the nature of the threat the U.S. would face should our interaction stagnate or lessen. The U.S. and Cuba have many shared concerns and a long history of shared collaboration - such as joint medical research that predates the Spanish-American war; so-called "fence talks" between Cuban and American soldiers on Guantanamo; overflights by U.S. hurricane hunters to predict extreme weather; and piecemeal partnerships between our Coast Guards. Most of this cooperation requires nothing more than political will to implement it. Increased cooperation in these fields could give political leaders in both countries the confidence they need to end this fifty-year era of mistrust. An April 13, 2009 letter from 12 retired generals and admirals to President Obama gave a persuasive argument for greater U.S.-Cuba engagement. It stated: Cuba ceased to be a military threat decades ago. At the same time, Cuba has intensified its global, diplomatic and economic relations with nations as diverse as China, Russia, Venezuela, Brazil, and members of the European Union. ... Even worse, the embargo inspired a significant diplomatic movement against U.S. policy...when world leaders overwhelmingly cast their vote in the United Nations against the embargo and visit Havana to denounce American policy, it is time to change the policy, especially after 50 years of failure in attaining our goals. These generals and admirals recommend, and I quote: ...renewed engagement with Havana on key security issues such as narcotics trafficking, immigration, airspace and Caribbean security...This idea of engagement underlies our current policies in Iran, Syria and North Korea, all much graver concerns to the United States - where Americans are currently free to travel. Experts generally agree that U.S. national security would be strengthened if Cuba pursued alternatives to Venezuelan or Russian influence. Increasing energy trade with Cuba would contribute to U.S. energy security and would create competition with the "export-oriented" populist agenda of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, while dampening Venezuela's efforts to strengthen its regional presence through visible aid to Cuba. U.S. energy trade could also limit the attractiveness of the more assertive foreign policy of Russia, and China's increased presence in Latin America and investment in Cuba's energy sector. Cuba's strategic location and its apparent seriousness of purpose in fighting drugs is another strong argument for comprehensive U.S.-Cuban cooperation. Closer coordination could also help close off trafficking routes in the western Caribbean and disrupt ongoing operations of South American cocaine mafias.

#### Caribbean instability causes global war

Griffith, 2k (Ivelaw L. Griffith 2k, professor of political science and dean of the honors college at Florida International University, “U.S. Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security”, JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2000, Issue 26)

The strategic importance of the Caribbean is found in its resources, sea lanes, and security networks. The Caribbean Basin is the source of fuel and nonfuel minerals used in both the defense and civilian sectors. Of particular significance are petroleum and natural gas produced in Barbados, Colombia, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Moreover, though several countries and U.S. territories in the area do not have energy resources, they offer invaluable refining and transshipment functions (Aruba, Bahamas, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, and U.S. Virgin Islands). Other mineral resources from the Caribbean include bauxite, gold, nickel, copper, cobalt, emeralds, and diamonds. The Caribbean Basin has two of the world's major choke points, the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea. The former links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and saves 8,000 miles and up to 30 days of steaming time. The canal has military and civilian value. And while it is less important to the United States than it was two decades ago, other countries remain very dependent on it, and many, like Chile, Ecuador, and Japan, are militarily or politically important to Washington. Once ships enter the Atlantic from the canal they must transit Caribbean passages en route to ports of call in the United States, Europe, and Africa. The Florida Strait, Mona Passage, Windward Passage, and Yucatan Channel are the principal lanes. The Caribbean is also our southern flank. Until a decade ago the United States maintained a considerable military presence throughout the Caribbean, mainly in Puerto Rico at the Atlantic threshold, in Panama at the southern rim, and in Cuba at Guantanamo on the northern perimeter. In 1990, for instance, there were 4,743 military and civilian personnel in Puerto Rico, 20,709 in Panama, and 3,401 in Cuba. Much has changed since 1990, requiting strategic redesign and force redeployment. Today Puerto Rico is home to fewer forces, and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) relocated from Panama to Miami in September 1997, leaving behind only small components. Guantanamo, long considered to have little strategic value, serves essentially as a political outpost in the last remaining communist bastion in the hemisphere, with about 1,200 military and civilian personnel. During the 1980s the Soviet presence in Cuba included modern docks and repair facilities, reconnaissance aircraft, and satellite and surveillance capabilities. The 28-square mile base located at Lourdres monitored missile tests, intercepted satellite communications, and relayed microwave communications to diplomatic posts in the Western Hemisphere. The facility was reputedly the largest maintained by the Soviet Union abroad. It is still in operation, but not at Cold War levels. Yet fear of foreign encroachment persists. The United States is concerned about increasing Chinese interest and investment in Panama. Although such strategic affairs may not be crucial to Washington, they affect allies as well as regional stability and security and thus bear watching. Geoeconomics The mixture of geography, economics, and national power in the area exercises influence over trade and investment. For example, the Department of Commerce found that for the four-year period prior to 1988 a total of 646 U.S. companies invested over $1.5 billion in Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) beneficiary countries. Moreover, from 1986 to 1995 U.S. trade surpluses with the area grew from $297 million to $2.6 billion. In 1995 exports grew by 15 percent, to $8 billion, with the Dominican Republic and Jamaica accounting for 55 percent. That year also saw surpluses with every country except Aruba, Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago. Last year the U.S. Trade Representative told an InterAmerican Development Bank forum, "Taken as a whole, the Caribbean Basin is a larger market for our goods than ... France, Brazil, or China. Likewise, the United States is the area's natural market, taking 80 percent of its exports and providing nearly $50 billion in foreign direct investment." The United States is the largest trading partner and source of capital flows for Caribbean Community and Common Market countries. CBI nations are a principal market for U.S. exports, totaling $21.1 billion in 1998 (9.1 percent over the previous year). Exports to the Caribbean Basin accounted for 3 percent in 1998 (up 2.8 percent over the previous year). An estimated half of each dollar spent in the area is returned to the United States compared with 10 cents from Asia. Further, this trade supports some 400,000 jobs in this country and many more in the Caribbean. Moreover, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) reported in 2000 that from 1995 to 1999 it assisted in 38 projects in the area involving $3.2 billion in investments, which are expected to generate $1.5 billion in U.S. exports and, in turn, support 4,500 jobs in this country. Moreover, in February 1999, OPIC and Citibank established a $200 million investment facility for Central America and the Caribbean to help meet needs for medium- and long-term capital. Geonarcotics There are four dimensions in the drug phenomenon: production, consumption, trafficking, and money laundering. These activities threaten the security of states around the world. Narcotics operations and capital ventures which they spawn precipitate both conflict and cooperation among state and nonstate actors in the international system. Because of the global dispersion of drug traffic and physical, social, and political features of facilitating countries, power involves securing compliant action. In the drug world, this power is both state and nonstate in origin, and some nonstate sources exercise relatively more power than state entities. Politics revolves around resource allocation through the ability of power brokers to determine who gets what, when, where, and how. Because power in this milieu is not only state in origin, resource allocation is not exclusively a state function. Drug operations generate complex relationships. Some involve nonmilitary pressures such as political and economic sanctions by the United States against countries it considers not proactive enough in combating drug traffic. Yet the problem entails more than the movement of drugs from and through the area; it involves money laundering, organized crime, corruption, arms dealing, and matters of sovereignty. Such activities are reported in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report issued annually by the Department of State and are reflected in the following vignettes: Operation Dinero, an international money laundering sting conducted out of tiny Anguilla from January 1992 to December 1994, led to the seizure of nine tons of cocaine and $90 million in assets, including expensive paintings, Head of a Beggar by Pablo Picasso among them. Cocaine seizures in only five nations--Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica--totaled 3,300 kilos in 1993. Seizures for those same countries amounted to 6,230 kilos--almost double--during 1999. Between 1993 and 1998, over 9,000 deportees were returned to Jamaica, most for drug-related offenses in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In November 1998, American owned Cupid Foundations closed its business in Jamaica after 22 years with a loss of 550 jobs. Cupid could no longer afford the fines incurred with the seizure of its merchandise by U.S. Customs because of attempts to smuggle drugs in its clothing. Operation Conquistador, conducted March 10-26, 2000, involving the United States and 24 nations in the region, led to the issuance of 7,300 search warrants, arrest of 2,300 people, and seizure of 12,000 pounds of cocaine, 120 pounds of heroin, 150 pounds of hashish oil, 30 pounds of morphine base, 172 vehicles, 13 boats, and 83 guns. Between November 24, 1999, and June 6, 2000, 12 freighters were seized in Miami on arrival from Haiti with over 6,000 pounds of cocaine hidden in their cargo. Since mid-October 2000 Jamaica has produced a drug-related drama involving high-level police corruption, illegal wire-tapping of government officials, and the attempted assassination of the head of the National Firearms and Drug Intelligence Center. Traditional and Emerging Issues Security in the Caribbean has political, military, economic, and environmental implications and includes internal and external threats. Nonstate actors are as important as state actors. Indeed, many nonstate actors can mobilize more economic and military assets than some countries. Thus the security landscape reveals both traditional and nontraditional concerns. Territorial disputes and geopolitical posturing are core traditional issues. Belize, Colombia, Guatemala, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela have serious disagreements, some of which Involve multiple disputes. For example, Guyana faces claims by Venezuela for the western five-eighths of its 214,970 square kilometers of territory and by Suriname for 15,000 to the east. Drugs, political instability, migration, and the environment are major nontraditional issues. There is no uniformity in the importance ascribed to them, but a comparison of the traditional and nontraditional categories reveals a generally higher premium on nontraditional issues. Some states, such as those in the Eastern Caribbean, face no traditional security concerns or overt threats. The foremost nontraditional threat involves drugs. This multifaceted problem has increased in scope and gravity over the last decade and a half and added security effects. Crime, corruption, and arms dealing dramatically impact on national security and governance in political, military, and economic terms. They also infringe on national sovereignty. Two decades ago most Caribbean leaders were reluctant to acknowledge that their countries faced a drug threat Two decades ago most Caribbean leaders were reluctant to acknowledge that their countries faced a drug threat. But the severity of the problem grew until the danger was obvious inside and outside the area. For instance, at a meeting on criminal justice in June 2000, which was attended by officials of Europe, Canada, the Caribbean Basin, and the United States, the attorney general of Trinidad and Tobago spoke of "the direct nexus between illegal drugs and crimes of violence, sex crimes, domestic violence, maltreatment of children by parents, and other evils," and remarked that "aside from the very visible decimation of our societies caused by drug addiction and drug-related violence, there is another insidious evil: money laundering." Engagement Challenges Leaders in the Caribbean and the United States share a common assessment of the principal security concerns in the area: drugs, border disputes, poverty, corruption, natural disasters, illegal migration, insurgencies, and the environment. Consistent with this view, SOUTHCOM is focused on counterdrug operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. One basic challenge in redesigning policy or strategy is determining which instruments and modalities should be changed. Except for Cuba, engagement does not warrant revamping existing practices. Some things work well and should be retained; others do not and should be modified. This discussion addresses both types. Robert Pastor, who served on the National Security Council staff during the Carter administration, noted that Caribbean nations are too small and poor to directly challenge the United States. What really moved Washington was the threat of powerful adversaries from other parts of the world forging relationships in the area that facilitated the harassment of or attack on the United States or its neighbors. "When the threat diminishes," he remarked, "so does U.S. interest. That accounts for the apparent cycle between preoccupation at moments of intense geopolitical rivalry and neglect at times of geopolitical calm." Today's relative geopolitical calm justifies the concern of scholars and statesmen about the likelihood of a new phase of benign neglect or even worse. Hence it is important to highlight the challenge of staying engaged in both symbolic and substantive terms. Some years ago, the prime minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines declared: "We have to behave like Grenada or Fiji to get attention, and when we stop misbehaving we are left to languish in blissful obsecurity." Engagement demands flexibility and adaptability. For some missions, political expediency may require that nonmilitary personnel take the lead, or perhaps coastguardsmen as opposed to soldiers or marines. And flexibility and adaptability may be compromised by pushing the economy of force envelope too far. Also, engagement programs must not mistake silence for satisfaction. In addition, engagement requires the first team. U.S. leaders must not relegate decisionmaking to uninformed interns, junior staffers, or freshman bureaucrats. Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela are clearly hot spots that should be watched closely; but so must other countries. Guyana bears scrutiny because of resurgent territorial claims, the impact of that dispute on investment and development (especially because U.S. and Canadian investors are involved), the likelihood of political instability, and the influence of drug trafficking. Another concern is violent crime in Jamaica, some of which affects foreign tourists and investors. In addition, Jamaican organized crime poses transnational dangers to law enforcement and economic interests. Drug trafficking and economic deprivation could also lead to renewed political instability. The Dominican Republic faces issues of drug traffic, transnational crime, illegal migration, and political instability as that nation strives to translate rapid economic growth into less deprivation. The economy grew by 6.5 percent in 2000, 8.3 percent in 1999, and 7.3 percent in 1998, yet many Dominicans do not benefit from this wealth as some 20 percent of the country's 8.5 million people live in poverty. Puerto Rico also warrants attention. Although a domestic question for the United States, Vieques detracts from U.S. conflict resolution credibility. While Vieques is allegedly indispensable for Navy training, this issue highlights a troubling aspect of relations between the mainland and the island. Programs must operate on several tracks encompassing broad interagency activities. Multifaceted engagement is especially vital in counternarcotics efforts. Countermeasures must be multi-level--regional and international as well as national--because drug operations are transnational. Moreover, the measures must be implemented on a multiagency level to grapple with jurisdictional, legal, social, and economic issues precipitated by the drug problem. In addition to government agencies, a range of corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and international bodies such as the Organization of American States and the U.N. International Drug Control Program must play critical roles. Multilateral security measures do not preclude bilateralism. Indeed, such measures may be more politically expedient because they can be designed and executed faster. There may be budget incentives to act quickly. Moreover, in light of resource difficulties, a premium should be put on regulatory and operational aspects of interagency work to guard against turf and prestige battles. Whether it is an issue of drugs, territorial disputes, migrant flows, or the environment, engagement should be pursued on the basis of mutual interest. This is not always achievable. Sometimes even leaders of comparatively wealthy states, though partners, are unwilling to agree to collective efforts because of concern about their impact. Domestic factors such as political change and public opinion often make it difficult to honor or renew pledges. But despite such complications, leaders must not let the possibility of conflict undermine cooperation. There are high stakes for the United States in the Caribbean. The stakes are also high for the Caribbean countries. New defense and foreign policy initiatives may encourage effective engagement and investment of the resources to match the national interest in an area that represents a global crossroads and an essential element for regional stability.

### Relations key Caribbean stability

#### US/Cuba relations are key to effective Caribbean stability

Birns 13 (Larry – COHA Director, “Best Time for U.S.– Cuba Rapprochement Is Now”, 1/30, http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/)

The Obama Administration should be prepared to take, in quick progression, three important initial steps to trigger a speedy rapprochement with Cuba: immediately phase out the embargo, free the Cuban five, and remove Havana from the spurious State Department roster of nations purportedly sponsoring terrorism. These measures should be seen as indispensable if Washington is to ever mount a credible regional policy of mutual respect among nations and adjust to the increased ideological diversity and independence of the Latin American and Caribbean regions. Washington’s path towards an urgently needed rehabilitation of its hemispheric policy ought to also include consideration of Cuba’s own pressing national interests. A thaw in US—Cuba relations would enhance existing security cooperation between the countries, amplify trade and commercial ties, and guarantee new opportunities for citizens of both nations to build bridges of friendship and cooperation. For this to happen, the Obama Administration would have to muster the audacity to resist the anti-Castro lobby and their hardline allies in Congress, whose Cuba bashing has no limits. Nevertheless, it is time to replace belligerency with détente.

## Credibility

### Add-on – Obama Credibility

#### Cuba engagement is key to Obama’s credibility---reverses the perceived decline of US influence---solves multilateralism

Lieutenant Colonel Sergio M. Dickerson 2010 "United States Security Strategy Towards Cuba," Strategy Research Project, [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053)

**Conclusion**¶ Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.¶ If the Cuban model succeeds **President** Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism**.** **Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and** credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea **who might associate their plight with Cuba. 35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and** reverse its perceived decline **in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.**

#### Obama weakness causes global conflict

Ben Coes (a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration) September 30 2011“The disease of a weak president”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

Off case The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.¶ If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.¶ Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.¶ I wish it was that simple.¶ The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.¶ There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

## Topicality

### Economic Engagement = energy investment

#### economic engagement includes energy investment

Bradley Bosserman (Policy Analyst at NDN and the New Policy Institute) 2012 “Oil And Gas Account For 90% of US Imports from Middle East, US Should Diversify And Strengthen Economic Ties Following Arab Spring”, http://www.policymic.com/debates/6690/oil-and-gas-account-for-90-of-us-imports-from-middle-east-us-should-diversify-and-strengthen-economic-ties-following-arab-spring)

US policy should be directed intensely toward the development of human capital, democratic institutions, broad-based economic opportunities, and the entrepreneurial culture needed to support a vibrant and democratic political life through out the Middle East and North Africa. Elections are not enough. Not by a long shot. The UN’s Arab Development Report makes clear that the economic changes needed to support these democracies are, in fact, quite revolutionary themselves. Before the Arab Spring, the “dominant form of the social contract in the region [was] one where the population resigns itself to lack of political freedom in exchange for provision of certain services and exemption from or low taxation.” The hard work of changing this culture will be done in large part by local stakeholders, but needs to be supported by a holistic strategy of US economic engagement. Currently, Oil and gas account for over 90% of US imports from the region and US investment has been largely confined to the energy sector. Growing that economic relationship will be essential for addressing the fact that the next generation of Arab leaders and citizens have yet to realize the gains of globalization. Over 50% of the population in Arab countries is under the age of 30, yet they suffer the highest unemployment rate in the world, breeding discontent and frustration. Their energy needs to be channeled into productive economic opportunities so that they can support their families and develop a real stake is building and maintaining liberal, democratic societies.

### Economic Engagement = offshore drilling

#### Economic engagement includes cooperative offshore energy production – it’s predictable – the government includes it

Dan Sullivan (Former Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs) 2007 “Economic Engagement: Building the U.S.-Azerbaijan Relationship”, http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/2007/91369.htm

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SULLIVAN: Thank you very much Mr. Semed Seyidov for your kind introduction. Great to be back in Azerbaijan. Each time I visit Baku I feel the energy of a changing, growing and modernizing economy. I can actually see changes that have taken place since my last visit in February – new roads, bridges and buildings all around the city. Clearly Baku is taking its place as a key regional economic hub. The Azerbaijani economy is taking off, and the country’s oil and gas revenues have the potential to transform the country and the lives of the people here. The United States has deep and long-term interests in the Caspian region. We are committed particularly to helping ensure Azerbaijan’s prosperity, independence, and sovereignty. And we fully support President Aliyev’s commitment to making Azerbaijan a modern, secular, democratic, and market-oriented state. Azerbaijan’s key role in global energy security, our important cooperation on regional security, and the country’s strategic position as the natural gateway between Europe and Central Asia make it an essential partner for the United States. Over the past year, due in large part to the intensive efforts of our Ambassador and your officials, we have intensified our engagement with Azerbaijan across three critical areas: 1) democracy and democratic reform; 2) security cooperation; and 3) energy cooperation and economic reform. Now, my Bureau, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, I focus on the third area – energy and economic cooperation, but we it’s important to recognize that all three of these areas are absolutely very interconnected. We look for progress in all three because progress in each of these three areas reinforces progress in the others and we believe that these three areas moving forward will lead to lasting security, stability, and prosperity that all citizens desire and deserve. Energy Cooperation So let me first talk about the critical area of energy cooperation between our two countries. We have a well-established history of cooperation and trust in the field of energy. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline – which as you know, is one of the most modern, state of the art pipelines in the world – is a symbol and testament to that critical cooperation. Azerbaijan’s regional leadership was essential to bringing the BTC vision to reality. We are building on this tradition of close cooperation in the energy field. This past March, my boss at the State Department Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov signed a memorandum of understanding formally establishing the U.S.-Azerbaijan Energy Dialogue. I co-chair this Dialogue and we had very constructive meetings to further advance our common energy security goals in this area. What are these goals? Well, as we announced today, during the signing of a U.S. Trade and Development Agency grant that will go to SOCAR. We believe we are now embarked on the next stage of Caspian Energy development, which would entail a number of things: 1) enhanced production of oil and gas in Azerbaijan’s offshore sector; 2) continued natural gas exports to Georgia and Turkey, and initial exports to Greece and Italy; 3) further work on the Nabucco pipeline project, with Azerbaijan’s and perhaps Central Asia’s gas moving to markets in Central Europe, and 4) the emergence of Azerbaijan as an oil and gas transit country, as Azerbaijan continues its outreach to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan’s continued leadership will be essential to achieve these goals, as we continue cooperation between the U.S. and Azerbaijan, as well as working to deepen the cooperation between Azerbaijan and our European allies and the European Commission. The commencement of the next phase of Caspian energy development, we believe has already begun. As I mentioned, today we signed a rather large feasibility study to construct an oil and gas pipeline connecting Central Asia to Azerbaijan. This is a big and important step and it is the beginning of many good things to come in terms of the next phase of Caspian energy development. We believe the opportunities in this sector are great and can lead to lasting opportunity for the people of the region. Now is the time to seize these opportunities.

## Politics

### Shielding – executive action

#### Normal means is executive licensing – shields the link

Pascual and Huddleston 9 (Carlos – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy – the Brookings Institution, and Vicki – Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, April, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413\_cuba.pdf)

Given the strong sentiments and expectations that Cuba engenders, it would be preferable for the Executive Branch to proceed discreetly. The president might first announce the principles he hopes to achieve in Cuba through a policy of en - gagement that promotes human rights, the well- being of the Cuban people, and the growth of civil society. To carry out the president’s vision, the Secretary of the Treasury will then have the responsibility to write and publish the changes to the Cuban Assets Control regulations by licensing activities designed to achieve these ends. The Secretary of State can quietly accomplish many diplomatic initiatives on a reciprocal basis without any need to publicize them. This quiet diplomacy might be complemented by a refusal to engage in what some refer to as megaphone diplomacy, in which our governments trade in - sults across the Straits of Florida, and which only contributes to making the United States appear to be a bully.

#### The Treasury department can do the plan without congress – shields the link

Cave 12 (Damien – NYT, “Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, 11/19, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0)

In Washington, Mr. Gross is seen as the main impediment to an easing of the embargo, but there are also limits to what the president could do without Congressional action. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act conditioned the waiving of sanctions on the introduction of democratic changes inside Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act also requires that the embargo remain until Cuba has a transitional or democratically elected government. Obama administration officials say they have not given up, and could move if the president decides to act on his own. Officials say that under the Treasury Department’s licensing and regulation-writing authority, there is room for significant modification. Following the legal logic of Mr. Obama’s changes in 2009, further expansions in travel are possible along with new allowances for investment or imports and exports, especially if narrowly applied to Cuban businesses.

### Shielding – oil lobbies

#### oil loves the plan and lobby for it---determines Congressional sentiment

Sadowski 11 – Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, “IN THIS ISSUE: NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT: CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING: PREPARATION AND PREVENTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES' EMBARGO,” Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexis

A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba's offshore oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas. n29 Cupet, the state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves are double that of the U.S. estimate. n30 One estimate indicates that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day. n31 Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India. n32 Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves. n33 [\*38] Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S. investment and technology. n34 Finally, the concern over Cuban offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure and harms human rights.¶ ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN¶ For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. n35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes. n36 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures. n37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are, in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply" n38¶ This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates. n39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves. n40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock valuation. n41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States." n42

#### Drilling lobbyists support the plan – generates GOP support and shields the links

Kraus 10 (Clifford – NYT, “Drilling Plans Off Cuba Stir Fears of Impact on Gulf”, 9/30, http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=209452)

New Mexico’s governor, Bill Richardson, a Democrat who regularly visits Cuba, said Cuba’s offshore drilling plans are a “potential inroad” for loosening the embargo. During a recent humanitarian trip to Cuba, he said, he bumped into a number of American drilling contractors — “all Republicans who could eventually convince the Congress to make the embargo flexible in this area of oil spills.”

### Link turn – china hate

#### Anti-Chinese opposition generates GOP support

Bolstad 8 (Erika, “GOP claim about Chinese oil drilling off Cuba is untrue”, 6/11, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/06/11/40776/gop-claim-about-chinese-oil-drilling.html#.UZwkw8rSmp4)

Why, ask some Republicans, should the United States be thwarted from drilling in its own territory when just 50 miles off the Florida coastline the Chinese government is drilling for oil under Cuban leases? Yet no one can prove that the Chinese are drilling anywhere off Cuba's shoreline. The China-Cuba connection is "akin to urban legend," said Sen. Mel Martinez, a Republican from Florida who opposes drilling off the coast of his state but who backs exploration in ANWR. "China is not drilling in Cuba's Gulf of Mexico waters, period," said Jorge Pinon, an energy fellow with the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami and an expert in oil exploration in the Gulf of Mexico. Martinez cited Pinon's research when he took to the Senate floor Wednesday to set the record straight. Even so, the Chinese-drilling-in-Cuba legend has gained momentum and has been swept up in Republican arguments to open up more U.S. territory to domestic production. Vice President Dick Cheney, in a speech Wednesday to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, picked up the refrain. Cheney quoted a column by George Will, who wrote last week that "drilling is under way 60 miles off Florida. The drilling is being done by China, in cooperation with Cuba, which is drilling closer to South Florida than U.S. companies are." In his speech, Cheney described the Chinese as being "in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to higher prices means more supply." "But Congress says no to drilling in ANWR, no to drilling on the East Coast, no to drilling on the West Coast," Cheney added. The office of House Minority Leader John Boehner defended the GOP drilling claims. "A 2006 New York Times story highlights lease agreements negotiated between Cuba and China and the fact that China was planning to drill in the Florida Strait off the coast of Cuba," said spokesman Michael Steel. The China-Cuba connection also appeared in an editorial Monday in Investor's Business Daily, which wrote that "the U.S. Congress has voted consistently to keep 85 percent of America's offshore oil and gas off-limits, while China and Cuba drill 60 miles from Key West, Fla."

#### Err affirmative – Policymakers support the plan because of China – that outweighs the link

Franks 11 (Jeff, “China to play major role in Cuban oil development”, 6/8, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/cuba-china-oil-idUSN08140650201106)

The prospect of Cuban drilling has touched off opposition from Florida lawmakers who say it threatens the state's environment and helps the Cuban government so hated by many in Miami, the center of the Cuban exile community. They have filed bills in Washington attempting to thwart the drilling by punishing foreign companies and individuals who take part in Cuba's exploration. U.S. oil companies cannot work in Cuba due to the longstanding U.S. trade embargo against the island. Repsol representatives met with U.S. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar last week to assure him they have solid safety plans in place should there be a blowout like that at the BP well last year off the Louisiana coast. "It sounds as if the (U.S.) administration is trying to figure out how to work cooperatively with Repsol, and that is definitely in the U.S. national interest," said Cuba expert Phil Peters at the Lexington Institute think tank in Arlington, Virginia. "Florida wants high standards of environmental protection in the gulf and Florida also doesn't want the U.S. to talk to Cuba. You can't have it both ways," he said. Chinese involvement in Cuban waters would add a new element to the U.S. debate over relations with Cuba. Former Vice President Dick Cheney mistakenly said in 2008 that China was drilling in Cuban waters 60 miles (96 km) from Florida, and used it to argue the U.S. should step up its own drilling. But China's presence also might be used by lawmakers who want to justify a hard line against Cuba's exploration plans. In 2005, the Chinese National Offshore Corp. tried to buy California-based oil company Unocal, but there was strong opposition in the U.S. Congress on grounds of national security. CNOOC withdrew its bid and China learned a lesson, Pinon said. "China learned how sensitive this country is to China's activities," he said. "China is a good political whipping boy."

### Link turn – oil revenue

#### Only drilling in U.S. waters link-turns politics---the possibility of revenues being shared with states is key to bipart

Coral Davenport 13, energy & environment correspondent, National Journal, 2/5/13, “Breakthrough Nears on Tapping Offshore Energy Supply,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/breakthrough-nears-on-tapping-offshore-energy-supply-20130205

In a season of political gridlock, a breakthrough could be near on legislation to promote energy production off the nation’s coastlines.¶ A bipartisan energy bill now being crafted in the Senate could hit a sweet spot between expanding offshore oil and gas drilling, which many Republicans want, and creating incentives for new offshore wind and tidal power, which many Democrats want. **It could also create a** new source of revenue **for the nation’s 24 coastal states—a** tempting prospect **for many cash-strapped state governments**.¶ The bill is being written by Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, the top Republican on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, along with Democratic Sens. Mary Landrieuof Louisiana and Ron Wyden of Oregon, the new chairman the Senate Energy panel.¶ Energy has emerged in recent years as a hot-button political and economic issue, as the nation suffered from record-high gasoline prices in 2008, reeled from the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010, and clashed over how to tackle the controversial problem of climate change. But it’s been five years since Congress has actually passed a comprehensive energy bill. Indeed, the high-profile politicization of energy issues has often appeared to make it more difficult to actually write and pass energy policy.¶ The Murkowski-Landrieu-Wyden bill has the potential break that logjam—and to allow both Democrats and Republicans to actually claim that they are moving an “all-of-the-above” energy bill. Both sides spent 2012 touting that energy slogan on the campaign trail.¶ The new bill relies on an old idea with some fresh tweaks. **Its central proposal is to allow coastal states to receive a share of the money generated when energy—of any kind—is produced in federally owned waters off their shores.** Currently, with one exception, when an oil or gas company drills offshore in federal waters, it must pay a hefty 18.75 percent of the value of the fuel that it produces to the federal government. Last year, offshore drilling royalties sent $5.2 billion flowing to the Treasury.¶ In 2006, Landrieu sponsored a bill that would have opened up new portions of the Gulf of Mexico for drilling and sent 37.5 percent of the money set aside for the U.S. government to Gulf Coast states instead of the Treasury. The idea was that the money would be used to help the Gulf Coast rebuild and restore its coastal wetlands after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina.¶ Now Landrieu and Murkowski, whose own home state also relies heavily on the oil industry, **want to apply that revenue-sharing formula to the entire U.S. coastline.** The idea is that it would create an alluring incentive for states to open up their coasts for drilling, knowing that along with oil and gas rigs, they’d get a new revenue stream — as much as an estimated $500 million a year. There has actually long been strong bipartisan support in Congress for the idea of revenue-sharing. In 2006, Landrieu’s bill passed the Senate on an overwhelming vote of 71-25.¶ For years, the biggest obstacle to revenue-sharing legislation was former Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., who retired from Congress last year. Bingaman fiercely opposed revenue-sharing as a concept that would divert much-needed federal revenue to state coffers.¶ But Wyden, the new Energy chairman, hails from a coastal state that could benefit from the proposal. His idea is to write the bill in such a way that it would also promote renewable energy and environmental conservation. It would allow states to take in a percentage of revenue from generating electricity with offshore wind farms, and it would set aside a portion of that money for environmental restoration and conservation.¶ **“There’s an opportunity to** knit together a coalition **of people interested in federal lands and federal waters, of people interested in job creation and protecting the environment**,” Wyden told National Journal.

### Link turn – olive branch

#### Obama PC fails now---action on OCS drilling’s a key olive branch that generates GOP support for other priorities like immigration

CSM 1-20 – Christian Science Monitor, 1/20/13, “Obama’s second term: Can he work with Congress? (+video),” http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0120/Obama-s-second-term-Can-he-work-with-Congress-video

“The president has been criticized by many people for his inability or unwillingness to spend a lot of time stroking members of Congress,” says Ross Baker, a congressional historian at Rutgers University who is writing a book on bipartisanship in the US Senate. “I think a lot of this is based upon the widely-accepted theory [that the] power of a presidency is the power to persuade – which is perfectly plausible, and it was certainly plausible in the 1950s.... The problem is, there are no persuadables" today. ¶ But by focusing on issues of common ground with the GOP, Washington could generate some bipartisan successes in the next four years. ¶ Immigration and Energy¶ For one, the president could team up with Republican moderates and much of the party’s leadership on immigration reform. ¶ “We believe that immigration reform is different in that it has a past, present, and future of bipartisan support,” said Ali Noorani, executive director of the National Immigration Forum. “What we’ve seen over the last two years is conservatives, moderates, and liberals want this president and this Congress to act, and that’s different from any other issue.” ¶ And the president could perhaps turn down the bellicosity on the Hill by working with some of his loudest critics (though risking the ire of environmentalists in his political base) in one area that the deeply-red right and the president could agree: energy policy. ¶ “We were encouraged by President Obama’s 2012 campaign comments supporting an all-of-the-above agenda on energy, and his statements outlining support for oil and natural gas,” said Jack Gerard, president of the American Petroleum Institute, the oil and gas industry’s powerful trade association, in his annual State of American Energy address in Washington earlier this month. ¶ But Republicans rage about a disconnect between what the president and members of his administration say they favor and what Republicans say is foot-dragging in building the Keystone XL pipeline, exporting natural gas, or freeing up more offshore areas for energy exploration. If the president were to get behind any of these initiatives he’d likely have plenty of GOP support – but that remains a large “if.”

### A2 cuba lobby – it’s weak sauce

#### Cuba lobby weak – it’s all a bluff

William LeoGrande 4/21/2013 “The Cuban Chill”,

http://www.registerguard.com/rg/opinion/29740770-78/cuba-lobby-policy-china-political.html.csp

Likewise, the Cuba Lobby has blocked a sensible policy toward Cuba for half a century, with growing damage to U.S. relations with Latin America. When a courageous U.S. president finally decides to defy the Cuba Lobby with a stroke as bold as Nixon’s trip to China, she or he will discover that the Cuba Lobby no longer has the political clout it once had. The strategic importance of repairing the United States’ frayed relations with Latin America has come to outweigh the political risk of reconciliation with Havana.

## Drilling Disads

### Plan solves it

#### Cuban drilling is inevitable—only the plan allows for safe drilling that prevents spills

Stephens et al 11 (Sarah, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba\_Drilling\_and\_US\_Policy.pdf)

This year Cuba and its foreign partners will begin drilling for oil in the Gulf of Mexico. Drilling will take place as close as 50 miles from Florida and in sites deeper than BP’s Macondo well, where an explosion in April 2010 killed 11 workers and created the largest oil spill ever in American waters. Undiscovered reserves of approximately 5 billion barrels of oil and 9 trillion cubic feet of natural gas lie beneath the Gulf of Mexico in land belonging to Cuba, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, although Cuba’s estimates contain higher figures. The amount actually recoverable remains to be seen.¶ Finding oil in commercially viable amounts would be transformative for Cuba. Revenues from natural resource wealth have the potential to provide long-sought stability for Cuba’s economy and are likely to significantly alter its relations with Venezuela and the rest of Latin America, Asia and other leading energy producing and consuming nations. Discoveries of commercially viable resources would also have an enormous impact upon the Gulf environment shared by Cuba and the United States. ¶ The U.S. embargo against Cuba, a remnant of the Cold War, is an obstacle to realizing and protecting our interests in the region. Not only does it prohibit U.S. firms from joining Cuba in efforts to extract its offshore resources, thus giving the competitive advantage to other foreign firms, but it also denies Cuba access to U.S. equipment for drilling and environmental protection—an especially troubling outcome in the wake of the disastrous BP spill. The embargo compels Cuba’s foreign partners to go through contortions—such as ordering a state of the art drilling rig built in China and sailing it roughly 10,000 miles to Cuban waters—to avoid violating the content limitations imposed by U.S. law. ¶ Most important, due to the failed policy of isolating Cuba, the United States cannot engage in meaningful environmental cooperation with Cuba while it develops its own energy resources. Our government cannot even address the threat of potential spills in advance from the frequent hurricane activity in the Gulf or from technological failures, either of which could put precious and environmentally sensitive U.S. coastal assets—our waters, our fisheries, our beaches—at great peril. ¶ The risks begin the moment the first drill bit pierces the seabed, and increase from there. Yet, our policy leaves the Obama administration with limited options: ¶ • It could do nothing. ¶ • It could try to stop Cuba from developing its oil and natural gas, an alternative most likely to fail in an energy-hungry world, or¶ • It could agree to dialogue and cooperation with Cuba to ensure that drilling in the Gulf protects our mutual interests. ¶ Since the 1990s, Cuba has demonstrated a serious commitment to protecting the environment, building an array of environmental policies, some based on U.S. and Spanish law. But it has no experience responding to major marine-based spills and, like our country, Cuba has to balance economic and environmental interests. In this contest, the environmental side will not always prevail. ¶ Against this backdrop, cooperation and engagement between Cuba and the United States is the right approach, and there is already precedent for it.¶ During the BP crisis, the U.S. shared information with Cuba about the spill. The administration publicly declared its willingness to provide limited licenses for U.S. firms to respond to a catastrophe that threatened Cuba. It also provided visas for Cuban scientists and environmental officials to attend an important environmental conference in Florida. For its part, Cuba permitted a vessel from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to look for damage in Cuban waters. But these modest measures, however welcome, are not sufficient, especially in light of Cuba’s imminent plans to drill. ¶ Under the guise of environmental protection, Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Vern Buchanan, Members of the U.S. Congress from Florida, introduced bills to impose sanctions on foreign oil companies and U.S. firms that help Cuba drill for oil, and to punish those foreign firms by denying them the right to drill in U.S. waters. This legislation would penalize U.S. firms and anger our allies, but not stop Cuba from drilling, and will make the cooperation to protect our mutual coastal environment more difficult should problems occur.¶ Energy policy and environmental protection are classic examples of how the embargo is an abiding threat to U.S. interests. It should no longer be acceptable to base U.S. foreign policy on the illusion that sanctions will cause Cuba’s government to collapse, or to try to stop Cuba from developing its oil resources. Nor should this policy or the political dynamic that sustains it prevent the U.S. from addressing both the challenges and benefits of Cuba finding meaningful amounts of oil in the Gulf of Mexico. ¶ The path forward is clear. The Obama administration should use its executive authority to guarantee that firms with the best equipment and greatest expertise are licensed in advance to fight the effects of an oil spill. The Treasury Department, which enforces Cuba sanctions, should make clear to the private sector that efforts to protect drilling safety will not be met with adverse regulatory actions. The U.S. government should commit to vigorous information sharing with Cuba, and open direct negotiations with the Cuban government for environmental agreements modeled on cooperation that already exists with our Canadian and Mexican neighbors.¶ Most of all, the administration should replace a policy predicated on Cuba failing with a diplomatic approach that recognizes Cuba’s sovereignty. Only then will our nation be able to respond effectively to what could become a new chapter in Cuba’s history and ours.¶ There is little time and much to do before the drilling begins.

### Spills inevitable

#### Spills are inevitable---regulations fail

Nerurkar & Sullivan 11 (Neelesh Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf)

Oil Spill Risks29

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico heightened concerns over the potential of an oil spill in Cuban waters and the risk such a spill could affect Florida’s waters and coastal areas.30 As noted above, Repsol’s current plans for drilling in Cuba fall within about 55 to 60 miles south of Key West, Florida. Were an oil spill to occur in these areas, it could have environmental impacts in the United States. Oil can be spilled from acute exploration and production accidents, through longer-term discharge from operations, or through transportation accidents, such as a tanker collision or pipeline rupture. ¶ Risks of a Spill in Cuban Waters ¶ The U.S. agency in charge of enforcing safety and environmental regulations on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, including oil spill response, is the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). In addition, several statutes, including the Clean Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act, establish a liability regime for oil spills. Offshore exploration and production operations in non-U.S. waters may not be governed by analogous regulations or fall under a liability structure that creates an incentive to minimize oil spills. Since the Repsol project is only the second deepwater well to be drilled in Cuba’s EEZ, Cuban officials are in the process of developing and implementing up-to-date regulations to prevent offshore drilling accidents and contingency plans to address accidents if they do occur.31 They have pledged to follow the highest international environmental and safety standards, and have expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with the United States and other countries on safety measures.32 However, as the recent U.S. experience in the Gulf of Mexico illustrates, even the long-time existence of regulations and regulator may not always prevent an oil spill.

### Drilling ineviatable

#### Tons of offshore drilling now

Michael Conathan 12, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, spent five years staffing the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation’s Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, master’s degree in marine affairs from the University of Rhode Island, 2/29/12, “More Drilling Won’t Lower Gas Prices,” <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/02/29/11091/more-drilling-wont-lower-gas-prices/>

As fundamental as the law of supply and demand might be to macroeconomic theory, the on-the-ground reality is that more drilling will not lower gas prices. Here’s why:¶ It hasn’t worked yet. There are currently more oil rigs operating on U.S. lands and waters than in the rest of the world combined, production is at an eight-year high, and the most recent “Short-Term Energy Outlook” from the Energy Information Administration projects production to continue growing at least through 2013 based on current activity. By the end of President Obama’s recently issued five-year drilling plan, fully 75 percent of our undiscovered, technically recoverable offshore reserves will be open to drilling. All that additional activity hasn’t stemmed the recent gas price spike.

### Ocean resilient

#### \*\*\*only read these cards if you ARE NOT reading the environment ADV

#### Oceans resilient

Kennedy 2 - Environmental science prof, Maryland. Former Director, Cooperative Oxford Laboratory. PhD. (Victor, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm)

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.

#### Marine life resilient

Dulvy 3 – Professor of Marine Science and Technology, Newcastle (Nicholas, Extinction vulnerability in marine populations, Fish and Fisheries 4.1)

Marine fish populations are more variable and resilient than terrestrial populations Great natural variability in population size is sometimes invoked to argue that IUCN Red List criteria, as one example, are too conservative for marine fishes (Hudson and Mace1996; Matsuda et al.1997; Musick 1999; Powles et al. 2000; Hutchings 2001a). For the (1996) IUCN list, a decline of 20% within 10 years or three generations (whichever is longer) triggered a classification of 'vulnerable', while declines of 50 and 80% led to classifications of 'endangered' and 'critically endangered', respectively. These criteria were designed to be applied to all animal and plant taxa, but many marine resource biologists feel that for marine fishes 'one size does not fit all' (see Hutchings 2001a). They argue that percent decline criteria are too conservative compared to the high natural variability of fish populations. Powles et al. (2000) cite the six-fold variation of the Pacific sardine population (Sardinopssagax, Clupeidae) and a nine-fold variation in northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax, Clupeidae) over the past two millennia to suggest that rapid declines and increases of up to 10-fold are relatively common inexploitedfish stocks. It should, however, be borne in mind that the variation of exploited populations must be higher than unexploited populations because recruitment fluctuations increasingly drive population fluctuations when there are few adults (Pauly et al. 2002).